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FREE WORLD

A Monthly Magazine

devoted to

Democracy and World Affairs

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Colored Cavalry

First of all
They rode in the parade.

Twelve men abreast they came,
A flood of clattering hoofs and glittering sabres,
Of nodding heads and gleaming bridles,
A moving wall of men.
Motionless they sat in their saddles,
One *row of fists around the hilts,*
One *row of bluish-black faces under the caps,*
Stiff from awe,
Sweating in streams from sincerity and sunheat,
Shine on shine,
The eyes toward one invisible goal:
To keep the line straight,
Straightest of all the lines.

On they rode, on,
Rigid as statues in their saddles.

They don't ride for programs and principles.
Perhaps they did not read the Atlantic Charter
And never were told about the people's war.
They ride for their own folks,
For Negroes standing with wet eyes in the lining crowds,
Making signs to one who does not see,
For wrinkled mothers listening in filthy backyards,
Nodding in pride when the hoof clatter passes.
They ride for themselves,
For the things they have won,
For the rights in it and the promise in it:
For their polished shoulder straps,
Their heavy sabres and shining saddles,
For their place in the line of those willing to die,
The straight line just behind the general,
The place in the line of equals.

On they ride, on,
Unbreakably in line,
And the street runs in waves under their hoofs.

These are our men.
They don't understand our words,
Don't share our memories.
But just the same, they fight the people's war.
One *thing they have grasped through the humming of inanities,*
One thing, the kernel of all.
The vanguard are they for uncounted millions
Who wordlessly sigh in their thousand languages
For the same simple justice;
Shock troops
For a life they were never allowed to live,
And which they are going to realize for a world.
The waves break in these squadrons
Of an ocean on march,
And whatever rises against them
Shall be ground to dust under their hoofs
And shall never have existed.
On they ride, on,
Toward a day they know,
When again they are riding down these streets,
Between the lining crowds,
Twelve men abreast, unbreakably in line,
With broad smiles on shining faces
And with freedom on the point of their sabres,
Our *freedom and* theirs.
And the world shall realize
That it never knew before
What is joy.

Sigmund Skard

EDITORIAL

THE forthcoming negotiations between the United States and Soviet Russia, which we may expect as a result of the Roosevelt-Eden-Hull conferences and the "95 per cent agreement," bid fair to be of the utmost importance both in the conduct of the war and the framing of the peace. To be sure, at this time the Russians seem to be solely interested in military operations, and particularly in a Western invasion of Europe. The natural impatience of the Russian people to end, or at least to mitigate, the suffering and destruction which they have undergone, has taken concrete shape in the demand for an Allied offensive which will divert sixty or more nazi divisions from the eastern front and thereby permit the Russian armies to drive the invader from their soil. This eagerness to see military operations begun in Western Europe is shared equally by the other European nations, who are paying with the lives of thousands of men and women for each day of nazi occupation.

It is fortunate, therefore, that the American representatives will be able to make some definite commitments in the matter of a general offensive against "Fortress Europe." Though while these lines are being written Tunis and Bizerte are still formidable obstacles to the complete liberation of Africa, the liquidation of the nazi forces may be expected in the very near future. This will release a substantial army of veterans for offensive action. It will open the lines of communication between America and "the underbelly of Europe." It will, in brief, enable the Allied forces to establish the long-awaited Second Front in the West.

With the military situation assured, the Russian representatives at the conference will certainly be in a better mood to discuss the question of the future. They will realize that Russian commitment on these questions is as vitally necessary in the interest of future peace and security as Allied assurances in the matter of a Second Front. It is reasonable to expect that the four great powers of the United Nations will reach some agreement. This will naturally cover only the essential principles and will do no more than lay the foundations for those specific obligations which each of these major partners in the United Nations must assume in establishing a system of collective security through the creation of a world organization. Yet agreement on these basic principles will in itself further the elimination of minor differences and the solution of secondary problems. Upon the establishment of a world organization with power to uphold and enforce international law, boundary conflicts and other territorial questions will be settled by arbitration, plebiscites, and mutual agreement.

But beyond the immediate territorial conflicts lie the great problems of world reconstruction: the creation of satisfactory economic conditions for all peoples, the protection of nations from fascist rule, whether internal or external. A solution to these questions far exceeds the competence and powers of the Big Four of the United Nations. The solutions can be reached

only if the United Nations remain the organism that was originally conceived—an organization of free and equal nations, and not a Directory of the four big powers. Mutual confidence and understanding, culminating in the complete unity of the four powers, are essential to the success of the United Nations; but the full participation of all the other members in the direction of the affairs of the world is equally necessary. This war, more than any other, is being fought to establish freedom, equality, and justice; and however powerful the four big nations may be at its close, it would constitute a betrayal of these principles to end this war with a Directory. More important, it would be futile—as all previous attempts to dominate the world have proved futile.

It is only fair to say that nothing official has been done by any of the governments of the four great powers to justify the belief that such a Directory is contemplated by them. There are, however, strong and influential elements which are known to favor this development, and it is for them as well as for the people of the Democracies that a warning is necessary. The preservation of peace, the solution of the vital economic and political problems which have caused wars in the past are dependent on the creation of a world organization based on the principles of freedom, equality, and justice. Obviously, for a long time there will be a functional inequality in this organization; particularly during the transition and reconstruction period, the major powers will have to shoulder the major responsibilities. But this functional leadership must not be confused with permanent control. One need only point to the experience of the League of Nations to justify opposition to a Directory. There the successive abandonment by the smaller powers of the League ideal was due to the growing belief that Geneva was merely an instrument in the hands of France and Great Britain.

These aspects in the development of the United Nations will receive particular consideration upon the arrival of Dr. Eduard Benes, who as President of the Czechoslovak Republic will come as an official guest to this country. The presence of one whose name is associated with the principles of collective security, freedom, and democracy is both welcome and necessary. Americans have a special sense of kinship with the Czechoslovak Republic, which alone of all the nations created from the dismembered Austro-Hungarian Empire resisted fascist tendencies. Under the guidance of Masaryk and Benes and with the enthusiastic support of the vast majority of its people, Czechoslovakia served as a living bridge between Western democracy and Eastern Europe until the day when it was betrayed and abandoned in Munich.

Now Dr. Benes comes to America not merely as the leader of his own people, but as the representative of the smaller countries and one of the chief protagonists of the ideals of the United Nations. He can make a great contribution to the future of the world, and more particularly to the United States and Russia, if his services are utilized in the coming negotiations. The United Nations must recognize that the character and extent of a man's contribution to the common cause cannot be measured by his nationality or by the size of the country of which he is the head. Those, like Dr. Benes, who have given proof of their wisdom and statesmanship, must be called to the leadership of the United Nations in order that the entire world may benefit thereby.

Principles Not Personalities

IT is a great injustice to Generals de Gaulle and Giraud to degrade their differences to a question of personal ambition. The situation is not helped at all by those who call De Gaulle ambitious, as the *New York Times* did recently. On the contrary, it justifies the impression that he is being attacked now because he has so completely adopted the democratic principles of France. Obviously, if no more were involved in the differences of these two men than a struggle of two generals for power, those of us who view the French problem in the large would not concern ourselves with either man. The fact is that in these differences lies the fate of France rather than the future of either individual.

Long before General Giraud appeared on the scene in North Africa, we insisted that the leaders of the Free French movement must assert their unqualified support of the French Republic and her great democratic tradition. In so far as General de Gaulle showed Rightist or reactionary tendencies, we opposed him. And we welcomed the increasing collaboration between the French National Committee, of which he was the chief, and the French Underground movement, which represented the vast majority of the French people. Recent events have established complete co-operation between De Gaulle and the French Underground, as the result of which De Gaulle has unqualifiedly adopted a democratic policy. In fact, it may be said that now General de Gaulle has a clear mandate from the Underground movement to represent it in the Council of the United Nations. He is thus bound to oppose those whom the French people consider traitors to their nation and to their political principles. He cannot, without betraying the thousands who have been imprisoned and enslaved and murdered, join forces with the men who constituted the pro-fascist regime of Pétain and Laval and supported the tyranny of Hitler. He must insist that Giraud eliminate from his entourage all those who were responsible for collaboration with the Nazis, even though these men may now be ready to accept him as their chief.

The position of General Giraud is equally clear. He personally has not been compromised by collaboration with Hitler. At the risk of his own life he has given testimony to his opposition to the Nazis. But there has been too little evidence that he is loyal to the democratic ideals of France, despite his recent proclamation in favor of the French Republic. He has made concessions to the pro-fascist elements in France by maintaining Vichy-ites in civil and military positions of the utmost importance, and by the abrogation of the Crémieux decree, of which Mr. Torrès writes elsewhere in this issue. There is good reason to believe that this act is dictated by the desire to disfranchise the Jews at the first election in Algiers in order to lessen the democratic vote. Whatever the reasons may be, it is clear that there still remains an ideological gap in the political conceptions of the two men which can only be bridged by concrete acts on the part of General Giraud.

However much French unity may be desired, it is to the interest of the United Nations and of the future of the world that this unity be not imposed by sacrificing democratic principles. A democratic France is indispensable in the reconstruction of a peaceful Europe, for a democratic France will

serve as a rallying point for all the progressive forces on the Continent. On the other hand, a reactionary, chauvinistic regime in France would encourage reactionary tendencies in every nation of Europe; it will sow the seeds for another and even more disastrous world war. Perhaps this development is not being taken into account by those who are so ready to envisage the end of France as a great power and as the center of democratic forces. But those who recognize the relation between the French Republic, re-established with all her past power and influence as a democratic force, and the future of civilization will continue to support the uncompromising stand taken by General de Gaulle.

The Kuomintang Declaration

THE declaration adopted at the last session of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang is of the utmost significance to an understanding of the attitude of the Chinese people. Although very carefully worded in order not to display the slightest dissatisfaction with the actions of the Allies, it nevertheless clearly deplores the fact that the task of freeing the ten provinces of China which are now occupied by the enemy has been left to the unaided effort of the Chinese forces.

Expressing sincere satisfaction and gratitude to America and Great Britain for the abrogation of the extraterritorial rights and concessions, the declaration asserts that now China will have to assume the role of a stabilizing factor in the Far East, a role which will enable her to participate effectively in the reconstruction of Asia. The Chinese concept of reconstruction does not include any aims for conquest or territorial expansion—as Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has so clearly stated in reference to Thailand. It envisages a political order, however, which will be more just to the peoples of Asia, and it does not hesitate to say that China will fight for a just order.

But perhaps the most significant feature of the declaration is its appeal to the Chinese Government to seek the co-operation of all Chinese citizens, provided "they sincerely support the doctrine of Sun Yat-sen, resist Axis aggression, and respect the law." The statement is specific in its application to all Chinese citizens, irrespective of their political doctrines and of their past activities. This appeal clearly implies that the Chinese Communists are included, while it excludes the followers of the Nanking puppet regime.

Altogether, the declaration confirms the political stability of the Chungking Government. It is a reminder that in the political field such omissions as the one in Mr. Churchill's recent speech may not be repeated. China and the other Asiatic nations are particularly sensitive at this time, and any indication of discriminatory policy is bound to have serious repercussions. Fortunately, Mr. Eden was able to correct Mr. Churchill's omission quickly and magnanimously. He has thus reassured those who hold that China's presence on an equal basis with the other powers is indispensable to the realization of a true United Nations. Similar assurance is necessary that, however great the urgency of the European front, the vital role of China in the defeat of Japan will not be ignored and that help to the utmost will be given her in the struggle.

What Price FREEDOM?

by Ralph Barton Perry

IT is important to recognize that the world of peace and freedom which we of the United Nations have set out to create cannot be proved to be the route to every destination which a man or nation may choose. Men who prefer plunder to trade, or violence to peace, or domination to fraternity, or quick gains to long-range prosperity, or the good of the part to the good of the whole, cannot be expected to join our ranks, unless they are made to; and they cannot be made to, unless there are enough of the opposite mind to create the necessary force. Justice is not a mere enlightened injustice; and unjust men cannot be brought into line with justice unless just men rule. If in the name of justice we promise men the fruits of injustice, we may deceive them for a time, but they will find us out and turn upon us.

We must not rest the new world order upon a fraud, even a fraud designed to bring reinforcements to the side of the good. It would be a mistake to promise the brigand that the best way to secure the rewards of brigandage is to obey the Ten Commandments. Even if he were momentarily persuaded, he would make an unreliable ally. And that goes for every lesser form of narrow self-seeking. The champions of justice and humanity can promise good to the just and the humane, but it is a distinct kind of good, preferred only by those who relish it. To enjoy that good it is necessary to renounce other goods. Only those recruits can be counted on who have counted and accepted that cost.

Once this is recognized we can afford to recognize the further fact that the cost of justice in terms of narrower goods is diminishing. The gap between self-seeking and humanity grows smaller and smaller. There is less and less to be gained by selfishness even in its own terms. To an increasing extent the good of any man, or the satisfaction of any interest of any man, is dependent on the goods and satisfactions of every other man. To some this signifies the emergence of the plan of creation, the world having been originally so designed as to make the goods of all creatures reciprocal. To others it signifies a recent change in the conditions of human life brought about by natural causes. For the purpose of the present argument it does not matter which alternative is accepted. In either case the difference between the present situation and that which has prevailed throughout the greater part of human history is the cumulative effect of the advance of science and its technological applications.

The effect of this advance, broadly speaking, is to make men less dependent on their local physical environment. Man has become more mobile and more resourceful. He has departed more and more from the condition of the vegetable, which is rooted to one spot and limited to the pre-existing conditions of life with which it is in immediate contact. The powers of locomotion and manipulation which distinguish the animal from the vegetable have been steadily enlarged by that utilization of tools which distinguishes man from other animals. Using first his own two feet, and thereafter the horse, the sailing ship, the steam vehicle, the automobile, and finally

the airplane, man has learned how to remove himself from one part of the earth's surface to another with increasing ease and speed. By the same improved means he can transport material goods. Satisfied at first to transport his written word, like his body and his commodities, at ever increasing speeds, he has recently learned to send the unwritten word by vibrations around the world in a time which now approaches zero. The result of these changes is to annihilate distance and bring all men into a closeness of contact that was once confined to groups inhabiting the same locality.

At the same time through irrigation, fertilization, industrialization, chemical synthesis, and mass production man has become less and less dependent upon the natural resources that lie ready at hand. What he lacks he can make. He is no longer dependent even upon local forms of power. Drawing upon the total resources of the earth's surface, breaking them down and recombining them, he can create material goods wherever he is, in accordance with the growing complexity of his interests, and on a scale commensurate with the volume of his needs.

These two changes, mobility and resourcefulness, reinforce one another. Man employs his increased resourcefulness to multiply his instruments of motion, and employs his mobility to bring himself and his resources together at whatever place and time he may choose. Man still remains a finite being, subject to the fatalities of birth and death, and dependent on his general natural environment. But both his habitation and his possessions have become global, rather than rooted, domestic, parochial, rural, urban, insular, or national. The change has occurred so rapidly that he has not had time to become regional, continental, or hemispherical before even these boundaries have become obsolete. Threads of connection now reach out from each individual man and group to the extremities of the earth—threads of communication, travel, transport, trade.

Whether they like it or not, men now belong to a world domain, a world society, and a world economy. They can no longer suffer from, or profit by, aloofness. No man can say that any of his interests—his life, his security, his ambition, his prosperity, his vocation—are independent of those of any of his fellowmen, anywhere. The aggregate of mankind are bound, even by the most sordid self-interest, to pool their resources, combine their efforts, and take account of one another. The great outstanding problem which hangs on the issue of the present war is the creation of a political and moral solidarity that shall parallel man's other solidarities. The world domain, the world society, and the world economy are already historic facts. In space, communication, and resources there is already one all-comprehensive group of men living together on one continuous and narrow surface. Shall these also be one world polity and one moral world community?

II

POLITICS and morals are the arts by which men solve their problem of living together. This problem is now raised to global dimensions. The first step toward its solution is to recognize that this problem is created, and not solved, by mere proximity. If men's lives did not touch one another, and act and react upon one another, there would be no problem; or only the comparatively simple problem of getting along with oneself and one's God. When thrust into one another's presence men may, for the first time, have rivals and enemies. The several goods they seek bring them into collision with one another. They then have three options. They may treat one another as enemies, and destroy one another; or one may subjugate another; or they may become friends. Mere proximity and interdependence do not prescribe which of these courses shall be chosen.

The first world institution to get itself established was world war—in which rivalry and the combative emotions have divided men into two gigantic armed camps. Since the first world war was in fact succeeded by a second, more terrible than the first, and despite the lessons of the first, it cannot be said to be impossible that the second shall be succeeded, after a brief period of recuperation, by a third. It is not fantastic to imagine that when the terrestrial epic is finally written, it will tell how the members of the human race, pos-

sessing something of divine knowledge, but too little of divine pity or justice, destroyed themselves because their inventive brains created a situation in which they could not escape from one another.

To escape the effects of global anarchy men look in one or the other of two directions—world dominion, or a world-wide order of peace and freedom, based on justice. The first of these alternatives is not impossible. The same technological changes which have brought men together can be used for the purpose of a new and greater tyranny than history has previously known. He who controls the machines of communication and production can anticipate and stamp out resistance. The proximity and interdependence of men throughout the world can be used for their exploitation by a small group of unscrupulous men heading up in one superior leader of their own "party." Such a modern and global tyrant will have all the riches of the earth at his command, and all of mankind as his lieutenants or servants.

The remaining alternative, to which we of the United Nations are committed—by hope, by faith, and by endeavor—is to extend to all mankind the system of joint partnership which has from time to time been achieved in varying degrees on a lesser scale in those societies which we call "democratic." This is what *we* are determined to make of man's new global solidarity. We see in that solidarity both a new threat of evil and a new possibility of good. Men are at the parting of the ways when in order to escape an unprecedented danger of destruction or slavery they must boldly seize an unprecedented opportunity of peace and freedom.

The more "practical" adherents of world order, to whom morality and piety are forms of weakness or sentimentality, accept the actual changes which modern technology has brought about in the condition of human life, and then appeal to any given individual in terms of his own private danger or his own hopes of private gain. And such is now the degree of human proximity and interdependence that such an appeal is in the great majority of cases a valid and warranted appeal. It is true of almost any given man alive today that his own personal advantage or that of his family, class, or nation is to be found in the establishment of a new organization of world affairs founded on justice and international law. It is true of almost any man that his chance of physical safety and security, his opportunity of livelihood, vocation, and personal development is enhanced by the creation of a world order that will bestow similar benefits on all men everywhere. It is right and proper that this appeal should be made, and it is doubtful if a sufficient support for the new order could be obtained without this appeal to enlightened self-interest.

But it is also true that this appeal carries no weight with men or groups whose interest is identified with differential advantages. If a man desires power *over* others, wealth *at the expense* of others, social position which *excludes* others, or any other form of special privilege which will enable him to enjoy a sense of superiority, then this appeal will be wasted upon him. If he holds to this selfish interest, enlightenment may well teach him to side with the enemy. It is true that in such a choice he will incur risks; but he is justified in taking them, especially if he enjoys taking risks. To convert him it is necessary to alter his self-interest so that it will coincide with that larger self-interest which coincides with the general interest. Or, he must shift the center from which he approaches the problems of life from "I," or from some narrower "we" of party, class, or nation, to a broader "we" which voices the needs and hopes of all mankind.

All that can be certainly claimed for a political world order is that it will give the maximum of security to *everybody*. All that can be certainly claimed for a world economy is that it is an optimum economy, which provides the fullest measure of material goods and the maximum utilization of the earth's resources for *everybody*. All that can be certainly claimed for a world society is that it creates for *everybody* the largest opportunity of developing human potentialities through intercourse with the physical and social environment. The world order of peace and freedom founded on justice, is the best for everybody; and it can be guaranteed to be the best for *anybody* only in so far as he adopts the good of everybody as his means or as his end.

Men are distinguished from plants and animals by the fact that their destiny is governed by their own judgment. They are expelled from the nursery of mother nature and must shift for themselves. It is this which gives grandeur to human life, but it is also this which creates its peculiar hazards, burdens, and bestiality. This is why human life points to high heaven or to the depths of hell. The present phase of history is man's greatest ordeal. He may perish from his passion, his blindness, and his selfishness: or he may save himself by his intelligence and good will.

To save himself man must have moral courage—not brute force, but patience, skill, imagination, intelligence, steadfastness, and fellow feeling. The way of failure is easy, the way of success is hard. To live justly with one's fellowman is harder than to fight or dominate him. It is easier to get on with a domestic animal than with one's wife or brother or neighbor. Slavery is easier for the slaveholder than is free labor for the employer—it requires physical strength but makes little demand upon his magnanimity or intelligence. It is easier to be an Oriental despot than the president of a modern democracy: the head lies easier. It is easier to make mistakes than to avoid them; it is easier to yield to the passions than to control them. It is easier to wrangle and dispute than to agree and co-operate.

At this time when we admire physical courage and endurance on the battlefield and rally to the slogan of the enemy's "unconditional surrender," it is well to remember that other courage—the courage required for a just peace as well as for a just war, the courage to face and overcome the forces of moral inertia which retard man's ascent to decency, civilization, and piety, and threaten to drop him into the pit of destruction. We can lose the war by timidity and irresolution, as well as by ignorance and lack of foresight. We can also lose the peace by moral defeatism, scepticism, and irresolution. We shall not lapse into peace and freedom by evasion, but we can achieve them if we put our heads together and support them with an alliance of bold hearts.

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THE PROPHECY OF PRESIDENT BENES

IN welcoming the immiment arrival of President Eduard Benes of Czechoslovakia, member of our International Honorary Board, we present below a remarkable prediction which Dr. Benes made in November, 1938 in an interview which, so far as we know, has never before been published in this country. President Benes saw early and clearly that the betrayal of Czechoslovakia in Munich would not bring "peace in our time." He foretold with extraordinary precision Hitler's attack on the Western powers and the resulting universal tragedy. As we all know now, his warning fell on deaf ears.

> Our policy was right as will be seen and agreed by all.
>
> There is nothing that I want to change. If we were to change any part of our main principles and outline, we definitely would lose thereby. Here [in the West] they may still believe that in Munich they saved peace. Soon they all will discover that they are already at war. Munich made war inevitable. I do not know when it will break out; possibly in a year, perhaps in two, or three. I personally doubt whether it will take more than a year. The first to suffer the blow will be Poland. Beck helped and helps Hitler against us, but actually he is helping Hitler against Poland and the rest. France will pay horribly for her betrayal of us. And Chamberlain—he will still live to see the results of his appeasement of Hitler and Mussolini. Hitler will attack all—in the West and even Russia—and in the end America, too, will be in it.

DEMOCRACY AND POWER

BY QUINCY WRIGHT

THE war aims of the United Nations have been stated in a number of documents, notably in President Roosevelt's Declaration of the Four Freedoms (January 6, 1941), Lord Halifax's commentary on this Declaration (March, 1941), the Atlantic Charter (July, 1941), the Declaration of the United Nations (January 1, 1942), the master Lend-Lease Agreements of 1942, and Premier Stalin's speech of November 6, 1942. The last briefly summarizes most of the others in the following terms:

> Abolition of racial exclusiveness, equal rights for all nations and the inviolability of their territories, liberation of enslaved nations and restoration of their sovereign rights, the right of every nation to manage according to its own wishes, economic help to nations which have suffered and co-operation with them in the task of attaining material welfare, restoration of democratic liberties, and destruction of the Hitlerite regime.

An even briefer summary can be found in President Wilson's message to the Russian government on May 26, 1917: "Brotherhood of mankind must no longer be a fair, but empty, phrase; it must be given a structure of force and reality. The nations must realize their common life and effect a workable partnership to secure that life against aggressions of autocratic and self-pleasing power."

The United Nations, like the Allied and Associated Powers of the first World War, are for democracy and against despotism. They want to apply democracy to race relations, international relations, economic relations, and human relations. If they are to do so, public opinion within the United Nations must not only desire a firmer and broader establishment of democracy, but must understand what democracy means in practical application.

The line between democracy and despotism often becomes controversial when applied to the solution of practical problems. For instance: Is the demand for national self-determination democratic or despotic? Is the demand for an international police power democratic or despotic? Would it be democratic or despotic for the United Nations to compel their enemies after defeat of the latter to accept an international organization which they had developed during the war? Is maintenance of the "balance of power" a democratic or a despotic principle of foreign policy?

Confusion sometimes arises because ends and means are not distinguished. The end of democracy is undoubtedly the freedom and welfare of human beings as such. Democracy has been defined as "Liberty plus groceries" for everyone. Democracy refuses to accept any class, group, nation, or race as an absolute. Undoubtedly many reasonable classifications of men may be made, and it may be useful to attribute special rights and duties to certain of these classes as a means to securing the liberty, equality, and welfare of individuals. But such classifications, however historically sanctified, can, in democratic theory, only be regarded as means to be justified in proportion as they serve the larger ends of democracy. Despotisms, on the other hand, accept some classification of human beings as an absolute. They regard the Aryan race, the Italian nation, the capitalistic class, the aristocracy, the ruling dynasty, the white man, Japan, or some other limited concept as a good to which all else is subordinate. The human being, as such, is not a goal of effort, but only the human being viewed as a member of a particular race, of a particular nationality,

of a particular class, or of a particular color.

Too often democracy has been discussed only in terms of its end. With discussion thus limited, an efficient and benevolent despotism might seem the best exemplification of democracy. It is not inconceivable that an absolute monarch, whether of a temporal or a spiritual state, might be guided by a sincere desire to increase human liberty and welfare. If the power of such a monarch extended to the world, it is easy to believe that the ends of democracy might be better promoted than by any other political method. This belief, in fact, was widely held during the Middle Ages. Men differed less on the need of a single absolute and universal power than on the question of whether that power should be vested in a universal church or a universal state. Pope Innocent III, in striving for the first, and Dante for the second, were probably both motivated by a sincere desire to promote what has been described as the ends of democracy. Such ends have even been asserted by more recent exponents of universal empire such as Napoleon and Hitler. The latter, in fact, has said that he alone understands the method for achieving real democracy.

The present war has been described as one between democracy and despotism. We must, however, hunt beyond the ends of democracy to its means if we are to understand what we are doing. Here we pass out of the realm of metaphysics into the realm of science. We can ask, on the basis of human experience, what methods are actually best calculated to achieve the ends of democracy. Theoretically, it is difficult to argue against the possibility of democratic ends being achieved by universal absolutism; practically, that possibility can be refuted by an analysis of history and of psychological observations. Human experience has shown that the efficiency and benevolence of absolute monarchs cannot be relied upon. Democracy, therefore, has come to be a term applicable to those methods of government which in experience have actually contributed most to the achievement of democratic ends. What are these democratic methods?

Sometimes democracy has been associated with an extensive use of voting by a wide electorate. It has been recognized, however, that popular voting may lead to gross inefficiency and a breakdown of government if applied to all decisions. Administrative and technical problems soluble only by experts must be distinguished from political problems suitable for the electorate. Adequate solutions of the former require specialized knowledge, of the latter only common sense or common opinion. Furthermore, it has been recognized that popular voting may lead to despotism, if the voting process is not surrounded by suitable safeguards. Despots have frequently risen to power through plebiscites. Finally, under certain social conditions, it is clear that voting may run so counter to the habits of the people that it will not function. Popular elections have been a specialized convention of Western civilization, and in other civilizations other methods may yield more democratic results.

For these reasons, voting has been considered not the essence of democracy but merely one method by which public opinion may be ascertained. Democracy is government by public opinion. In this sense, it is contrasted with government by a monarch or by a small class. Since a ruler or a limited class has infrequently retained position without an army and since the opinion of a broad public cannot be ascertained without some political machinery, the two forms of government may be contrasted as government by military or by political methods. One may ask the question, where in a group does ultimate authority reside to determine the major issues of group policy? If the answer is, in the authority whom the army obeys, then the society is a despotism; if, on the other hand, the answer is, in the politically organized public, then the society is a democracy. If the army controls, coercion is the ultimate method for achieving unity of the group upon a policy. As an army can only function through command from above, the control is in the hands of the few and the presumption arises that the few will act in their own interest. If, on the other hand, politically organized opinion controls, then consent is the ultimate method for achieving unity in the society. As the public includes a large proportion of the people, the presumption of self-

interest means that decisions will be for the people because they are by the people. It is because of the fear that army control will not be in the public interest that democracies have insisted that the military agencies shall be subject to a civilian, responsible eventually to the political organization.

The distinction between consent and coercion, though suggestive, is not easy to apply because all governments have to use both. All democracies have had armies and have used them both internally and externally. Coercion may be essential to the preservation of democracy as that great democrat, Abraham Lincoln, pointed out. Public opinion cannot function without a political structure as large as "the public," and Lincoln justified the four years of Civil War as necessary to preserve a united political structure for the American public. Furthermore, if consent is pushed to the limit, as it has been in the family of nations, the results will be an anarchy of absolute sovereignties. The conception that the state is never bound, except with its consent, has led to the system of balance of power as the fundamental structure of international relations, a system which has broken down in two world wars. Such a system is anything but favorable to the perpetuation of democracy.

II

IT IS believed that a more complete analysis of the foundations of social order is required if the difference between democratic and despotic methods is to be understood. The forms of social control applicable to large dynamic societies can be classified as military, political, economic, and legal. Behind these forms lie respectively the power of the sword, the power of the word, the power of the purse, and the power of the law. Men will generally conform in order to preserve their lives, and the sword can either take or protect life. Men act according to their beliefs; and the word, with all the modern arts of communication, propaganda, and education, can establish in the minds of men either attitudes or opinions. Most men have their price, and the purse can either give or withhold material needs. Men love liberty; and law, rationalizing custom, can either insure or deny a sphere of freedom.

Utilizing the dependence of human existence upon law, faith, property, and liberty, societies have organized military, political, economic, and legal powers so as to preserve social unity at more or less expense to the autonomy of the human personality. Frequently social criticism has centered upon one or more of these types of control. Extreme pacifists, for example, have wished to eliminate the power of the sword altogether. According to them, violence should be eliminated and social unity should be achieved by non-violent methods such as economic non-co-operation and political propaganda. Military men, on the other hand, have often recoiled from the influence of propaganda and the spread of "dangerous thoughts." They have sought to prevent freedom of expression from which new ideas might emerge. Socialists have been unremitting in their criticism of the power of the purse. Property they regard as the root of all evil, and seek to eliminate it. Anarchists have been equally critical of law. The state, as the embodiment of law should, in their judgment, be done away with and the sphere of individual freedom should be defined, not by law, but by individual rational appreciation of the virtues of tolerance and of the need of self-restraint.

Experience with these proposed reforms gives little hope that occasional resort to any of these powers can be eliminated. The power of the sword can only be taken from the individual by giving it to society. If society abandons it, individuals find it necessary to defend themselves by arms or to organize vigilance committees. If the power of the word is taken from the individual by the group, it passes to the state which utilizes propaganda for its own purposes. If the power of the purse is taken from private enterprisers, it passes to the state which utilizes this power for its own purposes. If the state administering law is eliminated, every man aserts his own right and society degenerates into a war of all against all.

The difference between democratic and despotic methods does not, therefore, lie in the elimination of any one of these forms of control, but rather in the way in

which the capacity to use them is distributed. Democratic method consists in an organization of each of these powers in relation to the others so that it can be used only for democratic ends.

Each of these powers can be used either to give or to withhold. A democratic use of power generally consists in giving to the many and withholding from the few, whereas a despotic use consists in giving to the few and withholding from the many. If the sword is used only to protect the many from crime and invasion, it is used democratically; if, on the other hand, it is used to protect the ruler or aristocracy from rebellion, it is used despotically. The public purse may be used to maintain services for the general welfare or to permit aristocrats and bosses to live in affluence. The law may embody equity, giving to each according to the ethical code of the community, or it may establish privileges for the few. The word may be utilized to increase the general level of society through education or it may be used to propagandize in the interests of the influential.

III

How can these distinctions be applied to the world community?

The power of the sword if given to the many becomes the right of self-defense; if given to the few, it becomes aggression. This distinction, however, cannot be maintained unless the community itself has sufficient power of the sword to suppress aggression and sufficient power of law to distinguish defense from aggression. Thus in a democratically organized world community, the state must be free to use armies in self-defense and the world community itself must have sufficient military power to prevent the aggression of any state or probable combination of states. War as an instrument of national policy must be abandoned and the sword must be utilized only in the service of justice and order.

The power of the word, if given to the many, becomes freedom of speech; if given to the few, it becomes censorship. Freedom of speech results in such an abundance of communications that attitudes are formed and personalities are conformed to changing conditions of society by the educational process. Censorship, on the other hand, tends to confine communications to a few channels and to develop propagandas which create opinions according to the aims of those who control the channels. Such opinions often fail to conform to basic attitudes, developed from personal experience, and result in the splitting of personalities and in general unrest. Even among democratic societies, however, some limitation of freedom of speech has been found necessary. Libel and slander are prevented, and propagandas tending to destroy the unity of society itself are forbidden. Furthermore, the society assumes responsibilities in education. If translated into world terms, this means that a democratically organized world community must respect freedom of speech and religion through a universal bill of human rights, but the world community itself must prevent propagandas disintegrative of itself and dangerous to other states.

The power of the purse, if given to the many, becomes freedom of economic enterprise; if given to the few, it becomes monopoly, of which the most complete is the monopoly of the state in national socialism. Even the most liberal democracies recognize that some services must be performed by the state, and consequently some power of the purse, arising from taxation, must exist in order to set up the instrumentalities through which the state's other powers can function. Translated to world terms, it would appear that the power of the purse should be distributed through freedom of international trade and that world authority should take measures to prevent national monopolies or international cartels from controlling raw materials or markets. Economic compartmentalization of the world must be eliminated and the power of the purse must be prevented from being utilized by the favored few to their own profit, at the expense of the many.

The power of the law, if given to the many, becomes the freedom of each to act within his legal rights under general law and to form a preliminary judgment upon the scope of those rights. It precludes administrative determination as to the scope of individual rights before action, and subjects the individual to law only

through officially determined liabilities for wrongful acts. If given to the few, the power of the law becomes a regime in which law gives privileges and special advantages to certain persons. It is clear that law cannot function unless ultimate power to apply and enforce it is vested in the community itself. Furthermore, in complicated dynamic societies, the law cannot be confined to remedial action but must permit administrative and preventive action to guide behavior of the individual in matters where the public interest is especially involved.

In democratic societies there has always been a preference for decentralization: that is, for a wide distribution of the powers of the sword, the word, the purse, and the law among independent bodies. Churches, business concerns, schools, private associations, and private individuals all have some of these powers. A public monopoly of certain uses of each of these powers has, however, proved necessary. In modern states, however, the powers even of the central government have usually been so distributed among different agencies that no one can be used except for the benefit of the many. Complicated distributions of power both regional and functional have been prescribed by the constitution. Only in time of crisis is general centralization permitted. It is through organization, by which each power is conveyed by other agencies, that democracy is preserved. The sword is used not to promote the interests of favored groups, but as a general police power behind the law. The word is used, not to propagandize particular policies, but only to promote the education of all. The purse is used, not to benefit favored groups or to bribe powerful individuals, but to provide general services, especially of communication, transportation, statistics, education, social security, and defense. The law is used, not to sustain privileges, but to assure to all plaintiffs access to the courts, to compel defendants to submit to law, and to assure to all litigants notice and hearing before judgment. Democratic methods imply that all four types of power be used by society as a whole and only on the basis of a universal law.

Translated into world terms, this suggests that the world community must be vested with certain military, political, economic, and legal powers, to be used, however, only under a universal law, and to be controlled by different agencies exercising a check upon one another. There must be a World Council controlling an effective police power, a World Secretariat formulating ideas, a World Assembly with financial resources capable of sustaining the other world institutions, and a World Court with jurisdiction over international disputes and over controversies concerning world law. But these must be used to give protection, enlightenment, services, and justice to all states, and to prevent any state from committing aggression or resorting to war as an instrument of policy, from engaging in either censorship or propaganda against human or international rights, from erecting barriers to trade or engaging in other forms of economic warfare, and from attempting to give final judgment on its own international rights or to enforce its own law in conflict with universal law.

The problem of democratic world organization is to give powers to each of the world institutions so that it can perform its functions and prevent usurpations by the others. Even more than national states, which in a world of power politics must be capable of unifying authority for emergencies, the world community whose only problems are internal must organize checks and balances to thwart the growth of overcentralization or the suppression of national variety. States in the system of power politics were checked from excesses, not only by their own constitutions but also by the opposition of other states. A world organization, with sufficient power to prevent aggression by any state, and without any external opposition, must have within itself reliable checks to its own overcentralization.

Through such an organization, sustained by a vigorous world public opinion, the United Nations may realize their hope, after destroying the nazi tyranny, to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.

Shall we be Able to Defeat Stupidity this Time?

BY
AHMET EMIN YALMAN

WILL there be a real peace this time? Will decency, tolerance, love, reason, triumph at last against stupidity, petty interests, prejudice, hatred, political opportunism? Will the huge sacrifices be at last justified and rewarded? These are the questions many a responsible world citizen is asking himself day and night. Unless he chooses to be carried away by illusions and by wishful thinking, he can hardly arrive at a cheerful answer, because stupidity is still all-powerful as a history-making factor and because various safety measures being resorted to here and there can hardly be viewed as sufficient.

Democracy will win this war. *It cannot help winning the war.* It has been able to make time its ally and to set in motion its superior resources of a material and moral character. It will certainly be possible for democratic nations to endure more and to carry the burden of sacrifices with a cooler head and more cheerful spirit. However, time cannot be made a dependable ally in preparing the peace. Things are bound to break in too suddenly, maybe overnight, perhaps any day. Unless the proper barrage is constructed at the right time, the forces of stupidity, petty interests, and narrow-minded national conceit will again steal from common sense the legitimate fruits of victory.

We can hardly forget that after each war in history, people who had suffered directly from its horrors seemed to be very determined indeed to make it the last war. Is there a peace treaty in history which does not speak of "eternal peace?" Each time, however, politicians of various kinds were able to paralyze the sound instincts for security and peace and co-operation. They knew how to maneuver emotions, passions, and greed; they waited patiently for their hour; and each time they were able to perform the same tricks with the same dreadful results.

I am of the opinion that Turkey is a good observation post from which to spot the trouble and suggest a basic remedy. We Turks do not claim to be more clever, more farsighted, or better equipped mentally for the task. We have, however, at our command a particular kind and a peculiar sequence of experiences which enable us to view things from certain angles which are not readily accessible to some other people, whose vision seems to be blinded by established, conventional ways of doing things. We have sufficiently proved this by directing our destinies after the last war in ways which remained always in absolute agreement with certain principles of decency, with existing facts and the inherent requirements of any given situation, while

other countries directed their national policies haphazardly and chose to remain blind to the real meaning of events and to their potential bearing.

Turkey has at her disposal the following favorable factors for being able to reach a dispassionate judgment concerning a constructive policy for peace:

1. We are the only country among the numerous combatants of the last war which has signed a peace based on free consent, and we have actually enjoyed the moral fruits of a real peace.

2. We have lost a huge empire within the memory of the present living generation. During this process we have become conscious of the enormous liability which an empire constitutes for a nation, especially in our state of economic development. We have also experienced the benefits of having for our national home a territory which is strictly limited by various rational considerations and the proper development of which can keep us busy for hundreds of years.

3. We were allies of Germany in the last war; we also were the main objects, before and during World War II, of very skillful efforts on the part of the Germans to reduce us to the state of a ready tool of German designs. We were the only country which withstood completely German Fifth Column work, just because we managed to keep our eyes open all of the time.

4. We have a tradition of war extending over centuries. War knows us Turks and we know war. As a matter of fact, we were the "Sick Man of Europe," because the cumulative effects of so many wars were too much for even our robust constitution.

We actually died in 1918—but to be reborn in 1919 to a new life with new horizons. As a result of our long sickness, our body seemed to have acquired an immunity against the usual causes of national disease like greed for fresh territory, imperialism, Irredentism, hatred of others, blindness about one's real and lasting interests. We almost seem to have been inoculated with a serum gained from the dead body of the "Sick Man of Europe" so that no pressure, no bribe, no flattery has been able to mislead us from our chosen path. Our spirit may best be illustrated by the following words uttered by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the chief architect of New Turkey. It was part of a statement made during an informal gathering of Balkan journalists and may be considered his political testament addressed to all humanity:

> A wise leader and a wise nation cannot consider their destinies separate from those of other nations. It is our duty to ourselves to attach the same value to the happiness of other nations as to ours. To work for the prosperity of other nations means to work for our own interest. If the relations between nations lack security, stability, and peace, no effort of any individual nation can secure these high values for itself alone.
>
> Those leaders who desire for their nation something different from what they desire for other nations are short-sighted fools. All world events tend to prove that the destinies of us all are interdependent. We can never tell that we might not some day be touched by an event which we believe at the moment too far off to concern us.
>
> The only wise way would consist in considering all humanity as a single body and the nations as members of this body. Any member which cannot react to the pain to which any other member of the same body is exposed must consider itself as lacking sensitiveness and real vitality.

These words certainly denote the secret of the new spirit in present day Turkey. They also express the right outlook for building up the coming peace. The whole problem consists in catching the broad meaning of this spirit and making it the unshakable foundation of the coming settlements.

II

If we human beings cannot unite right away in a constructive scheme, we are bound to repeat the same errors and blunders and become once more blind victims of stupidity. The tendencies and currents which have rendered stupidity the supreme force in history are all there. We are far from being ready to cope with them.

It is true that the realization of the danger is greater now and more general than at any time in history. The people at large are better informed about the issues involved and have quite intelligent views of things. No war in history has come nearer to having clear and ethical aims, and no war before has represented so strongly the struggle of

good against evil. This means that we may arrive at the right solution this time, but it does not mean that we are actually prepared and equipped to forestall the influence of innumerable adverse factors and to fill various loopholes through which stupidity may creep in again.

To begin with, national conceit, national jealousies and suspicions are there to pervert our views. They are the main obstacles in the way of a general unity in aim and purpose. It is an irony of destiny that we Turks should come forward to assert this. As a "Sick Man of Europe," our only chance of survival for generations consisted in relying on the disunity among nations and in attempting to create more dissent and disunity. As a sound and developing nation, we feel that our chance of survival and progress can only be found in international unity and harmony, and we have devoted our entire career to fostering them among nations, beginning with our Balkan neighbors.

It is particularly important for America and England to remain united. Without their being fully united in principles, in aims, in methods of procedure, the peace settlement is doomed to failure. One may argue that such a danger does not exist in view of the close bonds of culture and common language between the two nations. There is, however, no conflict as deadly as one which may arise between brothers. There are tendencies toward dissent between Americans and Englishmen which may easily create a false sense of national pride, jealousy, and suspicion. A mere rumor may be sufficient at times to obscure the existence of most essential common interests. It will not be easy for Americans and Englishmen to get used to the idea of acting as equals in the new world order. A secret longing for the first role will exist among certain elements, and there are not lacking other elements which will try to exploit tactless utterances and any other sources of trouble. This is not a matter pertaining to English-American relations alone, but a common threat against the best interests of humanity, and it must be forestalled. As an objective observer of the war effort in both countries and of the ideals by which the two nations are animated, I feel that it is safe to say that the two nations have proved to be worthy of each other's respect and confidence and that it would be criminal for them to allow stupidity in various forms to creep in and to disturb the harmony of their relations.

The danger that national pride, greed, and all sorts of jealousies, may create artificial dissent and obscure vital issues exists potentially in the relations of all Allied and United Nations. The obsolete ideas of the old world order are kept alive in all countries by a group of self-styled super-patriots who use their patriotism chiefly to disguise their personal ambitions. They will cause their countries to present to the peace conference conflicting bills to be paid for their sufferings and services. Everybody will claim that he is the main factor in winning the war, on account of so and so. Controversies about conflicting interests and claims may obscure the common purposes and create uncontrollable passions. One concession made may lead to other compromises. Without being conscious of it, we may be carried away again by ambitions leading directly to the beaten paths of stupidity. A great deal of wise leadership, a broad sense of justice and integrity, a strict ethical adherence to basic principles are necessary to dispel this great source of danger.

In redrafting the map of the world, the permanent considerations concerning security and survival for everybody must be predominant; we cannot afford to allow the creation of new breeding grounds of future conflicts. Feelings of revenge and hatred are more than legitimate in view of the horrors committed by one side, but hatred is a sort of quicksand. You cannot build on it anything stable. We Turks were the most hated people after the World War I. It took only a year for Allied Nations to become divided in our regard, and we appeared on the world stage as victims and martyrs, later on as respected heroes of a War of Independence.

Another source of trouble endangering the coming peace consists in the party-mindedness lingering in democratic countries. Strangely enough, the people are not party-minded, but the party machineries are there to carry out a *Blitz* war against innocent citizens without defense. These well-organized machines in the hands of cunning men used to playing their trumps

in a masterly fashion are also apt to obscure the basic principles and foster individual claims and jealousies. Unfortunately, parties are making only temporary concessions for national unity. Such concessions are not even whole-hearted and complete in the days of crisis and common danger. In this struggle, party interest, opportunism, and short-range policies are organized; the ideals and aspirations of honest citizens, long-range interests of humanity are not organized. Stupidity has there vast opportunities to exert its sway.

III

In order to create a new world order you need facts. Such concrete information does not exist, however. The ignorance of the nations regarding one another is appalling. In this period of hitherto undreamed of methods of communication, many such means seem to be used to separate rather than unite.

Secret intelligence services are organized in such a way and recruited of such elements that they are inclined to seek only sensational stuff to report. Colorful reports from such sources are apt to be preferred to the dull ones of objective observers. Newspaper men are also expected to hunt for excitement and for the abnormal and the unusual. If any of them were to insist on repeating the same plain facts, his existence would hardly be justified in the eyes of his own publisher. Even the scientific bodies set up to collect facts for the use of the peace conference do not always have a clear picture of affairs in foreign countries. Supposing that they do obtain such a picture, there is no guarantee that their reports will be followed. They are mere advisers, and politicians will say the final word with a view only to keeping the largest number of people contented. And nobody will be there to tell them that they are not faultless sources of wisdom.

If we were obliged to bet under existing circumstances about the outcome of a peace settlement, the chances would be twenty to one in favor of all-powerful stupidity. On the other hand, human beings in all countries are perfectly ready to accept the ushering in of a perfectly new world. It is up to the world leaders to agree beforehand on its basic principles. And such principles can be derived from the adverse experiences of the last war.

The Atlantic Charter is only a beginning as an instrument of peace and a statement of principles. It is desirable to publish at an early date a solemn proclamation providing for the following principles:

1. A World Federation as the basis of the new order.

2. National armies, navies, and air forces to be abolished at the moment of signing the armistice. All armed forces to be considered as units belonging to an international police force entrusted with the task of maintaining order and security in the world, of liquidating national armaments and militarism, and of carrying out the number one principle of the World Constitution outlawing war, whether international or civil, and establishing compulsory arbitration with a final verdict to be respected by everybody.

3. National policies to be geared to the public interests. Slavery of nations and empires based on compulsion to be abolished. Only associations by consent within the frame of the World Constitution to be tolerated. Retarded people needing development and stability to receive help in the name of the World Federation. No mandate system to be carried out through individual nations.

4. Proclamation of tolerance in its absolute form for religions and social creeds of every sort.

5. Abolition of minority rights which are nothing but a pretext for intrigue. There should be an exchange of population, wherever practicable, and those who like to remain in their native land as citizens of a foreign government should be ready to become part of the body of the country they live in and be fully assimilated culturally by the majority.

6. No difference of large or small countries from the viewpoint of the world federal laws. In order to make sure that a relationship is established between equals, the small nations should form regional federations among themselves and tend to become entities of a size equal to the big ones.

Nothing short of such a program can serve as the foundation of a new world. Only thus can stupidity be deprived of all of its chances. The sincere proclamation of such a program at once may contribute also to shortening of the war. All signs seem to indicate that the resistance in the Axis countries is not prompted by a hope of victory but by the pessimistic idea that the humiliations of the coming peace might prove to be worse for them than the horrors and hardships of continuing the war; they are merely struggling to delay the hour of reckoning. A sincere and solemn proclamation of the Allied Powers in form of a statement of principles to serve as a basis for the constitution of the coming World Federation will deprive the Axis resistance of its very motive power and may serve to shorten the war.

Stupidity is the final enemy after all, and it can only be defeated with the help of ideas. Why not try to perfect the moral weapons necessary for this purpose? This does not need to mean neglecting or weakening efforts for the production and better use of physical weapons. Such weapons are destined to win the war, as a preliminary step to defeating stupidity and making the ground ready for the erection of a real new order. But at the same time moral weapons must also be improved, perfected, and properly used. If stupidity is left free to breed the usual diseases, all the tremendous efforts and sacrifices for winning the war will be merely wasted again.

An Editorial

PROOF OF GOOD FAITH

SECRETARY CORDELL HULL put his finger on the point which demands most serious consideration when he said of the Reciprocal Trade Act, now before Congress: "The many people who look toward this country with hope are watching our action on this Act with profound interest." Indeed, this action will affect not merely the countries concerned but all the rest of the world. The attitude of our Congress in renewing these agreements will be considered a fair test of the desire of the American people to participate in world affairs.

The question of economic gain from these reciprocal trade pacts pales into insignificance when we realize that they are the minimum rather than the maximum step which the United States can take in world collaboration. At the time when, as Mr. Hull put it, we are engaged in the greatest co-operative enterprise in history, it is imperative that we show to all our Allies a genuine enthusiasm for co-operation. The few shrill voices of the isolationists in Congress must be drowned out by the great body of patriotic and enlightened representatives of the American people who recognize that even so distant a thing as a vote in Congress can give encouragement and inspiration to the fighting forces across the Atlantic and the Pacific. This vote must give proof to the peoples of the world that while they are sacrificing their lives for an ideal, the United States is not drawing up a balance sheet of profits and losses, that it is ready for co-operation in every phase of human activity without secret reservations and limitations.

The Abrogation of the CRÉMIEUX DECREE

by

Henry Torrès

WHAT would be the reaction of American public opinion if it were to discover that American citizens of two or three generations' standing, with a record of having heroically carried their country's flag on the battlefields of Artois and Argonne and contributed at least their share to the civilization of their motherland through their accomplishments in art and science, had been suddenly stripped of their American citizenship? Would it accept as valid the excuse offered by the perpetrator of this arbitrary decision that such a step, directed against a single category of citizens, had been taken to appease Indians and Negroes, and to resolve political problems which concerned them?

The comparison is neither exaggerated nor illusory, but forced by the abrogation of the Crémieux decree on the minds of those who are concerned to the point of anguish with the grave problems of French national developments and the course of international affairs, with the moral as well as the political state of the world.

The abrogation of the decree was announced by General Henri Giraud in his momentous address of March 14, 1943. To justify his attitude, so palpably contradictory to the anti-racist declarations and the unrelenting condemnation of Vichy which made up the essential fabric of his speech, General Giraud claimed that the Crémieux decree was being annulled because of his desire to eliminate racial discrimination, since—according to him—"the decree, at the time of its promulgation in 1870, created a difference between native Moslems and Jews." He thereby appealed to the principles of equality and justice to support a flagrant wrong and the infliction on a category of French citizens of the worst of deprivations—the deprivation of citizenship.

Let us examine the facts, the history, the law itself, and leave further decision to the verdict of the reader. When, in 1830, French troops occupied Algeria, they were received enthusiastically, as was the American Army 112 years later. Included in the welcoming population were some 30,000 Jews who had suffered oppression under Ottoman rule and who awaited the French as liberators. August 6, 1830, the date of the French occupation, was declared a holiday by the Jewish community. The pacification of the Arabs, on the other hand, took some fifteen years. Not until 1848 did the new-born Republic—in the hope of consummating assimilation—bestow universal suffrage on the colony, at the same time that it became effective in France. Simultaneously, Algeria was made a French territory and divided into three *départements;* Algiers, Oran, and Constantine. Regardless of what form the home government took, the Jewish population of Algeria was unequivocally loyal to France. In 1841 Baron Baude, Councilor of State and Minister of King Louis Philippe in North Africa, said of the native Algerian Jews: "They are bound to our cause; they are destined to serve as the vehicles for our influence."

In 1842 a basic change occurred in the life of the Algerian Jews. France's moral

and peaceful conquest prompted them to abandon the laws and customs to which they had clung for innumerable generations, some of which were contrary to French custom and law. From that time on, France could apply to this segment of Algerian population her traditional colonial policies, whose origin dated back to Jean Baptiste Colbert, the Minister of Louis XIV. The naturalization of the Algerian Jews was, therefore, no more than a spontaneous outgrowth of their integration into the civil and moral laws of France. The Arabs, on the contrary, adhered to their own regulations, laws, and customs, among them polygamy. They held—and this without opposing the naturalization of the Jews—that their own naturalization would be a blow to their religion, since it would oblige them to renounce their ancestral laws. Against these, liberal France had no designs, despite their incompatability with her own morals and codes.

In his study of Algerian colonization, de Baudicourt wrote, as early as 1847, that "the French Government has a major interest in incorporating the Algerian Jews." In 1864, Napoleon III, during a trip to the territory, officially received the Chief Rabbi and his consistory in the Chateau Neuf at Oran. Replying to the Rabbi's address, the Emperor said: "I hope that the Algerian Jews will be French citizens." In 1865, the Algerian Court of Appeals declared that the hour had come for the Jews to attain French citizenship. Flandin, Councilor of State in 1869, reporting to the Senate on June 22 of that year, recalled that the native Jews of Algeria had "voluntarily enlisted in the military ranks of their liberators. They have shown themselves to be grateful, and were among the most illustrious officers in the African Command. Let the Senate remember that there is not a witness who will not attest to the fact that whenever the occasion demanded, the Jews rendered valuable services."

Napoleon III asked his Council of State to prepare a law which would collectively naturalize the Jews of Algeria. The Arabs, on the other hand, were to receive the benefits of a *Senatus Consulte* of 1865, which established the following principle: "The native Moslem is French. Nevertheless, he is to remain subject to Moslem law. He may ask for the rights of French citizenship, in which case he will be subject to the civil and political laws of France."

From 1865 to 1869, the General Councils of the three *départements* of Algeria, at every annual session, reaffirmed that "considering the numerous evidences of their patriotism and their services, the native Jews unquestionably merit that French citizenship be bestowed on them without delay." On March 7, 1870, several weeks before the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, Count de Hon, speaking in the Imperial Parliament, demanded that the rights of citizenship be granted to the Jews in recognition of their services. According to Millot, Professor of Law at the University of Algiers, in his study of Algerian legislation, "Prime Minister Emile Ollivier would probably have achieved the reform which made French citizens of the Algerian Jews, had not the events of 1870 brought his fall, together with that of the Empire. It was the subsequent passage by the Government of National Defense of the law better known as the Crémieux decree, which effected the reform. History shows that the Government of National Defense did no more than effectuate a project prepared previously by the Imperial Government."

One of the co-authors of the law named after Crémieux—Leon Gambetta, a member of the Government of National Defense, and the incarnation—in 1870—of his country's spirit and will to resist, always vaunted his share of responsibility in the act, which he said was passed "to maintain order in the colony, and because of which grave disorders were prevented or quelled."

The Crémieux decree declared that "the native Jews of the three *départements* of Algeria are French citizens. Consequently, their property and personal rights are from the day of the promulgation of the present decree under the jurisdiction of French law; all rights acquired prior to this date remain inviolable." After the issuance of the decree elevating them to the dignity of French citizens, the Algerian Jews became so thoroughly a part of the French people that until 1940 and the establishment of the vassal Vichy Government, no one dared dispute their political and civic equality.

From 1870 on, a company of Algerian

Jewish sharpshooters maintained a brilliant military record. In 1914, Algerian Jews comprised one-fourth of the active Zouaves; and in the Battle of the Marne, as has been pointed out by Maurice Barrès, the great French Catholic writer, the Jewish Zouaves participated with the 45th Division in the heroic stand at Meaux, where General Gallieni unleashed his decisive offensive. In 1939-1940, Algerian Jews formed an important contingent of shock troops, and became famous for their advance-guard fighting. On May 9, 1938, at the anniversary celebration of the Battle of Carency, Rivollet, leader of the Conféderation Nationale des Anciens Combattants and one-time Minister for Military Pensions (he later disgraced himself through his ignominious collaboration with the proponents of the "new order") paid this tribute: "Although the Jewish population of France and Algeria barely totaled 169,000, and about 35,000 Jewish soldiers were mobilized at the beginning of the war, 6,500 fell on the field of honor." As to the role played by Algerian Jews in the development of French influence in Algeria and their contributions to French civilization, the name of Professor Fernand Widal, internationally famous physician and scientist, is sufficient illustration.

II

GENERAL GIRAUD did nothing less than deprive these people of French citizenship, imitating Vichy, which considered its deed indispensable to the policy of subordination to the Reich. Vichy twice abrogated the Crémieux decree, once in the law of October 7, 1940, promulgated under the authority and responsibility of Peyrouton (then Minister of the Interior for Pétain), and again in the law of February 18, 1942. Pétain, then Giraud, between whom Peyrouton is the link, thus withdrew the rights of citizenship from the handful of surviving Jews who were the original beneficiaries of the 73-year-old decree, as well as from the 44,000 male descendants of the original beneficiaries who are no longer alive.

In either case, the abrogation of the Crémieux decree, through its victims, is a blow at one of the organic laws of French justice, a law so important that it was incorporated in Chapter I, Article 2 of the French Civil Code; "A law is applicable only to the future; it can in no way have a retroactive effect." The principle of the non-retroactivity of law is the cornerstone of French jurisprudence. Springing from a concept in Roman law, more than two thousand years old, it is part of the legal systems of all civilized countries in Europe as well as America. In France, it was honored by the Kingdom, the Empire, and the Republic alike.

This absolute rule, common to all countries where justice is founded on respect for the human being, has for its object, according to the French jurist Planiol, "the guarantee of security for citizens, who demand that their rights, their fortunes, their personal property, and the consequences of their acts and of their agreements be safeguarded from jeopardy, compromise or suppression by the whim of a legislator."

In abrogating the Crémieux decree, General Giraud, following Marshal Pétain, retroactively deprived the Algerian Jews of the benefits of naturalization specifically granted them on October 24, 1870; he equally deprived all those who had died since that date, including those who fell on the field of battle. Against this sacrilege I offer only one witness: the ossuary at Douaumont where thousands of Algerian Jews lie in their French uniforms.

But it is not only that General Giraud violated the principle of non-retroactivity in law to strip the heroes of the Marne and the martyrs of Verdun of their French citizenship. The 44,000 descendants of the beneficiaries of the Crémieux decree (I give the official figure), the children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren of the native Algerian Jews of 1870, who were collectively naturalized by the Government of National Defense, are today French not because of the effect of this naturalization, but by all that is signified in *"nés d'un Français en France"* (born of French parents in France), as stated in the naturalization law of August 10, 1927, with specific reference to Algeria in Article 15. In violating the sacred rule of non-retroactivity in law and wresting French citizenship from Frenchmen of two, three, or four generations' standing, the abrogation of the Crémieux decree is as much an outgrowth

of the Nuremberg Laws enforced in Nazi Germany and in the regions occupied or controlled by the Reich as was the law promulgated by the Government of Vichy.

Does General Giraud consider Article 2 of the Civil Code, which is the very charter of our system of justice, and the naturalization law of 1927, which is the standard of French citizenship, as mere scraps of paper? What right has General Giraud, by abrogating the Crémieux decree of his own accord, to repeat one of the most shameless illegalities perpetrated by the Vichy Government under German pressure, when in his speech of March 14 he declared so precisely that he considered all Vichy legislation utterly void and invalid because it lacked popular consent? From what legal authority does General Giraud derive the power to abrogate and replace a Republican law for the nation, which alone has the right to alter its decisions? Does General Giraud, like Marshal Pétain, want to infect French public law with discrimination between Jews and non-Jews, in violation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, that "law of laws," which states in its first article that "men are born and live free and equal before the law," and in Article 16, "any society in which a guarantee of rights is not assured . . . has no constitution."

These are the four questions which I submit to the self-appointed apologists for General Giraud, found in the United States among the semi-Vichyite emigrants as well as among the renegades from the French Communist party of the Comintern.

The reason given by General Giraud for the abrogation of the 1870 decree—the necessity of putting an end to racial discrimination between Jews and Arabs, is specious. The problems affecting the French citizenship of the Arabs are absolutely independent of the citizenship of the Jews; they were always considered in the light of their own special features, involving the native mores and beliefs to which the majority of the Arabs are faithful. This special status of the Arabs, which Franch undertook to respect at the time of the occupation in 1830, includes (even in the Algeria of today) polygamy, unilateral repudiation of a wife by the husband, forced marriage, and succession of the male line only. The contradiction of these customs to our laws and morals, and their incompatability with the exercise of the full rights of French citizenship, demanded that Arabs be required to renounce their native laws before being admitted to French citizenship. According to the law of February 4, 1919, this renunciation is the only condition imposed on the native, the only limitation to which he need submit before he becomes as completely French as any other son of French soil.

Liberal French legislation has assured extensive political rights to the native Algerians; they elect one-fourth of the General Councils and one-third of the Financial Delegations, which decide on the budgets for the three *départements*. Yet certain members of the French Parliament, particularly those representing Socialist parties, wanted the Republic to be even more generous. Consequently, they proposed that the Arabs be endowed with complete political rights, either through an electoral college of their own or jointly with other French citizens, and yet be allowed to retain their special laws. These parliamentarians based their demand on the heroism of the Algerian sharpshooters in 1914—a heroism that prompted Georges Clémenceau and Georges Leygues, in a communication addressed to the President of the Council on November 25, 1915, to ask that "the natives be offered the advantages of a new naturalization law, which would not involve the renunciation of their own regulations."

On December 30, 1936, Léon Blum, then President of the Council, and Maurice Violette, one-time governor of Algeria, made public a plan whose symbolic significance would have far outweighed its immediate efficacy. The plan would have elevated to French citizenship some 27,000 natives whose civic competence had already been tested, without imposing on them any obligation to renounce their special laws. This plan was eventually rejected by Parliament. In refusing to take this first step toward collective naturalization of the Arabs, Parliament acceded to the importunate warnings received on February 8, 1938, from the Federation of Mayors and Deputies of Algeria. A unanimous resolution was adopted by the Federation threatening mass resignations if Parliament passed a law "detrimental to the future of France

. . . the granting of full citizenship to native Moslems, regardless of the fact that according to the law of 1919, it depends entirely on their own volition. France has gone further on their behalf than on behalf of the native Jews."

So it was not the Jews, hostile to racism in any form, who opposed the hopes of certain groups of natives that they could acquire plenary French citizenship without forfeiting a bit of their Moslem privileges. It was not the Jews who stalemated the governmental project of December 30, 1936, which will carry the name of Léon Blum into history, just as the law of October 24, 1870, carried the name of Crémieux and the anti-Semitic laws of October, 1940, the name of Peyrouton.

III

AFTER victory is won, it will rest with French sovereignty, with the French Constituent Assembly, to take up again the problem of Arab acquisition of citizenship. To withdraw citizenship from Jews who received it several generations ago is only to establish a precedent that will militate against the Arabs themselves, and handicap their complete emancipation. Leveling downward does not constitute reform, but regression. To be just toward one category of citizens, it is not enough to be unjust to another. Without offering the slightest real satisfaction to Arab claims, the Algerian High Commission has fed the demagogery of a few native agitators, who prate anti-Semitic doctrines from which German propaganda alone can derive any benefit.

It is not merely arbitrary, but often absurd, to consider anti-Semitism in Algeria a spontaneous native movement. Colonists, frequently newly naturalized, imported it under the tutelage of Edouard Drumond at the time of the Dreyfus affair in 1898, and —after 1935—under the guidance of Jacques Doriot and his vicious French Popular party, vassals of the Nazis. But history has shown that anti-Jewish agitation in North Africa has invariably been a screen and a blind for anti-French agitation. It has shown also that in Algeria disturbances can be allayed and religious harmony assured by a handful of intelligent administrators, sufficiently conscious of their duties and responsibilities to the Republic not to concede to or compromise with the mob. Let the present-day government in Algeria be inspired by the example of Governor General Lepine, who needed only several weeks to quiet the ferment throughout Algeria. Let the present-day government resolve not to succumb to blackmail, which can endanger the security of the Allies and the integrity of the French Empire only in so far as it is abetted by complacency or weakness.

It is for the reader to decide whether the abrogation of the Crémieux decree is not a blow at law, and—above the law—at human dignity; whether it is not a crime against history, a burden on the present, a portentous warning for the future; whether it is not a vestige of Vichy, a concession to nazism, an obeisance which certain castes prefer to make toward fascism and racism from within the shelter of democracy's magnificent structure; whether it is not an insensate and cruel retaliation against the spirit of republicanism, toward which the Jews are guilty only of fidelity. I ask you to judge with the uttermost objectivity and calm, forgetting even—in order that your decision may be more potent—that you are party to the debate. For an outrage against the principles and the justice for which the United Nations are fighting is no less an attack on the Protestants of Philadelphia and the Catholics of New Orleans than it is against the Jews of Oran or of Philippeville. I ask, above all, in order that your verdict be absolutely unbiased, that you forget how these Algerian Jews—now debased by the ukase of General Giraud—hoped for, prepared, welcomed, and served the debarkation in Africa of American troops, the emissaries of liberation.

—Translated by Libby Benedict

The ENIGMA *of* MEXICAN SINARQUISM

by

Harold E. Davis

WHEN the National Sinarquist Union of Mexico (UNS) finally issued an official bulletin on July 15 urging its members to combat "all kinds of activities that sympathizers with totalitarian powers use against the security and tranquillity of nationals," and "to keep close watch on nationals who might be inclined to work against the Democracies," it may have seemed to the casual observer a significant victory of the Mexican Government and the Mexican "Revolution" against the anti-democratic, counter-revolutionary, pro-Axis forces.

And in a certain sense it was. For this reputedly pro-fascist group had now been lined up—temporarily at least, perhaps for the duration of the war—behind the national war effort. Moreover, it was additional testimony to the great underlying strength of the far reaching social movement which has made Mexico the spearhead of liberal forces in Latin America, and made of the Mexican "Revolution" Latin America's greatest issue. The Revolution has now forced the counter revolution into verbal conformity, at least. But the forces of Mexican reaction and counter-revolution are still strong and the five-year-old Sinarquist Union is still their best expression. It is impossible to believe that the war has suddenly brought them to experience a sudden and complete change of heart. As a matter of fact, a serious struggle is going on between the forces of progress and the forces of reaction in this neighboring and allied state, and certainly we should not be as ignorant as we are of the nature of the contending forces. Otherwise, we run grave danger of repeating the mistake made at the time of the last Mexican presidential election—that of encouraging, unintentionally, the development of groups and tendencies basically contrary to the cause of democracy and to the welfare of Mexico. First and foremost this means the UNS.

The enigma of Sinarquism is created by the character of Mexican politics which, due to defective electoral machinery, is more fluid and elusive than the United States variety. But the importance of Sinarquism can be understood properly only in the light of Mexico's current political situation. The presidential election of 1940 was a critical one in the nation's history. Mexico, under President Cárdenas, had just gone through a remarkably successful six-year period of land and economic reform, inevitably arousing bitter opposition among propertied and conservative elements. Moreover, the Spanish Revolution had injected the issue of international fascism into the domestic scene. Relations with the Church, to be sure, were less strained than in the days of President Calles, for Cárdenas had followed a moderate and tolerant religious policy. But church circles were profoundly displeased with the suppression of church schools, the continued restrictions on the clergy, and particularly with the

law requiring socialistic instruction in the public schools. Strained relations with the United States and Great Britain over the oil and land expropriations further confused the situation and weakened the position of reform elements. President Cárdenas had wisely adopted a firm but conciliatory attitude on this question, even though this meant passing up the opportunity for making a demagogic appeal for support of his reforms against "Yankee imperialism."

It was natural, under all the circumstances, that the official Revolutionary party should select a middle-of-the-road presidential candidate—one who would hold an even keel and not aggravate that already delicate situation with prospects of further reform involving confiscation of property. General Manuel Avila Camacho was such a candidate. It was just as natural for the reactionary elements to gather behind the candidacy of Almazán, a general with a rather checkered revolutionary career.

The tolerant Cárdenas regime had allowed extensive freedom of organization, even to reactionary groups, resorting to suppression only when such groups as *Los Dorados* of Monterrey (using the sobriquet of Pancho Villa's bodyguard) gave evidence of becoming subversive in 1936. That same year the President exiled ex-President Calles and former Secretary of Labor Morones when the elements of opposition seemed to be organizing around them. But other groups unsympathetic to the Administration were allowed complete freedom, and freedom of the press was complete. A number of former revolutionary leaders, former followers of Carranza, Obregón, and Calles, took advantage of this new freedom to precipitate a lively literary argument over the true nature of the Revolution. In newspaper articles and books they assailed the administration for betraying the original purposes of the Revolution by engaging in rash and hasty socialistic experiments.

In the midst of this argument the Spanish Civil War broke out in 1936, giving new point and incentive to reactionary forces throughout Latin America. The Mexican Administration showed great friendliness for Republican Spain, while its opponents began to show sympathy for the Franco cause. But Mexico's reaction was different, on the whole, from that of many Latin American states, undoubtedly because of the strength and nationalism of its social reform. The Falange made little progress outside a limited group in the Spanish colony in Mexico City and failed to win any outspoken encouragement from clerical leaders. But over in the state capital of Guanajuato, in 1937, a German engineer and language teacher, Oscar Schleuter, founded the National Sinarquist Union. Not much is known of Schleuter. He soon disappeared from view, and his place was taken by three young Mexican leaders, all three unsuccessful lawyers, named Zermeño, Urquiza, and Abascal.

II

SINARQUISM is an antonym for anarchism. It claims that it will end the "anarchy" produced in Mexico by the Revolution. Like all demagogic movements it appeals to emotion and feeling more than to reason. As might be expected, its official statements and the cabalistic speeches of its impassioned leader and orator, Salvador Abascal, are full of contradictions. Its reactionary program has usually been cloaked under the guise of "restoring" the Revolution. Yet in November, 1941, Abascal said to a meeting of six hundred Sinarquist leaders in Mexico City: "The Revolution is dying. It will be killed and buried by Sinarquism. No more Revolution. No more god Huitzilopoxtli." Sinarquism professes to restore the old social order destroyed by "liberalism, masonry, Protestantism, and politicians," but speaks also of the restoration of democratic, orderly government in the municipalities.

It has all the external paraphernalia of fascism or falangism. It has its distinctive salute, a little like the French military salute. Its hymn is "Faith, Blood, and Victory." The popular songs of the Mexican cowboys are sung a great deal at the meetings, and they are unquestionably one of Sinarquism's most carefully exploited attractions. Its bible, "Mexico in 1960," pictures an authoritative state, based on the Catholic religion and the social and economic principles of Popes Leo XIII and Pius XI, upon Mexico's Spanish inheritance, and upon the enthusiasm of youth.

Its newspaper, *El Sinarquista,* founded about a year after the organization's birth, sells widely in Mexico City and in the provinces at the low price of five centavos (one cent). Incidentally, *El Sinarquista* has, on the whole, been less violently reactionary than some other papers of this sort in Mexico, *Omega* for example.

There is no denying the popular appeal of Sinarquism in Mexico. It has stirred the turgid waters of latent Yankeephobia, always potentially strong, by loose talk about recovering the Mexican *irredenta* in southwestern United States. It raises the specter of foreign intervention by the petroleum "imperialists." Or, again, the agitation of labor unions and "Communists" is pictured as having the intention of producing intervention! It makes a characteristic appeal to virility, always effective among Latin Americans. One is reminded of the recent popularity in Mexico of the film, *"Ay Jalisco! No te rajes!"* The title is a Jaliscan expression which defies translation, but might be loosely rendered, "Ay Jalisco, take it like a man." The cowboy songs make this appeal in Sinarquist meetings, an appeal vaguely reminiscent of the attraction of Theodore Roosevelt's Rough Riders and his "strenuous life" to an earlier generation in this country. For example, Jesús Guisa y Azeveda made a strong plea for Sinarquism on the grounds that it was the first movement in Mexican history "to take the Mexican man as he is (*que tome al mexicano como es*)," and in building a stronger Mexico, "to make of us Mexicans real men (*hacer que los mexicanos seamos hombres*)." It is the first time, he added, that Mexico had seen a "complete practice of good manliness and virility."

On the religious side, Sinarquism appeals to the resentment slumbering since the days of the cruel suppression of the "Cristeros," to the strong conservative Catholic feeling for the home and for religious schools, and against the labor leaders and "Communists" who are accused of attempting to destroy the family and the Church. In many ways the agitation of Sinarquists on religious questions has been scarcely distinguishable from that of the more closely Church connected *Padres de familia* organization, which carried on a successful campaign in 1941 to permit the parochial schools to exist side by side with the state schools. In other ways, too, religious implications of the movement appear. It is not unusual for Sinarquist orators to speak of Sinarquism as coming directly from God. And they constantly emphasize Mexico's Catholic and Spanish heritage, referring to the civilizing work of the Spanish missionaries in language which is often suggestive of the historical writings of the formerly great Mexican liberal, later turned reactionary, José Vasconcelos. Its debt to the intellectual reactionary Gomez Morín is even more direct. Thus it is in line with Franco's Hispanidad or Pan-Hispanism.

Much, perhaps too much, has been made of the fact that Salvador Abascal once studied for the priesthood in a seminary at Morelia under the present Archbishop of Mexico, then an instructor in the seminary. Certainly the mystic and homiletic tone of many of Abascal's speeches are highly suggestive of this theological background. But to read into these slender facts an inference that Sinarquism was Church controlled would be to go beyond the proved facts. Undoubtedly the Church approved the Sinarquist campaign for the return of parochial schools and against the required teaching of socialism in the national schools. Moreover, there are reactionary leaders among the clergy who would go

much farther with the Sinarquists. Sinarquism clearly appeals for Church support and it is possible that it is Church inspired. Its close relationship to the interests of the Church is clear. Yet it is hard to believe that the Mexican Church, under its present archbishop, would assume the responsibility of sponsoring the cause of counter-revolution through such an organization. The Mexican Church is hardly a force for reform. It is clearly a major conservative force. But it is not the reactionary force of fifteen to twenty years ago. However, many people well acquainted with the situation believe that the Mexican Church is disloyal and that Sinarquism is its tool. In fact, the great liberal labor leader, Vicente Lombardo Toledano has denounced Sinarquism in these very terms.

The strongest appeal Sinarquism makes, and the most dangerous, is to the unrealized ambitions of the Mexican Revolution itself. To the unemployed, and to the discontented and poorer middle-class youth of the cities, Sinarquists hold out the prospect of private land ownership through the colonization schemes they have diligently advocated. Throughout rural Mexico they make a strong appeal to the small landholders (and large ones, too) who, rightly or wrongly, fear confiscation of their lands and fear the "communism" of the Cárdenas *ejidal* communities such as the Laguna project near Torreon. The fascist slant of this argument is so obvious as to call for no further comment.

The UNS, although professing not to be a political party, was one of the groups backing the candidacy of Almazán in 1940. He made an even stronger appeal for its support after the election in his ill-advised and unsuccessful maneuvers for an armed uprising. That both Cárdenas and Avila Camacho realized the danger involved is clear from subsequent events, but various factors in the situation seem to have made it impossible for them to move directly against Sinarquism.

In spite of the claims of the Almazanistas to the contrary, claims echoed, unfortu-

nately, by some United States writers not too well acquainted with the Mexican situation, Avila Camacho was the choice of the Mexican people in the election of 1940. Unfortunately, Mexican elections leave much to be desired as an instrument for the free expression of public opinion, which always gives the defeated candidate a chance to claim he has been defrauded, and provides willing ears to listen to his claims. The Almazanistas exploited this charge to the utmost, and the Sinarquistas have capitalized upon it in order to represent themselves as the party of electoral reform.

It was equally clear that Camacho's election meant a pause, at least a temporary lull in the advance of reform. Partly this was a natural reaction to the rapid tempo of change under Cárdenas, who had left behind many of the older revolutionary leaders. Partly, as already suggested, it was the result of the trying international situation centering around the question of the oil and land expropriations, but with wider ramifications in the whole international area. The upshot of the whole matter, politically, was that after Avila Camacho assumed the presidency in December, 1940, the initiative no longer lay in the hands of the labor and peasant groups and leaders which had furnished the drive for the reforms of the preceding six years, but in the hands of forces of conservatism, or even reaction.

III

CARDENAS, before and after the election, had tried to gather all political groups behind a national, "revolutionary," or popular front. He was, apparently, reading the portents of the growing seriousness of the situation after the fall of France. Near the end of his term he pointed out Sinarquism as one of several seriously dangerous groups threatening this national unity by their refusal to co-operate. The principal keynote to the Avila Camacho administration so far has been its continuance of this emphasis upon national unity. He recognized conservative forces in his Cabinet with the appointment of Véjar Vásquez in the Department of Education to work out a conservative compromise on the schools question, and in the appointment of his very capable, but conservative brother, Maximino, to the important office of Communications and Public Works.

In the summer of 1941, President Camacho, too, found it necessary to denounce Sinarquism as "exotic" and separatist because it opposed his efforts at national unity. Then, on the eve of the celebration of Mexican independence, September 16, while his charge against the UNS was still echoing in a lively argument in the press, the President announced that he had accepted the offer of the Sinarquists to devote their chief energies to colonizing lower California and Sonora. The natural inference to be drawn, of course, was that the Sinarquists had been won over to the cause of national unity. Subsequent developments, however, raised many perplexing questions and cast considerable doubt on this explanation.

A better explanation seems to be that President Camacho, faced with divided counsels in his Cabinet, and acting in his characteristic rôle of balancer, decided to play the UNS into a position where they would be unable, or would not dare to join forces with really seditious elements such as the Spanish Falange, but would be brought to support his national unity instead. In so doing, he was electing to treat the UNS as the chief potential center of opposition to his Administration. He was recognizing the opposition as essentially counter-revolutionary, but was banking upon its fundamental Mexicanism.

The President's announcement, coming in the midst of violent arguments over changes in the school law, and in the midst of the negotiations for settlement of the petroleum question with the United States, stirred Mexico as few political developments have. The proposal to send groups of questionable loyalty to the Revolution, if not to Mexico, into strategically important regions like Lower California caused a great deal of uneasiness. Of course it was true, as the President pointed out, that only sparsely populated areas of this sort were in need of colonization enterprises. Moreover, the development of Lower California, in emulation of Upper California, has been a favorite project of Mexicans for many years.

The Mexican Congress was in session at

the time, and both Houses moved quickly to condemn the colonization agreement as dangerous. The Chamber of Deputies, accused by the UNS of being controlled by Cardenistas, was particularly outspoken in criticism. The Senate waited upon the President formally, but, in a closed meeting, was apparently convinced by him that he knew what he was doing. At any rate the Senate, without repealing its previous action, adopted a resolution of confidence in the President. Whether it was so intended or not, the President's policy had thus already borne some fruit by putting the UNS into open conflict with Congress. On December 4, a group of 172 senators and deputies organized themselves as a National Anti-Sinarquist Committee, with headquarters in a downtown office building in Mexico City. They denounced Sinarquism as counter-revolutionary, aiming to restore the situation prior to 1910, and as Fifth Columnist, following in the lead of the Spanish Falange.

To appreciate the full difficulty of the President's situation at this time it is necessary to realize that the long-drawn-out oil negotiations, plus the Mexican policy of close collaboration with the United States in all measures of hemisphere defense were creating an ideal situation for the Sinarquists to exploit the deep-rooted Yankeephobia by raising the specter of United States intervention. This they did in a sensational declaration on October 20, 1941, directed particularly against Vicente Lombardo Toledano, liberal Cárdenas labor leader, against Cárdenas himself, and against Cárdenistas in Congress. These groups, the UNS declared, were attempting by their agitation against the colonization scheme to bring about United States intervention!

By the first of December the question of Sinarquism was nearing some kind of crisis. Government officials were seemingly moving slowly and with hesitation to carry out the colonization plans, for complaints appeared in the press from the Sinarquist leaders that they were not being supplied with transportation and supplies which had been promised to them. Early in the month Salvador Abascal was arrested in Mexico City in connection with a disturbance created by his followers. Released a few days later, he resigned his position as leader of the Union to give his full time, it was said, to colonization plans. The other two principal leaders did likewise.

Then came the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor and the United States entrance into the war as an active belligerent. President Camacho led Mexico in an immediate break of diplomatic relations with the Axis Powers. His calm and timely radio speech on the night of December 9, heard throughout the Americas, did much to draw the nations of the Western Hemisphere together, and to prepare the way for the Rio de Janeiro Conference which followed. The President moved cautiously and deliberately to secure the backing of all groups in the nation for his international policy. The streets of the capital resounded to the marching of demonstrations of support for the Administration. On December 14, the newspapers carried a long statement of the UNS to its members. It urged full support for the President on the basis of his message of December 9. But, said the UNS, it would strive to its utmost to keep Mexico out of the war, and urged its members to pray to God to the same end. Half-hearted as this endorsement was, under all the circumstances it was a victory for the President's policy.

Any fear that the President was yielding too much to the Sinarquists, or that he was perhaps forming a political alliance with such counter-revolutionary groups, was more than offset by his appointment of ex-President Cárdenas to command the critically important Pacific Coast area within which the principal colonizing projects of the UNS lay. His recent appointment of Cárdenas to be Secretary of War further dispels any such fear. Moreover, the prominent and outspoken rôle of Mexico's representative to the Rio Conference, Ezekiel Padilla, left little doubt as to the attitude of Mexico and President Camacho toward the war.

As early as December 16, two days after the Sinarquist statement appeared, a group of students and teachers from the National University, who had been engaging in fascist-like agitation, and, incidentally, furnishing some of the inspiration for the Sinarquists, came to the President (at his invitation?) to say they would cease their

agitation. Throughout January the Congressional Anti-Sinarquist Committee became increasingly active. On February 22, the President, facing a rising tide of demand for action against fascist groups, again called upon the UNS to state its aims. If the Union, said the President, was attempting to organize Mexican Catholics in accordance with imported totalitarian doctrines its action was "criminal and unpatriotic." The Union's published reply denied that it had any foreign connections and claimed that it was purely nationalistic.

Not until after Mexico's entrance into the war as a belligerent was any further significant step taken against the UNS. While Axis nationals have been removed from dangerous coastal and border zones, UNS colonization projects have apparently gone forward slowly. The Spanish Falange has been suppressed, and a new national anti-fascist committee, headed by the President, of the official Mexican Revolutionary Party has transformed the campaign against fascist doctrine into a national campaign. Highly significant in its suggestion of one of the sources of Sinarquist support is the determined effort of this committee, announced in the press June 1, to enlist the support of business and property-owning classes. The official statement of the UNS on July 15, referred to at the beginning of this article came out of this new campaign and in response to another request from the President. It is significant for its pointed denial of fascist or other such activities or connections, and for its specific endorsement of the cause of the Democracies. In other words, the UNS has now specifically renounced a large part of its basic ideology, and while its conversion may not be very deep nor sincere, undoubtedly much of the wind has been taken out of its sails.

If President Camacho had been less loyal and less aggressive in the cause of hemisphere solidarity, or had played the dictators' game in any way, one might form a different and greater estimate of the danger of Sinarquism in Mexico. Not that its danger is in any sense slight today. It is the essence and the center of the forces of counter-revolution. Brought into line, perhaps, for the duration of the war, it will some day reappear. The issues of this war center around such movements as the Mexican Revolution, and if we really mean to make the next age the "century of the common man," we must see to it that the United States does not again, unwittingly, drift into such a situation as that in which it unintentionally contributed to the growth of counter-revolution and the development of Sinarquism in Mexico.

For we must remember that Sinarquism stands convicted as a fascist movement, although at this time only the Mexican Secret Service may have all the compromising evidence concerning its connection with foreign fascist organizations. Certainly it has all the external earmarks of fascism, plus the special danger in this time of crisis of sympathy with Hispanidad, the Franco-inspired international Pan-Hispanism. In view of these facts, President Camacho's policy of compromise has the appearance of appeasement; nevertheless, it would be fair to interpret it as one of strength rather than weakness. The distinction is an important one, and may even point a lesson in statesmanship. While boldly preparing Mexico to assume her responsibility in the world conflict, and to assume a rôle of leadership in the inter-American front, he disarmed a reactionary and potentially disloyal opposition by a remarkable combination of political perspicacity, common sense, and serenity, to borrow a popular Latin American expression.

But none of these considerations should cause us to forget for one moment that Sinarquism is the embodiment of the forces of reaction in Mexico, and that it is representative of similar forces throughout Latin America and the world at large. The present Administration in Mexico may have served a useful purpose in checking it. But it will rise again, and some day a more liberal regime must overcome it. Mexican liberal and labor elements are absolutely opposed to toleration of Sinarquism in any form. They rightfully see in it the greatest threat to Mexico's revolutionary social program and will not rest until it has been stamped out.

Progress of the Struggle

by NORMAN ANGELL

A YEAR ago the chief danger to Allied unity seemed to be a growing divergence between the United States and Great Britain. Today the danger is a momentarily growing divergence between the United States and Russia. A year ago the British retreats in Malaya and Burma had given sharp point to American feeling on the subject of British "colonialism" and imperialism, particularly in respect to Indian policy. Left and Right joined hands in indictments of Great Britain: the Left, disturbed by the refusal of concessions to Indian nationalism and the impression that Britain was blocking a second front in aid of Russia for political reasons; the extreme Right (as represented by, say, Mr. William Randolph Hearst, still at that time running his personal daily column) alleging that in making Germany and not Japan the chief enemy, America was being dragged at the heels of Britain. Between the two, feeling was beginning to run high. Even Mr. Wendell Willkie was giving expression to it. The "Open Letter to the British People" published in *Life* put it in somewhat crude form. There was obvious danger that this feeling might come into head-on collision with a certain obstinacy in the attitude of Mr. Winston Churchill, who took occasion bluntly to tell the world that he did not intend to preside at the dissolution of the British Empire.

The "risk of disunity" does not mean that in the midst of a world war any of the allies are going to part company and fight each other. The risk involved is that of administrative friction, delayed decisions, some damage to the morale of the members of the United Nations, sand in the machinery of co-operation, and a reduction of effectiveness, generally. The even greater danger is that at the cease-fire, when the unifying influence of a great common fear has been removed, the whole settlement will be endangered, as it was on the last occasion of peacemaking, when indeed our victory was not merely endangered but wrecked and thrown away because we had no agreed policy for the achievement of the aims for which we had been fighting.

This, of course, is what Hitler is hoping for from the activities of his agents in promoting the kind of squabbles which crop up between us from time to time, and which, a year since, seemed to center on Anglo-American differences. Goebbels must have a very high opinion of the value of Anglophobia as a disruptive element. It has served him incredibly well in France, as we know. (It is indeed quite arguable that without it the very narrow vote of the French Cabinet which took France out of the war would have gone in the other direction.) He had managed to persuade so many in France that in entering the war she was just picking British chestnuts out of the fire, and that "Britain would fight to the last Frenchman." Perhaps he hopes that Anglophobia will serve him equally well in North Africa. So far as this country is concerned, however, it seems very notably on the decline. For one thing, the theory of British decadence is much less commonly accepted than it was when Rommel was advancing to the very gates of Alexandria and Mr. Laski interpreted the British retreat as an "Epitaph on a System"—the "System" being the whole political, economic, and social set-up of Great Britain; and when Lord Strabolgi was explaining that the old school tie was strangling the British Army. A military retreat was, of course, in any case a somewhat slender basis for these very sweeping generalizations. If a social or economic system is to be judged by its military effectiveness, what are we to say of the German military achievements which, after all, have been considerable.

A later judgment than those just men-

tioned has been given by Major George Fielding Eliot, who does not hesitate to say that Montgomery has proved himself one of the great generals of all history, adding that "it is of even greater importance for us to realize the superior quality of the troops whose fighting made the victory possible . . . to know that the men of the free nations can beat the best that Germany has to offer."

It is for this reason that the battle of the Mareth line, Major Eliot thinks, marks a turning point in the history of this war. "From this point we go forward" he says "in the utter certainty that we are better men than those opposed to us; for what Britons can do, Americans can do also, and in the hell of Mareth it has been proved once again that the men of the free nations are the masters on the battlefield of the machinelike robots of Germany, granted only that their training and equipment be reasonably equal."

We should do well not to generalize too widely, but both the military and the political events in North Africa have very greatly reduced the danger that misgivings about Britain in this country might be used for the purpose of creating distrust and disunity. Rightly or wrongly indeed, many American liberals have taken the view that British political policy in North Africa has been more liberal than American; and a check to reactionary tendencies. The Indian situation has settled down; there will be no Indian revolt. Anglophobia as a factor of disunity has declined. Is its place now to be taken by misgiving as to future Russian policy, by a Russophobia?

Such incidents as the execution of Ehrlich and Alter, the Polish Socialists, and the usual ineptitudes of the Communist party in this country have sharpened the misgivings among liberals, and furnished convenient handles for the reactionaries.

II

IF we of the United Nations are not to play the Axis game by weakening the unity which will be as indispensable for the peace as it is in war, we must repeatedly remind ourselves of that simple, obvious, undeniable, rudimentary truth we are always in such danger of forgetting, namely that our thirty nations have come together, not because we are alike, or necessarily like each other, but because we want to survive. It is not true that the "way of life" or the ideals of the thirty-odd United Nations are similar, or that we need to love each other. We need to hang together for the quite simple reason that if we do not we shall of dead certainty be hanged separately. To say that our common purpose and one supreme interest is self-preservation is not merely to state the clear and undeniable truth; it is also to enunciate and bring into the foreground of our consciousness the deepest motive of all living things, the impulse which is coterminous with the whole of sentient existence, survival. This is surely firmer ground for cooperation than an alleged similarity of political or economic or moral ideologies, a similarity which does not in fact exist.

Our unity need not, and ought not, to depend upon a "liking" of Americans for the British, or of Norwegians for Iraqis, or of Yugoslavs for Egyptians; or of Guatemalans for Australians. Nor is it quite tactful to insist that we are fighting for "Christian civilization" when the vast majority of the people concerned—in China, in India, in the Arab world—do not profess Christianity and are not Christian peoples. It may be true that Russia is not a democracy in our sense of the term. It does not alter the fact that we fight with her, as we fight with Buddhist, Confucian, Hindu, Mohammedan, and Jewish peoples, for a profound human right, the first of all rights, the right to live; the right to be democratic if we want to be; or the right to impose the "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" if that, to those concerned, seems preferable to democracy, or, as some would argue, the preferable form of democracy.

It is interesting in this context to note that the Englishman who perhaps has succeeded best of recent years in negotiations with the Soviet is Anthony Eden, from the Conservative side of English politics, not from the Left. He has succeeded best just because he has kept this one purpose of mutual defense clearly, unwaveringly, before him. This is the true common interest, not alone of Russia and Britain, but of the Big Four, as well as of all the members of the United Nations.

There is a certain parallelism between the present difficulties of American opinion in its wrestling with the Russian problem and the difficulties of idealistic opinion in Britain in the relations of that country with France just after the signature of the Versailles Treaty. Clemenceau and Foch (like Stalin today) had one supreme first and last interest, the security of France against German attack. The British Parliament (like the American Congress) had refused to ratify the guarantees given to France by President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George, a refusal which kept alive all the ancient misgivings about Anglo-Saxon perfidy. "Idealistic" opinion in Britain looked upon guarantees given to France as a "return to the old game of alliance-making" and as incompatible with the League. On the contrary, the guarantees might have been made the road thereto.

The relations with Russia may be threatened by a similar confusion. First and last, Russia wants security for the Russian state. So long as she is doubtful as to the guarantees to be given by the United States and Britain, she will provide her own guarantees, which will mean in effect territorial ones, affecting the Baltic States, Polish, Bessarabian, and Finnish territory. If American opinion boggles at giving guarantees to Russia because Russia is a wicked, godless state, it will be futile to ask for morally satisfactory frontiers.

There is a further point in that connection which Americans would do well to consider. Britain, as we know, in the recently signed twenty years' treaty has been ready to give guarantees and to enter into a treaty of mutual assistance, but Moscow is fully aware that it will be extremely difficult for Britain to implement that treaty if to do so would bring Britain into conflict with the United States. The guarantees which either Britain or America may give to Russia will, in the Russian view, depend upon the degree of Anglo-American understanding. If that understanding is close and complete, then a common guarantee by those two states will be that much more valuable to Russia. The risk that Russia would regard Anglo-American understanding as a threat to herself is very small. A far greater risk is that she would regard guarantees given by Britain alone, necessarily obliged to consider American susceptibilities, as of questionable worth. If Britain's assurances are endorsed by the United States, we shall be considerably nearer to meeting the Russian misgivings.

A final word as to the Ehrlich and Alter case, briefly referred to above.

The more that it is made quite clear to Moscow that not merely have the United States and Britain no designs whatsoever against the security of Russia, but are fully prepared to accept her as equal and full partner in any future security system, the more it will be possible without danger to speak plainly about such incidents as the execution of the Jewish-Polish Socialists. That execution has shocked liberal opinion of all shades (outside the Communist Party of course) both here and in Great Britain. It is altogether wholesome that expression should be given to the feeling of moral indignation. And a wholesome reminder that Sacco-Vanzetti cases are not the pure product of capitalism, that the inauguration of a socialist society does not automatically ensure political freedom and the respect of elementary right.

But in so far as such incidents in Russia are in some measure a relic of the fears about Western hostility, which date from the early days of the Revolution, our first concern should be to see that we do all in our power to eradicate those fears, to make it plain that they are groundless. Fear of the West helped to make Russia, in the years which preceded the war, almost a hermit nation. The policy of the *cordon sanitaire* was a policy of erecting anti-Russian states right on the country's doorstep. No wonder Russia put up barriers. The more now they can be broken down, and every possible contact facilitated, the better. Mr. Berle's categoric declaration early in the month that the State Department unequivocally repudiates the cordon policy should help very greatly to bring this about. If it be true that Archbishop Spellman is about to arrange, on behalf of the Vatican, a concordat with the Soviet Government, then indeed will giant strides toward real co-operation with Russia—and the liberalization of the Russian regime—have been taken. If this comes off, it will be one of the great political victories of the war.

"Defenders of European Civilization"

The Burning of the Books

by ALFRED KANTOROWICZ

"We are not, and we do not want to be, the land of Goethe and Einstein. Anything but that."

—Berliner Lokalanzeiger

ON May 10, 1940, Hitler's armies began to move. They overran the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. On June 14, the Nazis goose-stepped along the boulevards of Paris. A few days later the "phony war" came to an end; the real war began. We recall this day, May 10, 1940, as the historical date which led up to the climax of the European tragedy. And just as in the drama of antiquity the climax reveals the fatal involvement of the hero, his "tragic guilt," so the course of the European tragedy disclosed the "tragic guilt" of the *old* Europe.

This becomes very clear if we relate that May 10, 1940 to the events of another May tenth—a day which will be considered at least as important in the cultural history of the world as the beginning of the *Blitzkrieg* is in military history. For on May 10, 1933, the quintessence of progressive German literature from the time of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing was publicly burned by frantic mobs in the capitals and university towns of the Reich. This will remain one of the darkest days in the memory of intellectual Europe. Even the terrible events which May 10, 1940 inaugurated cannot deprive it of its symbolic significance. In fact, it may be said that the real significance of the action on that first date was clearly revealed only by the events of the second, even as this first action laid the foundation for these later events. The Europe which tolerated—not to say, encouraged—the growth of barbarism in its midst was presented with the bill for its indolence—not to say, moral complicity—seven years to the day after the Nazis first brazenly flaunted their barbarism.

What happened on May 10, 1933? Some ten thousand books were burned. The fires were not started by a fanatic mob acting on the spur of the moment. On the contrary, they were carefully planned and organized by the Nazis. The Reichstag fire of February 28, 1933 had been the beacon of terror. The boycott of the Jews on April 1 had inaugurated the pogroms. The liquidation and robbing of the unions on May 2 had signaled the beginning of the oppression of labor. Now the autos-da-fé of May 10 openly announced the barbarization of Germany carried out with terroristic ruthlessness on official orders.

It was the privilege of Propaganda Minister Goebbels and his staff to arrange the show. No better men could have been found. In his youth Goebbels had tried his hand at writing. But he himself recognized and revealed in his only novel, "Michael"—an obvious piece of trash—that he was too dissolute and lazy to succeed in serious literature. He deliberately chose the career of a demagogue for which his skill in political catchwords qualified him. There were thousands of intellectually undisciplined students who sought the same path. They joined the worst elements of the young war veterans and the lowest classes of the population in making up the

cadres of nazi terrorist organizations. They were inspired by Hitler's battle cries against the spiritual tradition of Europe and by his uninhibited hatred of all intellectual things. They welcomed the opportunity for violence in Hitler's brown-shirted corps which began as a gangster organization of all the antisocial and psychologically degenerate youth of Germany. The oft-quoted passage from the play, "Schlageter" expressed their attitude: "When I hear the word, culture, I slip back the safety catch of my revolver."

Thus it was natural for the Nazis to offer their followers the book-burning spectacle as the first concrete manifestation of the triumph of barbarism in Germany. The ceremony itself was the climax of a hysterical orgy of oppression and destruction. "Committees of Action against the Un-German Spirit" were organized throughout the country to purge public and private libraries of *"Schmutz und Schund"* (filth and trash). This *Schmutz und Schund* included the works of Voltaire and Heine, Barbusse and H. G. Wells, Sinclair Lewis and Selma Lagerlöf, Thomas Mann and Sholem Asch, Romain Rolland, Albert Einstein, Sigmund Freud and Maxim Gorky, Upton Sinclair, Stefan Zweig, Martin Anderson Nexö, and many others equally great and equally famous. Almost everything in contemporary literature that had worldwide reputation and a substantial part of the classics of European literature and science were thus condemned by Hitler's critics to the funeral pyre.

The book burning in Berlin was copied throughout Germany, although nowhere did it quite have the same mixture of order and hysteria as in the Berlin ceremony. Goebbels' newspaper, *Der Angriff,* jubilantly reported this auto-da-fé, featuring a speech delivered by the representative of the student body in which the youngster renounced all that constituted the greatness of our civilization.

> Yesterday at last came the day when the German students gathered in the Friedrichstrasse for a great symbolic ceremony. In an impressive demonstration the intellectual youth of Germany, under the auspices of the Committee of Action Against the un-German Spirit, demonstrated on behalf of the true spirit of Germany by consigning to the flames a gigantic pile of un-German books and writings. The ceremony was a historic event, the day a day of deep historical significance.
>
> Amid the chanting of ancient war songs and ballads, amid the rattle and clangor of German military marches up the street drives the procession, flanked by lampadephori. . . .
>
> After the conclusion of the [student's] oration, student after student stepped out to the furnace and consigned to it by name Jewish and pacifist propaganda literature. And truckloads of this trash and muck disappeared into the boiling heart of flame....

An address by Goebbels ended the ceremony. In the striking scene on the square in front of the opera house he stood like the very incarnation of evil, his rat-like face lit up by the fire which was devouring the finest achievements of German and European civilization, and cried out to the assembled masses: "The past is buried in the flames. The future shall rise out of the flame of our own hearts!"

Many of the thousands who had gathered to watch this impressive spectacle may have been moved to believe in the flame of their own hearts. The prophecy did not call for reflection; it demanded faith. It appealed to ignorance and indolence; it exploited economic needs and social insecurity. It did not take into account the political realities of that time or of the future; it merely played up the wishful dreams of these people to be the masters of society. They did not know that at the behest of these false prophets and misleaders they had detroyed the signposts of the past and of the future—their own future.

II

THAT nazism declared war on thought and reason, on literature and philosophy was no accident. The burning of the books was not a spontaneous act, but a carefully planned operation of nazi policy. To a certain extent it was motivated by petty resentment on the part of the organizers; yet the wirepullers staged it chiefly because they counted on the petty prejudices of the masses. They knew that they could realize their plans only if they could keep their followers ignorant. The nazi system has been built on concealment of facts rather

FOR their book burning the Nazis chose the works of Jewish authors and of those non-Jews, living and dead, whose philosophy ran counter to the creed of tyranny and racism. This list continued to grow until more than thirty thousand books by several thousand authors were thus honored. Certain writers (marked with an asterisk) were put in a special category: some of their books were proscribed; others permitted.

AMERICAN

Sherwood Anderson
Sholem Asch
Stephen Vincent Benét
Franz Boas
Louis Bromfield
Pearl Buck
Erskine Caldwell
Joseph E. Davis
John Dos Passos
Theodore Dreiser
Edna Ferber
Waldo Frank
Martha Gelhorn
Lillian Hellman
Ernest Hemingway
Josephine Herbst
Langston Hughes
Helen Keller
Sinclair Lewis
Archibald MacLeish
Albert Maltz
John Reed
Carl Sandburg
Vincent Sheean
William L. Shirer
Upton Sinclair
Howard K. Smith
John Steinbeck
Dorothy Thompson
Richard Wright

AUSTRIAN

Otto Bauer
Fritz Brügel
Siegmund Freud
Richard Beer Hoffmann
Robert Musil
Alfred Polgar
Joseph Roth
Felix Salten
Arthur Schnitzler
Kurt von Schuschnigg
Bertold Viertel
Jakob Wassermann
Franz Werfel
Stefan Zweig

CZECHOSLOVAK

Eduard Benes
Karel Capek
Jaroslaw Hasek
Adolf Hoffmeister
Franz Kafka
Egon Erwin Kisch
Thomas Masaryk
Franz Weiskopf

ENGLISH

Norman Angell
Duchess of Atholl
Christopher Caudwell
Winston Churchill
Duff Cooper
Ralph Fox
Louis Golding
Aldous Huxley*
Hewlett Johnson
Eric Knight
Harold J. Laski
D. H. Lawrence*
Rosamond Lehmann
J. B. Priestley
Bertrand Russell
Bernard Shaw*
Stephen Spender
Wickham Steed
John Strachey
Jan Struther
H. G. Wells*
Tom Wintringham

FRENCH

Louis Aragon
Henri Barbusse
Julien Benda
Henri Bergson
Georges Bernanos
Jean Richard Bloch
Léon Blum
Aristide Briand
Georges Clemenceau
Eve Curie
Anatole France
Roger Martin du Gard
André Gide
Edouard Herriot
Victor Hugo
Henri de Kerillis
André Malraux
François Mauriac
André Maurois
Vladimir Pozner
M. M. I. Robespierre
Romain Rolland
Jules Romains
René Schickele
F. M. Voltaire
Emile Zola

GERMAN

August Bebel
Johannes R. Becher
Ernst Bloch
Ludwig Börne
Bert Brecht
Hermann Broch
Alfred Döblin
Albert Einstein
Friedrich Engels
Lion Feuchtwanger
Ludwig Feuerbach
Leonhard Frank
Oskar Maria Graf
Walter Hasenclever
Heinrich Heine
Karl Kautsky
Ferdinand Lassalle
Rudolf Leonhard
G. E. Lessing*
Karl Liebknecht
Emil Ludwig
Rosa Luxemburg
Heinrich Mann
Thomas Mann
Karl Marx
Franz Mehring
Karl von Ossietzky
Theodor Plivier
Walter Rathenau
Erich Maria Remarque
Ludwig Renn
Friedrich Schiller*
Anna Seghers
Berta von Suttner
Ernst Toller
Fritz von Unruh
Friedrich Wolf
Arnold Zweig

ITALIAN

G. A. Borgese
Benedetto Croce
Ambrogio Donini
Guglielmo Ferrero
Gaetano Salvemini
Carlo Sforza
Ignazio Silone
Dom Sturzo

RUSSIAN

J. Babel
Alexander Blok
Ilja Ehrenburg
Konstantin Fedin
Maxim Gorki
Valenti Kataev
Vladmir Iljitch Lenin
Maxim Litvinov
A. Lunatcharski
V. Majakowski
Ilf and Petrov
Boris Pasternak
Michael Sholokhov
Konstantin Simonon
Joseph Stalin
Alexei Tolstoi

SCANDINAVIAN

Martin Andersen-Nexö
Georg Brandes
Nordal Grieg
Selma Lagerlöf
Karin Michaelis
Sigrid Undset

SPANISH

Rafael Alberti
Manuel Altolaguirre
Manuel Azaña
José Bergamin
Federico Garcia Lorca
Antonio Machado
Constancia de la Mora
Fernando de los Rios
Ramon Sender
Alvarez Del Vayo

MISCELLANEOUS

Theodor Balk (Yugoslav)
Hans Habe (Hungarian)
Arthur Koestler (Hungarian)
Maurice Maeterlinck (Belgian)
Baruch Spinoza (Dutch)
Josef Wittlin (Polish)
Julian Tuvim (Polish)

than on enlightenment, on confusion rather than on clarity. The ridicule of rational standards and logical thought, the attacks on great literature which reveals the human motives and principles and ideals of civilization were necessary protective measures.

Liberal and progressive organizations accept criticism. They gratefully profit by it. Naturally, they derive great satisfaction from any artistic expression in which their ideas or ideals are confirmed. But the essence of their liberalism lies in the fact that they are able to view the conditions which they create. National Socialism, on the other hand, cannot stand the sight of its Gorgonian head. Woe to him who would try to picture it as it actually is! National Socialism and truth—truth in whatever form it may appear—exclude each other. The Nazis live on lies not only in politics but also in what they allege to be literature. Thus what is being written and read in the nazi Reich must never portray reality either directly or indirectly; it can neither mirror nor criticize the actual conditions.

In burning those books from which his ignorant followers might have received enlightenment or inspiration, Goebbels destroyed not only criticism of the present but the vision of the future. In accordance with its inner law nazism was compelled to suppress not only the work of contemporaries but also that of great scholars and writers of previous centuries—or to distort them by misquotations and misinterpretations. To the Nazis, a writer like Lessing, who advocated race tolerance two hundred years ago, constitutes a definite danger, and his work must be ridiculed and proscribed. The classical writers of the French Revolution (at which Hitler "spits" in his violent book) and all those who spoke up for reason, freedom, and human dignity were consigned to a similar fate. The Nazis had no choice in their campaign of vilification but to attack Heinrich Heine, the greatest lyric poet of the German language. They were obliged to censor the plays of Schiller, to delete such passages as Marquis Posa's famous cry, "Sire, give us freedom of thought," or to debar certain dramas like "Wilhelm Tell" entirely. What they did not toss on the burning pile they desecrated unscrupulously—from Goethe, who does not "appeal" to Hitler, to Nietzsche, whom the Fuehrer likes to quote.

But this protective measure was merely one of the reasons why the Nazis purged German literature. There was another aspect to their action which they had cleverly foreseen. The human mind must feed upon something; it seeks to be guided and inspired. After having outlawed the great works which contained noble and liberal ideas, the Nazis knew that it would be much easier to fill the empty minds with false ideologies. They had proscribed truth; now they could make lies seem real and glamorous. They had ridiculed reason; now they found it less difficult to play on the keyboard of immature emotions. They had condemned justice; now the road was cleared for tyranny. They had called freedom a "nation-infecting-whore"; now they could acclaim terrorism as order. They had indicted pacifism; now the violence and cruelty of war were to be praised as the noblest of national virtues. Thus the most insidious feature of the book burnings of May 10, 1933 was that they were the initial step in the ideological rearmament of German youth.

III

THE ceremony, which had begun with the singing of ancient songs, came to a close, like all nazi demonstrations, with the mass singing of "Volk Ans Gewehr" (Nation to Arms) and the Horst Wessel song. This was a fitting end. The symbolic destruction of two hundred years of German cultural development could not have found a denouement more in keeping with the ideas of the Nazis than the invocation to arms and the infantile rhymes of that infamous scoundrel, Horst Wessel.

A partial list of authors honored by having their works barred from nazi Germany is printed on another page. Most of these names were added after the book-burning ceremony. But the Committee of Action which had compiled the blacklists, replaced the "filth and muck" by a recommended list, characterized as "unassailable from the national viewpoint." Naturally, the name of Hitler led all the rest. After him came several score of writers whose

names are unknown outside of Germany and whose influence has been almost entirely disregarded by those who are concerned about the character and attitudes of the new generation in Germany. These books, published in editions of millions of copies, prepared the minds of the German people for the May tenth of 1940.

Fortunately for the culture of the world, the burnings were symbolical. Neither the books themselves nor their living authors were destroyed. Libraries outside of Germany retain and honor these works, and most of their writers have found in exile a refuge and often a home. Nevertheless, the number who were slain by the Nazis is significant. The poet Erich Mühsam was hanged in a concentration camp. Professor Theodor Lessing was murdered by the Gestapo in Czechoslovakia. Carl von Ossietsky, who had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, was tortured to death. The writers Kurt Tucholsky, Ernst Toller, Walter Hasenclever, Ernst Weiss, Walter Benjamin, Carl Einstein, and recently Stefan Zweig were driven to suicide by their horror at the increasing barbarism of Germany.

It is well to note here that a majority of these great German writers who escaped the clutches of the barbarians were what the Nazis called "Aryans." Their apostasy from the ideals of civilization would have been welcomed with a fanfare of trumpets by the Fuehrer and his propaganda minister, yet they left Germany because they could not work nor live in that "Aryan" paradise. They represent the thousands of German artists, musicians, philosophers who now in exile carry on the great achievements of German culture. Within the expanding boundaries of the nazi Reich these achievements can be found only in the catacombs. From the Underground movement we learn that the German classics are being read with deeper ardor than ever before by those to whom such reading is no longer entertainment or diversion; it is a study which furnishes both the inspiration and the ammunition for the battle that they are carrying on. It is an offense punishable by concentration camps, prisons, and even death. There is actually a prosperous black market in prohibited books, whether they are the works of Lessing or Heine, Voltaire or Marx, Freud or Thomas Mann.

Meanwhile, a new literature is being created in Germany. Hundreds of writers who could not leave for one reason or another have not published a word in these ten years. But we may assume that somewhere they have concealed manuscripts which one day will emerge as the revelatory chronicles of this reign of terror. Some such manuscripts have only recently been smuggled out of Germany. They show that many of the experiences in the land of horror have already found literary expression. And what has not been set down on paper is indelibly stamped in the minds of the younger writers. An instance of that occured last year when the *Tribüne für freie deutsche Literatur* awarded the prize in its literary contest to a story about the labor service in nazi Germany. When the sealed envelopes containing the names of the authors were opened, it was discovered that the winner was an unknown author, Fritz Zorn. Investigation disclosed that Fritz Zorn was a young German worker who escaped in 1939 to America where he was working as a dishwasher in a restaurant. In this story and in a novel which may soon be published this young man has converted the stark facts about the nazi heel into a literary document of the highest importance.

Thus we see that the ceremony of May 10, 1933, is not likely to be any more permanently successful than the military triumph of May 10, 1940. In that hysterical act of vandalism on the night of the book burning the Nazis sought to destroy even more than the works of the protagonists of freedom and democracy, even more than the rights of their own people; they sought to violate the human spirit. In this they failed. The measure of their failure was eloquently expressed by Franklin Delano Roosevelt last year in these words: "We all know that books burn—yet we have the greater knowledge that books cannot be killed by fire. People die, but books never die. No man and no force can abolish memory. No man and no force can put thought in a concentration camp forever. No man and no force can take from the world the books that embody man's eternal fight against tyranny of every kind."

—Translated by Andreas Dorpalen

The Speech of Henry Wallace

by MICHAEL WILLS

THE great speech of Vice President Wallace, now best known under the title, "The Century of the Common Man," has inspired the masses throughout the world. The Editors feel that no better commemoration of its anniversary can be presented than this simple account of the manner in which it affected the young Americans who are giving their lives that the ideals embodied in it may be realized.

MAY 8, 1942 is a date to be remembered. Two events make it memorable for me. But the chance that I was commissioned an officer in the Army of the United States on that day has no importance beside the speech Vice President Wallace gave which voiced the hope for a free world. For my personal reason I shall not forget that date, but some time the world will celebrate it for that other reason.

I had a foretaste of this on that very night, for I flew into New York just as my friend and host returned from the Free World dinner where it was delivered. His social tact which usually was so sensitive to the moods of others deserted him on this occasion. His first excited and enthusiastic words were:

"Oh, such a speech! Did you hear him on the radio? No? Why, Wallace, I mean. Oh, it was splendid! Uh, the uniform looks fine. Congratulations. Gosh, that was a magnificent speech. . . ." And he told me all about it. When I went to my post, I took a copy of the address with me.

In the Army an effort is made to acquaint the troops with the course of events in the world and the war. A certain amount of time is devoted to "orientation and citizenship" talks, nonpolitical discussions of events leading up to the war and reports on the progress of the armed forces. In June it was my assignment to present the current events lecture to my company. I had the speech at hand. The men were marched out into a small natural amphitheatre in the woods, where they sat on logs facing a rustic lectern. Under the beech trees the air was comparatively cool, and the men relaxed.

"Gentlemen," I said, "This is an hour devoted to current events. There is nothing else for you to do than to listen, listen and think of the meaning of what I am going to read to you."

As nearly as I can remember I told them that nothing of greater importance had happened on any front for some time than the presentation of this speech by Vice President Henry Wallace. "It is the first great statement of war aims by a qualified spokesman for our nation. I would like to hear what you think of it. After all, we are the ones who are going to fight this war and sometimes we may ask 'what for,' sometimes, when we're tired and grumpy or just thoughtful. I am going to read this text to you. We will discuss it afterward and I will try to answer any questions you have, if I can."

I read the speech. The men listened. Not one of them moved. I had hoped to interest some of them and I was surprised at the intensity with which every one of

them attended. They are draftees, selectees, enlisted men, what you will—Americans, Americans from all over the world; from upstairs and downstairs too. Some of them are intelligent, some dumb; some one way, some another.

"Why is it not possible," I asked them, "in a world where for the first time in history there is enough to go around, to aim to make it come true? That is the challenge in this speech. That is one of the greatest purposes of this war. We'll have this job of building to look forward to. I think it's a fine future. What do you say?"

They were damned enthusiastic. When I asked if any of them wanted to make some specific comment or question, at least a hundred (almost half of the group) put up their hands; so many that they all laughed at their own enthusiasm. I remembered the jubilation of my very polite and cultured host. What a great difference in the surroundings! He was exultant in his calm and ordered house; they, in rough clothes, surrounded by the mud and confusion of the tools of war, were just as insistent and full of ardor. Most of the soldiers' comments were about themselves or their families or their home towns and how they fitted into the picture of the world and the world purpose of the speech they had just heard.

That was the best part of it. They had heard the words of Henry Wallace, and understanding them, they caught sight of the great vista for which so many men have lived and strained all their energies, for which so many have sweated and died. That speech became a part of their working day; a purpose for them, it dignified their necessary chores and it would, remembered, give their courage something to look forward to, their energy something "beyond the call of duty" for which to fight.

On May 8, 1942, Wallace proposed a dare. Since then I have heard some who answered, "Aaah, who wants to anyway? This is sissy stuff."

Not so sissy. Not when it makes men want to fight. Not *so* sissy. When it arouses men to work with such a will, to sweat with a kind of glee, to curse with an almost religious zeal because they are full of its passion, because they feel their own purpose in the fight through the medium of those inspiring words. Better than the illustrated glorifications of their uniforms the advertisers put out, better than the mawkish radio reanimations of the soldier's life that get so insufferably chummy, the Vice President's speech talks to them honestly, with sense and with emotion. And the soldiers understand it.

There is something about the condition of a soldier that makes for intellectual and emotional courage as well as physical daring. Perhaps it is because all necessities being cut to the barest minimum, one of the greatest primal needs asserts itself powerfully—the need to use imagination and the heart. I do not know. That they understand a splendid dream is evident enough. I saw it with my men. All the rest of the day they worked with an added vigor, and for many days thereafter. When I passed them after duty hours, their salutes were neater than before. I recognized in them, in the eyes turned smartly toward me, that their hearts were full of purpose. They knew their job. They were accepting the challenge. They have left camp now; many of them must be overseas. Wherever they are, soldiers need a big, "impossible" ideal. They *need* it. And they get it in that speech on the "Price of a Free World Victory."

ee, old Cause!
peerless, passionate, good cause!
stern, remorseless, sweet Idea!
less throughout the ages, races, lands!
a strange, sad war—great war for thee,
ink all war through time was really fought, and
ever will be really fought for thee;)
e chants for thee—the eternal march of thee.
orb of many orbs!
seething principle! Thou well-kept, latent germ!
centre!
nd the idea of thee the strange sad war revolving,
all its angry and vehement play of causes,
h yet unknown results to come, for thrice a thou-
sand years,)
e recitatives for thee—

WALT WHITMAN

BUDDHISM

as a Japanese Propaganda Instrument

by

H. G. QUARITCH WALES

with a commentary

by

LIN YUTANG

IT was inevitable that the Japanese would seek to win support for their new order by pretending to champion Asiatic religions. By encouraging Islam in Central China and the Dutch Indies they have aspired to establish Tokyo as the Mecca of the Far East. More logically, for at least at an earlier period they could claim to be a largely Buddhist nation, the Japanese have sought culturally to permeate Northern China and the strategic lands of Southeastern Asia with perverted Buddhist propaganda of a particularly sinister type.

Naturally, now that Japan actually dominates Indo-China, Thailand, and Burma she is in a position to intensify her cultural propaganda with the intent of attaining eventually her logical goal—complete mastery of the minds of the peoples she has physically subjugated. We can hardly expect to be provided with detailed reports as to the degree of success her efforts are achieving. Persons who manage to escape from the occupied regions, even if qualified, have rarely had much opportunity to observe the working of the poison, though J. H. Marsman, author of "I Escaped from Hong Kong," is emphatic that Japanese propaganda has a powerful cumulative effect. In the main then, to arrive at any estimate of what may be the present situation, we have to depend on indications and trends that were already apparent before Pearl Harbor, and these certainly give good cause for uneasiness.

This Buddhist propaganda has for several years been carried on by the New Asia Bureau of the Dai Nippon Buddhist Association, which is under the joint control of the Japanese Education and War Ministries. It is responsible for all missionary work in East Asia, and long before Pearl Harbor was already deeply entrenched in Northern China. There, the more systematically to further its ends, the New Asia Bureau had established Sino-Japanese Buddhist associations at Hangchow, Amoy, and Nanking, subsidized by the special service section of the army, naturally not with purely religious motives in view.

In the countries of Southeastern Asia, the Japanese had to go about their cultural penetration in a more diplomatic manner, at least before military conquest. They endeavored to establish happy relations by sending their so-called International Buddhist Missionaries on good-will missions of a tentative character. It was in 1936 that I first learned of their activities in Thailand, a country which in view of its important strategic position it was very important to win over at an early stage. I met them again on a visit to Burma in 1938. Flattery of the Southern Buddhist *(Hinayana)* tenets, which are of course quite different from those of the Northern *(Mahayana)* Buddhism on which Japanese Buddhism is based, was then the principal weapon. In fact they were still busy over this method of approach as late as the spring of 1941, as the following incident will show.

In May of that year they decided to make a show of introducing to Japan the Vesak ceremony, the greatest annual festival of the Hinayana Buddhists of Ceylon, Thailand, Burma, and French Indo-China. It was staged rather as an exotic spectacle than as a genuine religious occasion at the Hibiya Park auditorium in Tokyo. Commenting on it in its issue of May 30, 1941, the *Japan Times and Advertiser* remarked: "This holy practice, typical of Hinayana Buddhism, was not known to the Buddhists in this country before, and the International Buddhist Society which has been so anxious to establish closer ties between the Buddhists of Mahayana and Hinayana schools, has recently decided to introduce this beautiful custom of Southern Buddhism."

Such flattery was only a preliminary. The next step was, wherever possible, to inculcate interest among the Hinayanist peoples in the doctrines of the Mahayana school, or rather in the peculiarly Japanese derivative of it. This part of the program is now believed to be in full swing in Burma and Thailand, for of course it is only when Japan controls the secular administration that the full implication of the Japanese Buddhist propaganda can be brought home to the peoples of the occupied country. To appreciate what this implication is, it is necessary to realize that Japanese so-called Buddhism, far from having any rightful claim to leadership in Buddhism, is in fact so perverted as no longer to be worthy of being ranked as Buddhism at all. The creed that the Japanese militarists have invoked to serve their aggressive purposes is now nothing more than Shintoism masquerading in Buddhist guise to ensnare the unwary.

This is so important that it will be well here to look a little more closely into the fate of Buddhism in Japan. The fact is that orthodox Mahayana Buddhism had not been introduced into Japan for more than a century before, in 806 A.D., a monk named Kobo Daishi began the process of harmonizing it with Shinto, the Way of the Gods. By the twelfth century, Buddhism in its purely Japanese form had emerged. This is Zen Buddhism which disinterested students, in agreement with orthodox Mahayanists, have described as a tissue of solemn nonsense, a defiance of common sense. Further developments led to the acceptance of easy methods of salvation by a simple profession of faith, without personal effort. Later sects claimed to have so improved Chinese Buddhism, by combining it with the Japanese racial characteristics of courage and action, that it had become a practical philosophy of life, very different from its pessimistic Indian prototype. It certainly had no longer any point of contact with the original teachings of the Buddha!

Since the seventeenth century even this peculiarly Japanese Buddhism had become moribund, as a result of the rise of Shinto. It could not compete with such a purely indigenous cult. Everyone who has visited Japan knows that nowadays the Buddhist temples, in districts where they still exist, are no longer centers of popular worship, and are often regarded merely as historical relics. This has been the position since, with the Meiji restoration, it was seen that there could be no official place for such an alien faith as Buddhism. The worship of the Emperor himself, as the Incarnation of the Sun Goddess *(Amaterasu O-Mikami)* was to be the national cult, religion and administration being united. For the first time the Buddhas began to be regarded not as Eternal Ones, but as incarnations of the Shinto gods, the original entities.

II

SHINTO, has, of course, lent itself admirably to the requirements of the Japanese Fascists, who had bracketed Buddhism with Christianity as "running counter to the national policy." Religions that created a Land of Buddha or a Heavenly Paradise that is other than Japan, were not tolerable. Yet, while oppressing Buddhism at home, the Japanese Government realized what a useful instrument it could be for preparing the genuinely Buddhist countries for slavery. For their part the Japanese Buddhists were anxious to improve their position by showing their eagerness to further the cause of aggression, and the Buddhist General Araki indeed is a typical militiarist. Thus, the Japanese Buddhists were glad to co-operate in the Government's propaganda plans.

Now the ultimate aim of the International Buddhist Missionaries becomes clear. It is to lead the nations of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, via the "true Buddhism" which recognizes the Buddhas only as incarnations of the Shinto gods, to the worship of the Sun Goddess and hence of her present day incarnation, the Japanese Emperor. A fairly advanced step in the program, so far as northern China is concerned, may be seen in a report some time ago from Tokyo that a bronze image of the Japanese Buddhist saint, Kobo Daishi, had been unveiled in Nanking. The significance of this is seen when we remember that it was Kobo Daishi who first began to bring Buddhism into line with Shinto. Moreover this monk made Mount Koya the center of the worship of the Great Illuminator *(Dai Nichi Nyori)*, the central Buddha who embodies in himself all other Buddhas, each of which is a symbol of his virtue. Now, according to the Japanese, the Great Illuminator was only a temporary manifestation of the Sun Goddess and her divine descendant the Emperor. As on him the Japanese nation centers, so they expect the smaller Buddhist nations to be willing to be embodied in, or absorbed by Japan. Not only is the image of Kobo Daishi already enshrined in Nanking; there is a recent report that a great temple for the Sun Goddess herself is being built there.

Perhaps as I write, images of Kobo Daishi have already made their appearance in Southeastern Asia with the idea that the influence of the saint will lead all East Asia to the "true worship." No doubt if the Japanese have their way, shrines will be prepared for the Sun Goddess in all the tributary states; she will oust the revered Emerald Buddha from the Chapel Royal at Bangkok, and her shrine will occupy a place of supreme dignity on the platform of the Shwe Dagon at Rangoon.

Now what, one may ask, is likely to be the long-term reaction of the Hinayana Buddhists to this revolutionary teaching? Surely the Buddhist monks of Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, and Ceylon are so devout, so deeply attached to the Pali canon, so conscious of its approximation to the actual teachings of Guatama, as not to be easily led astray by this propaganda? If we believe this, then we are going to allow ourselves to become the victims of a new species of complacency, none the less dangerous than others, and very much to the liking of our enemy.

As a matter of fact, even before Japan gained physical control of the southern Buddhist countries (other, of course, than Ceylon), signs were not wanting that such propaganda would not be entirely ineffec-

tive. Admittedly in all of them there are many learned as well as devout monks, deeply versed in the scriptures. These are men who would resist any attempt to tamper with the doctrines that have been handed down to them. But in Indo-China, Thailand, and Burma the number of such learned monks was being rapidly reduced. They had always been in the minority because the monasteries were always largely tenanted by young peasants and others who spent only a portion of their lives in the yellow robe, and had little desire or capacity to acquire much knowledge. These might be expected to fall easy victims to cleverly presented propaganda of popular appeal, but at present they are too inarticulate to be of much political account.

Of much more serious import will be the attitude of the increasing class of Western-educated young men in these countries. Not only did the monastic life of seclusion and study make no appeal to most of them but, as I have noticed myself, they found the rules to be observed at certain times even by laymen rather too onerous, quite apart from any question of strict monastic discipline. Of late years, it had become more and more the custom among the educated to reduce the tiresome period to be spent by every male Buddhist in a monastery, to a week or even to a single day. Can we then expect the preaching by the Japanese of a far easier means of attaining salvation than that offered by Hinayanism, with its endless rebirths and stress on personal effort, to fall always on deaf ears? The peoples of Southeastern Asia are easy-going by nature.

In Thailand, under the new regime, much of the old religious ceremonial of the Court has been abolished. On the other hand, popular Buddhism has been encouraged largely for its ethical value, and has even been developed as a feature of modern state occasions. But it would be unwise to suppose that the present military clique, who have been so ready to show allegiance to Tokyo in the secular sphere, would be any less subservient when it came to acting as channels for the spread of Japanese propaganda. In fact, a certain Luang Vichitr, who was educated in France and was one of the few civilians remaining prominent in the government, had already

indicated by 1941 the lines on which this collaboration might develop. At one time a religious revivalist, and always a keen student of Thai history, he had been for several years in charge of the government's nationalist and irridentist propaganda. The promise he had shown, when in 1931 he published a book advocating a purified conception of Buddhism among the masses, has unfortunately not been fulfilled. His talents have been diverted to less noble ends by the militarist clique who found in him a willing tool. He was appointed head of the "reorganized" Royal Institute. There his achievements included the training of a theatrical troupe for the performance of plays that glorified aggression and the issue of a number of pseudo-scientific bulletins purporting to prove that the Cambodians and other neighboring peoples were really of Thai stock and should therefore be incorporated in the kingdom.

In Burma, before the war, conditions were already very propitious for the cultural poison to take effect. The British Government had here, as elsewhere, tolerated the native religion, but in the early days certain unfortunate errors of judgment had been committed that were never forgotten by the Burmese Buddhists. In

particular, there was the building of a fort at the base of Shwe Dagon Hill, one of the most sacred shrines of Buddhism. Hence, there existed a condition of receptivity in the religious sphere which paralleled that in the political domain. When the Japanese arrived, the Burmese, to whatever extent they may have been disillusioned later, were favorably impressed by the fact that their new masters were Buddhists of whatever school. With many Burmese monks active in the political sphere, the mechanism obviously existed for the propagation of Japanese ideas, not so much on grounds of conviction, but just by way of reaction from British rule.

Thus, if the Buddhist nations are to be saved from the ultimate effects of long-continued Japanese cultural penetration, United Nations' counter-propaganda should recognize the dangers of the present situation and make every effort to combat the evil by short wave broadcasts and other means. Should such efforts be at present impracticable, it will merely serve to emphasize the dangers of delay, however inevitable, in beginning the liberation of Southeastern Asia.

COMMENTARY

THERE is a sharp distinction between Shintoism and Buddhism. Shintoism, however, has incorporated Confucian monarchism or loyalty to the emperor, exploited it to the fullest degree, and carried it to a fanatical extreme which was never reached in China. Although there is no philosophical connection between Shintoism and Japanese Buddhism, believers in the Orient do not make a sharp distinction between the two. People can believe in both at the same time, and many of them do.

The particular kind of Buddhism that the Japanese believe in is called "Zen" which is directly borrowed from China and based on Chinese Buddhist classics. In China the sect is known as "Ch'an." It is a kind of quietism —a belief in salvation through meditation and awakening, not by erudition or rituals, but by direct intuition. "Ch'an" is only one of the ten sects in China, where prevails the northern division of Buddhism, known as "Mahayana."

Any connection between "Zen" Buddhism and military imperialism is, of course, spurious. No true Buddhist can believe in war and slaughter. But the Japanese are exploiting the basis of popular belief in Buddhism which already prevails in the Orient. They can corrupt Buddhism, as the Nazis can do what they like with Christianity. In the East, popular religion is easily subject to corruption. For instance, Marco Polo has become a Buddhist saint. He is one of the five hundred canonized in Chinese monasteries. There is no reason why the Japanese Sun Goddess could not be incorporated in the Buddhist creed.

The learned Buddhist monks will not oppose the Japanese attempt to pervert and exploit their religion. They are quiet people. On the whole they would resign themselves to Japanese force and take no action against Japanese influence, although I know Chinese monks who are intensely interested in politics. A more practical method of counter-propaganda than that of broadcasting by short wave to people who have very few radios and who undoubtedly have not been permitted by the Japanese to keep these, would be to drop leaflets from planes. The natives of Southeastern Asia have a comparatively high degree of literacy.

LIN YUTANG



PIONEERS *of the* LEAGUE IDEAL

by

LEONARD REED

THE war will end; and when it ends we shall sit down in conference and draw up plans for the preservation of the ideals for which we fought. Out of that conference must come an international agency which, at the very least, will be empowered to resolve those difficulties which in the past have plunged us into wars. As we look forward to that day of co-operation, it should hearten us to remember that the League ideal was a force long before Woodrow Wilson evolved his Covenant. In all countries, for the past several hundred years, men have pleaded and labored for it, and some of their plans were strikingly similar to Wilson's.

More than three hundred years before Wilson announced his Fourteen Points, the spectacular Henri of Navarre, leader of the Huguenots and promulgator of the Edict of Nantes which gave religious and political freedom to Protestants, nursed a "Grand Design" for the assurance of European peace. Henri was a practical politician as well as a magnificent adventurer and a proponent of the idea of freedom. His policy as a ruler was to make alliances based on immediate gain rather than on future security. But at the same time, he had no illusions about the worth of these bonds, and so he dreamed of his Grand Design. Briefly, the Design was to divide Europe among fifteen nations in such a way as to set up and maintain a balance of power. The members of the federation were to be equal and were to support by varying contributions the armed forces of the associated powers. Representatives of the federation were to form a council for the formulation of the necessary legislation to settle all questions that would otherwise lead to strife and to manage all civil, religious, and political affairs in Europe. The council was to be in constant session. Henri's assassination put an end to the plan. Had he lived, he might have succeded in making it a reality, for he was a singularly forceful character. It is only fair to point out that the king's Prime Minister, Sully, probably contributed substantially to the Design. The only outline of it that we have is contained in his Memoirs.

In the same century another statesman, quite the opposite of Henri, and yet like him in his zeal for religious tolerance, visualized a system to guarantee world peace. He was William Penn. His plan is best described in his own words:

The Sovereign or Imperial Dyet, Parliament, or State of Europe; before which, the sovereign assembly, should be brought all differences depending between one sovereign and another that cannot be made up by private embassies, before the sessions begin; and that if any of the sovereigns that constitute these imperial states shall refuse to submit their claims or pretensions to them, or to abide and perform the judgment thereof, and seek their remedy by arms, or delay their compliance beyond the time prefixt in their resolution, all the other sovereignties, united as one strength, shall compel submission and performance of the sentence with damage to the suffering parties, and charge to the sovereignties that obliged their submission; to be sure Europe would quietly obtain the so much desired and needed peace to the harassed inhabitants; no sovereignty in Europe having the power and therefore cannot show will to dispute the conclusion; and consequently peace would be procured and continued in Europe.

Penn went no further than to incorporate this plan in an essay. His work sank into obscurity, and was forgotten until it was republished in England in 1914. In the foreword to his "Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe," Penn said:

I have undertaken a subject that I am sensible requires one of more sufficiency than I am Master of to treat it as in Truth it deserves and the groaning State of Europe calls for; but since Bunglers may stumble upon the Game as well as Masters although it belongs to the skillful to hunt and catch it, I hope this Essay will not be charged upon me for a fault as it appears to be neither Chimerical nor Injurious and may provoke abler Pens to improve and perform the Design with better Judgment and Success. I will say no more in Excuse of myself for this undertaking but that it is the Fruit of my solicitous Thoughts for the Peace of Europe and they must want Charity as much as the world needs Quiet to be offended with me for so Pacified a Proposal. Let them censure my Management so they prosecute the Advantage of the Design for 'till the Millenary Doctrine be accomplished there is nothing appears to me so beneficial an Expedient to the Peace and Happiness of the Quarter of the world.

The opening paragraph of the plan is notable for its poignancy and its grim kinship to this moment: "He must not be a Man but a Statue of Brass or Stone, whose Bowels do not melt when he beholds the bloody tragedies of this War, in Hungary, Germany, Flanders, Ireland and at Sea."

II

THE man who devised the most elaborately detailed plan for a League which came closest to our conception of a world federation, was the remarkable French cleric, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre. This priest is barely known to historians today. But in his time he was a picturesque figure, establishing a reputation as a man with a peculiarly versatile mind fairly bursting with ideas for the improvement of the world. Most people with whom he came in contact did not take him seriously. To some he was a crackpot; to others a nuisance. And small wonder, for he wrote—gravely, and without the least irony, such essays as A Project to Make Peers and Dukes Useful. But some of the keener intellectuals of France realized that De Saint-Pierre was a passionate, if often naïve, humanitarian, and a man of unusual vision. Rousseau was one of them, and it was he who made an abstract of the priest's three-volume outline for a world tribunal.

De Saint-Pierre was born in 1658 of a good Norman family and was educated for service in the church. His scholarship brought him admission to the French Academy when he was thirty-seven, and in that same year he became court chaplain to the Duchess of Orleans. Possibly the one crisis in his life occurred when the Academy expelled him because he criticized the vaulting ambitions of Louis XIV. He was extraordinarily catholic in his interests, as much so as his American contemporary, Benjamin Franklin. He advocated—and vigorously—free trade, abolition of class privileges, phonetic spelling, the codification of the law, education of women, complete freedom of the press, a sound coinage, the institution of a census, equalization of the burdens of taxation, the establishment of poor relief, the organization of what today we should call a Department of the Interior for the maintenance and improvement of roads and canals—and the League

to keep the peace of the world. In addition, he coined a number of effective words, among them "gloriole" (vainglory) and "Beneficience," and invented a machine for indoor exercising.

The two centuries spanned by the life of the Abbé were among the most bloody of history. Wars raged through the years with but brief intervals for recovery and realignment of forces. In 1713, the peace treaty ending one of the longest and most disastrous of these wars was being written at the Congress of Utrecht and De Saint-Pierre participated in its deliberations as secretary to the French plenipotentiary. Then and there he began the great work of his life, "The Project for Perpetual Peace." Although he preceded Woodrow Wilson by two hundred years, his plan went further than the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The structure of the organization consisted of a Federation composed of the Senate and General Assemblies. It was to have headquarters called the City of Peace. An administrative group was to take care of routine, supervisory matters, and the policing of the City of Peace. The committee system of legislation that is now in use in the American Congress was suggested for the Federation's Diet, and the Abbé's arguments for giving all members equal representation anticipated those used at our own Constitutional Convention, when the American Senate was organized.

The "Fundamental Articles" of the proposed Federation may be summarized thus:

1. There shall be a Federation embracing all countries in Europe. Membership shall be perpetual and irrevocable, and members shall appoint plenipotentiaries to hold a permanent Diet at which all conflicting claims will be abitrated. The decisions reached shall be enforced by the Fed-

2. The Federation shall not interfere with the internal affairs of its members except to help them subdue revolt. (This was the Abbé's somewhat undemocratic way of insuring that a signatory government would not be overthrown and breach the unity of the Federation. His uncanny foresight visualized just a situation as occurred in the United States after Wilson pledged his country to the League.)

3. After the Federation has attained a certain membership, it will compel other countries to join it, considering any outsiders enemies to the peace of Europe.

4. There are to be no more territorial acquisitions and no more private treaties. The sovereigns shall not be suffered to make an exchange of any territory, nor to sign a treaty among themselves, except with the consent and under the guarantee of the Union by a three-quarters vote of the members, and the Union shall remain guarantor for the execution of reciprocal promises.

5. No power is to make preparations for war. If it has any claims, its representatives in the Senate in the City of Peace will present them. If a sovereign does make preparations for war he will be declared an enemy of society, and the Federation will undertake to disarm him and enforce its regulations. The offending sovereign will have to pay the cost of the war and will lose permanently whatever territory has been taken from him at the close of the war.

6. The expense of the Federation shall be borne in proportion to the ability of the various members—this ability to be determined by a three-fourths vote of the Diet.

In addition there are "Important Articles," which round out the administration of the project. One of them is: "Each Sovereign is permitted to retain an army of only 6,000 men." Another: "After the Congress shall have declared war against an offending Sovereign, those of his subjects who side with him against the Common County shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life, while great reward awaits those who will support the Union." So precious was the Union idea to the Abbé that he went so far as to insert a provision in the plan that if any government broke the peace, the Union would, at the end of the war, take the two hundred most responsible officials and punish them with death or life imprisonment as disturbers of the peace. Bloodthirsty? True. But the Abbé was a pioneer and a zealot, two qualities which produce extremism.

Finally, the plan incorporated "Useful Articles." Chief among them was this: "The European Union shall endeavor to establish in Asia a permanent Society like



that of Europe that peace may be maintained there also." And another equally enlightened and progressive clause: "Free exercise of any religion shall be allowed." The Abbé also wanted any Senator who did not show himself to be peace-minded to be ousted.

In laying down the Fundamental Articles, the Abbé was sharp enough to point out that since these Articles could not be changed except by unanimous vote of all members, and since the guarantee to the various member states against interference in their internal affairs was in itself an Article, there was no need for any country to fear that once it signed up that rule might be changed. Too, he reminded the rulers that even though each would be required to provide a military contingent for the Federation Army, the military budget of each country would be cut enormously. To say nothing of being rid of war, the Abbé said, the savings in expenditures for the army could be used for the development of commerce, agriculture and the arts.

In writing his abstract of the Abbé's plan, Rousseau summed it up as follows: "The Federation would include all the important powers in its membership; it would be a legislative body, with authority to pass laws and ordinances binding upon all its members; it would have a coercive force capable of compelling every state to obey its common resolves whether in the way of a command or of prohibition; finally, it would be strong and firm enough to make it impossible for any member to withdraw at his own pleasure the moment he conceived his private interests clashed with those of the whole body."

It is a summary which makes the similarity between the Abbé's project and Wilson's project the more sensational. Similar, too, was the reception of the two men's ideas by their countrymen. The Abbé was ridiculed as an annoying visionary; Wilson was considered equally annoying and equally a visionary. Wilson, though, had a better chance of success. And Rousseau, the democrat, could see what the Abbé couldn't: that if such a system were ever to be established it would have to arise from democratized countries. He was convinced that the whole life of a despot is devoted to two objects: to extend his rule ever beyond his frontiers, and to make it more absolute within these frontiers. It is only now that we are fully realizing that when a government is not responsible to its own people, the strongest force for international order is missing.

III

THE Abbé de Saint-Pierre died in 1743. Thirty-six years later Benjamin Franklin, serving as America's Ambassador to the court of Louis XVI, in Paris, received a visit from a humble villager who lived in Provence. His name was Pierre André Gar-

gaz. The man introduced himself by telling something of his life. Many years before, he was sent to jail for a crime he had not committed. Later, proofs turned up which had not been available at the time of the trial, but he had had to serve out eighteen years of his twenty-year sentence before he was released. And then he obtained his freedom somewhat on probation. The years he spent in a cell, however, had not embittered Gargaz. On the contrary, they had given him the opportunity and the time to reflect on man's injustice to man, and that train of thought led him to ponder on the evil and futility of wars. The result of his reflections was a plan for the outlawing of organized conflict and for closer relationships between countries through an international organization. He had written out the plan and wanted to have it printed, although he had but a tiny income, no more than sufficient to live frugally. But because of his position as a convict he could not get permission for the publication. Hearing of Benjamin Franklin, the representative of the democratic Western world, Gargaz had set out from his village to ask his help in making the plan public. He did not have enough money to buy a horse or procure passage in a coach, and so he walked all the way to Paris.

Franklin was struck by the zeal of this peasant, as well as by the logic of what he had conceived, and he published his manuscript for him. "It appeared to me to have much good sense in it," Franklin wrote to D. Hartley, "and therefore I got some copies to be struck off for him to distribute where he may think fit. I send you one enclosed. The man aims at no profit from his pamphlet or his project, asks for nothing, and does not even desire to be known. . . . I honor much the character of this *'veritable philosophe.'* "

Gargaz called for a Universal Union with a Permanent Congress as the operative body. He seems to have been greatly influenced by the Abbé, but in outlining his plan he contented himself with principles rather than details. He, too, wanted an armed force at the disposal of the Congress to halt any aggression, but each country could have unlimited defensive structures and weapons, such as fortresses and guns. The last of his eight Articles embodies an unusual conception: "In order to diminish the fascination a military career exercises on so many people belonging to the higher classes of society, interest in agriculture, art, and trade, and good knowledge of them should be furthered among them. The enjoyment those occupations can give, together with the profits one can derive from them, is likely to teach the love of peace."

Franklin himself was a thorough convert to the idea of a world union to perpetuate peace, and gauged with extraordinary accuracy the time that would necessarily elapse before such a plan could be realized. Writing to Richard Price, he discussed the uselessness of treaties unless the governments that wrote them would "agree upon an alliance against all aggressors, and agree to refer all disputes between each other to some third person, or set of men, or Power." In the same year that Franklin wrote to Price, Jeremy Bentham, the father of the Utilitarians, proposed a plan for an international congress and court of arbitration, the abandonment of imperialism, the

elimination of armaments, and the establishment of free trade. The decisions of the international body were to be enforced by political and economic ostracism of the offending nations—the sanctions of the Wilson League.

An obscure American of Franklin's time, Anacharsis Cloots, also advocated with vigor and heart a "Universal Republic." He wrote words which should startle isolationists who point to our revolutionary pioneers as paragons of American isolationism. "What ignorance," he said, "what savagery to pen ourselves within different political entities, toying with each other while we have the advantage of inhabiting one of the smallest planets of the celestial sphere! . . . When I see a tyrant in Madrid and another in Petersburg on the point of dividing between themselves both hemispheres; when a Lama of Rome and another of Mecca make laws for Peru and Malaysia; when the merchants of Amsterdam and London rule Bengal of the Maluccas, I become aware of the facility with which an Assembly in session in Paris could govern the whole human race."

And another American some decades later, William Ladd, founder of the American Peace Society, campaigned so ardently for an adequate world organization, that the idea of a controlling international league came to be known—in weird contradiction to the Lodges and the Johnsons—as "the American Way."

In 1815, at the Congress of Vienna, following the defeat of Napoleon, another plan for a league was proposed, this time not by the critic of a regime, but by the head of a regime himself—the absolute head of a regime. The author was Alexander I, the Czar of Russia. He wanted a Europe organized into a federation of free, constitutional, and liberal states. Interestingly enough, during Alexander's youth, he had been deeply influenced by his tutor, La Harpe, who in turn had been a disciple of Rousseau—and by implication of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre. Alexander's insistence on his project finally forced the British prime minister to conclude that "unless the Emperor of Russia can be brought to a more moderate and sound course of public conduct, the peace, with which we have so dearly purchased, will be of short duration." So visionary did Alexander's scheme seem to the delegates, that when he explained it to Viscount Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington, they found it difficult to "go through the interview with becoming gravity," as Castlereagh later wrote.

Though Alexander's proposal for a Confederation of Europe failed, it gave birth to the so-called "Holy Alliance" between Russia, Austria, and Prussia, which began as the genesis of a European league. The three members declared their allegiance to peace and their abhorrence of principles not motivated by justice and charity. They invited all countries with similar ideals to join them. But to Prince Metternich of Austria the Alliance was a "loud-sounding nothing," and under his influence it became an instrument of reaction. History considers Alexander a vacillating idealist.

Some time before the Congress of Vienna, one of the great minds of Europe had also turned to the problem of a league. Immanuel Kant, the German philosopher, wrote a thirty-page essay on "Perpetual Peace," in which he made the point that a state of peace never existed in Europe. If there were no actual hostilities, the threat of an outbreak was ever present; each side was only catching its breath. A state of peace would therefore not come about naturally, but had to be established. Kant could see no way to peace without a federation of nations. In his proposed organization the civil constitution of each member was to be republican in form. He reasoned that a government that depended on the consent of the people was much less apt to start a war because the people, having all to lose, would be much less irresponsible than a despot who had nothing to lose but the lives of his subjects.

Regarding an international government, Kant wrote: "The attachment of the savages to their lawless liberty, the fact that they would rather be at hopeless variance with one another than submit themselves to a legal authority constituted by themselves, that they prefer their senseless freedom to a reason-governed liberty, is regarded by us with profound contempt as barbarism and uncivilization and the brutal degredation of humanity. So one would think that civilized races, each formed into a state by itself, must come out of such an

abandoned condition as soon as they possibly can. On the contrary, however, each state thinks that its majesty (the 'majesty' of a people is an absurd expression) lies just in the very fact that it is subject to no external legal authority." That declaration of Kant, although made a century and a half ago, aptly states the issue that will confront us when the forces of banditry have been defeated.

The outbreak of the first World War gave rise, in all the major countries of the world, to a number of organizations bent on guaranteeing that peace, when it came, would be perpetually maintained through the medium of some type of international federation. In 1915, the League of Nations Union was organized in London, and in the same year the League to Enforce Peace was launched in this country. Both enterprises advocated an International Court for the peaceful settlement of disputes and united military action by member nations against any aggressor. But the programs of these organizations, like those of the World Peace Foundation, New York Peace Society, Fabian Society, German Social Democrats, and that strange creation, the Ford Neutral Conference, were necessarily incomplete and vague in their plans, as a result of having been war-born.

The recrudescence of the immortal ideal was manifested in the writings of the times as well. A few progressive thinkers, notably Walter Lippmann, stopped a bit short of an international government. The latter proposed that permanent tribunals be set up in all areas of potential friction. But the majority of American and British writers, as well as the liberal leaders in Germany, were all busy with various proposals for an International League, and in 1916 Randolph Bourne edited a symposium of such ideals, "Towards an Enduring Peace." His contributors were such people as Norman Angell, John Bates Clark, Jane Addams, Hamilton Holt, Charles W. Eliot, Ed. Bernstein, Rudolph Eucken, A. Lawrence Lowell, and J. A. Hobson.

One of the clearest writers on World Federation at that time was Horace M. Kallen. Writing in 1918—before the tragedy of the peace conference was enacted—he stressed the point in his books, "The Structure of Lasting Peace" and "League of Nations Today and Tomorrow," that the proposal for a League should be the first rather than the fourteenth point in Wilson's program. Once the League were established, the settlement of issues would follow judiciously, he explained, and he predicted the "bargain-counter" atmosphere that would prevail if the League were to be a mere after-thought. Dr. Kallen pointed out, too, that a concrete description of the proposed League should be presented at the Peace Conference instead of advancing merely a suggestion of things to come. He placed emphasis on economic as well as political considerations and called for an internationally organized food and commodity distribution. Original, too, was his proposal that education be internationally controlled, with educators owing their allegiance only to the central international authorities, and with both teachers and students being encouraged to assimilate the thought of other communities by periodic transfers. Among his practical plans was his assertion that the manufacture of munitions should be placed in the hands of an international body and allotted to the member nations only when an aggressive nation threatened world peace.

Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations, therefore, was a distillation of all the efforts of men who had visions of perpetual peace through international co-operation. We, the American nation, did not support Wilson's humane and logical plan, and there is not much question in the minds of most responsible leaders that our failure to support him contributed vastly to the rule of the psychopathic Hitler and to the plunging of the world into a madness fashioned in the image of his own bloody person. But when there has been such a long and continuous striving for a world confederation, it is impossible that the confederation should not come. So many men have dreamed of a league, so many have tried to plan a league and to organize a league, that we see a perpetual striving for a binding together of the nations to achieve international peace. The history of the League ideal is practically a guarantee that this dream of an international tribunal to enforce neighborly living on our globe will come true.

Drawings by Theodore Brenson

Food for Europe

Seven Questions

BY M. K. BENNETT

EVERYBODY knows that there are people in Europe—not all the people, but many—who desperately need food now. Almost everybody expects the need to grow with prolongation of the war. Leading statesmen of the United Nations make it abundantly clear that official intentions are to relieve the needy of Europe—somehow and sometime at least, and so far as feasible. Public opinion seems to applaud the officially-expressed intentions.

The organizational machinery for relieving needy Europeans is in process of construction. An International Wheat Agreement signed in April, 1942 by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Argentina established a 100-million bushel pool of wheat for "relief in war-stricken and other necessitous areas so soon as in the view of the five countries circumstances permit." For many months in Great Britain, the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-war Requirements (the Leith-Ross Committee) has been scanning estimates, prepared by the governments-in-exile, of the post-war food requirements of their peoples. In the United States, the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation is taking shape and going forward with the analysis of its task.

A United Nations conference on post-war food production and distribution is announced for May 18, 1943. Apparently this conference is to deal with long-term problems of nutritional standards and food production and distribution in a post-war world that has yet to take its shape. A second and separate international conference dealing with more immediate and short-term problems of food relief and rehabilitation appears likely to follow at a date thus far unannounced. An international conference on these more immediate questions will presumably throw light on some matters that seem to need illumination now. The broad problem of relieving the needy of Europe in fact stands in a stage of embryonic development. Operational aspects in particular remain to be clarified. Food has to be purchased in specific places and quantities, paid for by specific payees, loaded on particular ships, unloaded in particular ports, and distributed in specific quantities and kinds to particular recipients by particular distributors. On such matters as these the official pronouncements remain vague, and properly so, because international relations are involved and avoidance of missteps is obviously desirable.

Laymen may nevertheless speculate. It is fair to say that seven principal questions more or less occupy the minds of inquiring observers outside the official fold. (1) What is meant by relief food for Europe, as distinguished from non-relief food? (2) Who will pay, or what is the financial mechanism? (3) What is Europe, or who will receive food? (4) When will the food reach the needy? (5) What kind of food will be sent? (6) Where will it come from? (7) Will there be enough for both senders and receivers?

II

NEITHER now nor in the future is relief food likely to be readily distinguishable from non-relief food. Consider the food that goes to Europe today. Eire receives food from overseas through direct purchase not far different from ordinary commerce. So do Sweden, Switzerland, Por-

tugal, and Spain. This is not relief food. Great Britain similarly receives food purchased abroad. She also receives food on loan—that is, on lend-lease account from the United States, as does Soviet Russia. Is this relief food? It may be called so if we accept the historical verdict on food shipped out of the United States in World War I to recipients to whom loans had been advanced by the United States with expectation of repayment. It may not be relief food from the point of view of the recipients, now or ever; and it may not be if the intangible *quid pro quo* contemplated under lend-lease arrangements and received by the United States satisfies American public opinion when the history of World War II is written. The French and others have received food from overseas as charitable donations of private persons. This is relief food. The Greeks regularly receive wheat donated by the Canadian Government. This, too, is relief food.

When food moves into a country as the outcome of straightforward purchase with payment tangible and in sight, it is not relief food unless one stretches the term beyond its common usage. When food moves into a country as the outcome of donation, it is relief food beyond question. But when it moves in as the outcome of a loan unclear as to time and definition of payment, as under lend-lease in this war or the long-term inter-governmental loans of World War I, its definition as relief food or non-relief food is apparently at the choice of the discussant. It may be expected that in coming months, as (we assume) the conquered nations of Europe are liberated and enemies conquered, the confusion of relief and non-relief food will persist. There will continue to be straightforward purchase of cash-on-the-barrelhead type, a method usable not only by neutrals and Great Britain but also by some or most of the governments in exile. Private donation will continue. But the larger fraction of the food that will reach Europe seems very likely to represent either international donation, or international long-term loan of World War I type, or international loan of lend-lease type.

Whether the food that reaches Europe is relief or non-relief food, it must originate in the overseas exporting countries. Not all of them can afford either outright donation on a large scale, or such exchange of tangibles for intangibles on loan as is exemplified by the American lend-lease system. A substantial part of the food that reaches Europe must be paid for by the United States. But by no means all. Other nations are able to bear part of the financial burden. If the general objective of relief is laudable, international agreement ought to be reached concerning the sharing of the prospective financial burden. It is to be hoped that international conferences can bring forth commitments on this matter.

The question of the most appropriate financial device—governmental donation, lend-lease loan, or long-term loan of the once-usual type—is of some moment in the United States. The only operating device at present is lend-lease. The Lend-Lease Act appears to a layman to provide that lend-lease aid may go to any foreign government whose defense the President deems to be necessary to the defense of the United States. The receiving government may arrange to repay either "in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory." It is difficult to perceive how this device can be made to cover all prospective recipients of food. When Germany is finally conquered, can lend-lease aid be properly extended on the ground that defense of Germany has become necessary to the defense of the United States?

The Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation thus far controls no direct federal appropriation. It is financed by the President's emergency fund (probably for administrative expense), or by funds initially appropriated for lend-lease use (probably for food purchase). Yet the reason for the existence of the Office is not obvious if it be merely to aid in spending lend-lease funds. To the layman at least, the agency has somewhat the complexion of one intended less to loan goods or money, even on the unspecific terms of lend-lease, than to make governmental donations to foreign recipients whether governments or individuals. If this be true, it seems anomalous for the Office to utilize funds apparently appropriated for loan but to stand in lack of funds appropriated directly by the Congress for use as gift. The air would be

clearer with respect to the prospective functions of the agency as loaner, seller, exchanger, or giver if the Congress should be brought to consider squarely the matter of governmental donation for food-relief purposes. The obvious administrative convenience of the lend-lease mechanism ought not to deter administrative officials from seeking some funds for straightforward donation. Our national intentions with regard to relief would be made manifest by the outcome of Congressional debate.

Lend-lease shipments of food customarily become the property of the receiving government on arrival at destinations. The receiving government determines their use and distribution. They may go to the armed forces or to civilians. They may be sold or distributed gratis. No distributing agency of the Lend-Lease Administration is required, or is indeed appropriate, in the receiving country. With such precedents established, it is difficult for the layman to see how food relief by way of lend-lease could be made to fit all prospective circumstances. If, for example, Italy should yield soon and need food, while an acceptable government eligible for lend-lease could not be found until months of military occupation had elapsed, it would seem essential that relief food should not only be provided promptly but should also be distributed as the property of and by agents of the loaner or donor. Donation would fit such circumstances far better than lend-lease in its established form.

III

THE utterances of statesmen are not explicit concerning what peoples of Europe are to receive food of relief type, even if we include lend-lease shipments in this category. Europe is not a unit. It contains active military allies, Great Britain and the USSR. Eire, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, and Sweden are neutrals either of the strict type, the pro-Axis type, or the pro-United Nations type. Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Norway, Greece, Poland, and Yugoslavia are Axis-conquered nations represented among the United Nations by governments-in-exile. Denmark, Albania, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia are Axis-occupied countries not represented by governments-in-exile. France perhaps stands between these two groups. Finland and Bulgaria are official enemies of some but not all of the three principal United Nations active in European warfare. Germany, Austria, Italy, Hungary, and Rumania are enemies of all three of the principal United Nations active in European warfare.

Statesmen of the United Nations neglect to mention food relief for neutral countries, though Spain unquestionably needs it. They rarely speak about relief for enemy countries, though one can find assertions and implications that food would be made available. Most commonly, the reassurance is given that countries under the Axis yoke shall receive relief. But the countries are not named. It is not possible to discern whether or not Lithuania stands in the same category with Greece, Denmark with Norway, France with Belgium.

The question of recipients is in fact delicate at the present stage of food-relief planning. There has been no general statement of agreement among the United Nations that food relief shall be accorded where it is needed, when it is needed, regardless of political or military considerations. Agreement upon so general a statement in fact appears improbable. Belligerents are not accustomed to afford each other—or one another's friends—assistance that would or might strengthen the opponent's hands. While the war endures, and not improbably afterward, food is likely to remain a weapon of war and diplomacy. Some of the needy may receive relief while war continues—but only after capitulation, or as *quid pro quo* for desertion from or for aid against the enemy, or as humanitarian action in the few places where relief of hunger could not possibly support enemy efforts, even indirectly.

It is clear that neither Soviet Russia, the United States, nor Great Britain is now in a position unilaterally to assure all the present and prospective needy in Europe of food relief when they become accessible. Soviet Russia, herself a recipient of lend-lease aid, is in no position to make unilateral commitments. She lacks resources both physical and financial. The United States, on the other hand, cannot enter unilaterally upon commitments to feed the

needy of Lithuania or Poland. Russia's concurrence is essential. The air could be cleared by joint declaration. The twin mechanisms of lend-lease and donation would thereafter suffice to implement the commitments, once the needy became accessible, within the limits of available supplies and transport.

The needy may become accessible in any one of three ways. Needy neutrals, already accessible in a technical sense, could obtain more food by negotiation or by abandonment of neutrality. Some Axis-occupied countries might obtain food relief through agreement among the principal belligerents to allow food to come in while Axis forces continue to occupy the territory. Other countries might of necessity wait upon conquest of territory by the armies of the United Nations. Greece receives relief now through agreement among the principal belligerents. It would be a mistake to assume that circumstances could never change enough to permit similar arrangements to be made for some other countries. Strong pressure in that direction exists in the United States with regard to Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Poland. Strong opposition exists both in the United States and Great Britain. The opposition might weaken with respect to one or another of the four countries as the prospect for defeat of the Axis becomes increasingly clear; the main basis for opposition appears to lie in the conviction that to feed the hungry in those countries is really to bolster the Axis war machine. This conviction might lose force with mounting success of Allied arms.

Prediction of the time when the doors of neutrals may be opened wider to food shipments seems foolhardy for private citizens who can only guess at diplomatic maneuvers. So it is, as well, with respect to the time when one or several Axis-occupied countries may become accessible to food relief by agreement among the belligerents. And even high officials are not likely to be able to predict with much certainty when other Axis-occupied countries, and eventually the enemy countries themselves, will be open to food relief. This is no more predictable than the ebb and flow of warfare.

The war may conceivably end in Europe within the year, by collapse of the Axis powers before the territory they now hold is invaded. If so, huge populations would become accessible soon and within a few weeks of the cessation of warfare. The task of food relief would assume enormous proportions both promptly and suddenly. On the other hand, the victory of the Allies might creep rather than spring. It might involve campaign after campaign until the end of 1945 or even beyond, with piecemeal invasion and conquest of the Axis fortress—perhaps first the Balkan Peninsula, then a push into the Baltic states and Poland, then conquest of Italy, then liberation of Norway, then of France—until eventually Germany stood compressed within or close to her old frontiers. The latter chain of events may seem somewhat the more probable, but neither is predictable. Yet the official plans for food relief ought to contemplate either possibility, and others as well.

The long war with piecemeal conquest of territory would simplify the task of food relief by breaking it into a successive series of relatively small operations, in each of which experience would be gained. On the other hand, it would tend to magnify the total task if continuing warfare means progressive decline in the productivity of domestic agriculture within the shrinking fortress of the Axis powers. Thus it is obviously impossible to foresee the time when the needy of Europe will be relieved. Official relief agencies must be prepared for any of a wide range of possibilities, including rapid shipment at need. Prompt access to a stockpile is obviously one of the first essential steps of preparation. Mr. Churchill spoke of such a stockpile as early as August, 1940. Official declarations have not yet given assurance that a stockpile properly composed would be available at need, though one may be unwise to assume the contrary.

IV

In the United States and Great Britain, a question appears to exist with regard to the advisable or desirable composition of a food stockpile or of relief food shipments. The question is hardly pertinent so far as concerns lend-lease aid. Procedure under

lend-lease involves requests by the borrowing government, which presumably asks for and receives about what it desires. It may ask for expensive meat to the exclusion of cheap cereals; or for coffee and sugar to the exclusion of fats. The borrowing government tends to decide the composition of shipments of this type—which may not be relief shipments—and to decide on whatever principles it may choose. The flow of requests for shipments tends to determine the composition of stockpile and shipments. In so far as food relief is to be financed by governmental donation, however, the donor is likely to decide upon the composition of relief shipments and of the stockpiles from which they are partially drawn. Two different attitudes appear in discussion of this question.

It is possible to argue that relief food ought to be good enough in composition to relieve not only hunger or undernourishment, but also malnourishment. This means that relief food ought to contain not only the food calories, but also the vitamins and minerals and the correct proportion of proteins, fats, and carbohydrates necessary to provide recipients with a nutritionally adequate diet. Proponents of this view may consider that peoples receiving food relief ought to get a nutritionally adequate diet whether or not they were accustomed to it: if they were not, then they should be taught.

It is possible, on the other hand, to argue that the primary task of food relief is to relieve hunger, while relief of malnourishment is secondary and is basically a problem of medical attention rather than food relief. Let scurvy or pellagra be cured by medication and special diets in the few instances that they appear, and not prevented by wholesale administration of an adequate diet to millions. Proponents of this view may stress calories more than proteins, fats, minerals, or vitamins, though hardly to the point of nonrecognition; they are likely to stress the cost of food relief and the desirability of providing recipients with the cheap basic foods they want and are accustomed to use.

Proponents of foreign relief at adequate levels of nutrition can hardly maintain their position if donation should be carried to the extreme of providing ex-enemies with a better-balanced diet than prevailed in the donating countries themselves. Proponents of cheap relief could hardly maintain their position if surpluses of the expensive animal products and vitamin-rich fruits and vegetables should emerge in the donating countries. On the assumption of a prolonged and exhausting war, the outcome seems likely to vindicate the present views of the proponents of cheap relief. Wheat, other cereals, beans, lard, possibly some sugar and coffee, and cheap vegetable fats seem likely to constitute the great bulk of donated food relief shipments. Canned and dried milk, meat, eggs, and canned or dried fruits and vegetables will be donated sparingly but not stricken from the lists. Milk for children will surely move in larger volume than comparably expensive foods.

V

THE impression appears to be far too common that the United States is providing Europe now with all the food received there through purchase, on lend-lease, or on gift. The circumstances are otherwise. Great Britain continues to receive large shipments of wheat and bacon from Canada, meat from Argentina, butter from Australia and New Zealand. These countries, and Brazil, South Africa, India, and French West Africa as well, continue to play important roles as food exporters. The neutral countries draw supplies from these areas rather than from the United States. If shipping permitted, total exports from countries other than the United States and Canada would be larger than they are now.

The United States does not now bear alone the burden of supplying Europe from our own agricultural output, nor will she bear the burden alone if and as shipments to Europe increase. The Southern Hemisphere exporters and Canada have gained greatly in stature since World War I; the resources there available for tapping are much larger than they were twenty-five years ago. Given finance and shipping, food can flow in large volume from these countries. Financing ought to be relatively easy. No reason appears why, if the Congress accedes, food cannot be purchased in other exporting countries by the United States and shipped from all corners of the world to Europe. Donations by several of those

countries are not too much to expect and work for. Shipping appears to be the limiting factor. No one can say whether it will become sufficiently abundant as relief needs mount to permit the food-exporting countries of South and Central America, Africa, and Australasia to be tapped extensively. The problem of planning upon sources of supply for relief food is, therefore, a joint problem—of location of available supplies, of arranging terms for their use, and of shipping to bring them forward at need. It requires joint consideration by the United Nations rather than unilateral action.

VI

WILL there be enough food in the world to provide relief for the European needy? No purpose can be served here by attempting to distinguish between relief and non-relief shipments of food to Europe. What must be held in mind is the total requirement for food either purchased, loaned, or donated. The only possible answer is: it depends—upon the length and course of the war, the future harvests of food and feed crops in Europe, in overseas exporting countries, in non-exporting countries outside of Europe; it also depends on the race of shipbuilding against ship-sinking and the degree of disorganization uncovered when the needy countries become accessible.

It is easy, and not at all irrational, to hold a pessimistic view. Withdrawal of labor and draft power from agriculture both in Europe and North America can hardly have reached its ultimate peak, and for this reason tendencies toward decline of agricultural productivity on the side both of receivers and suppliers of food may be anticipated with some basis of rationality. Expansion of armies and navies increases the draft upon food supply. When the Russian armies move farther westward and the British and American armies begin to invade the European fortress from south and west, the productivity of agriculture in the invaded areas may be expected to shrink, at least for a year or two. The weather was exceptionally favorable for crops in North America and Britain in 1942. It may not prove so in 1943 or 1944 or 1945. Shipping continues extremely scarce despite strenuous efforts in construction and convoying.

Yet there are also reasons for optimism in viewing the total picture. The very assumption of Allied victory implies an increase in the margin of ships built over ships sunk, and shortening of sea routes by opening the Mediterranean and presumably the Black Sea as well. Demands on shipping will continue heavy while war endures and beyond victory, but the supply may stand more favorably in relation to the demand than is true at present. An enormous advantage lies in the huge stocks of surplus wheat now piled up in exporting countries, and of coffee in Brazil. Actual and potential supplies of other foods are also larger in South America than the facilities for moving them out. Great efforts are being made in the United States to utilize fully her own agricultural potential. Great Britain, expanding her output of grain and potatoes, may become less and less dependent upon foreign food imports. The productivity of agriculture in Continental Europe, especially Germany, has been astonishingly well maintained thus far—much more so than in World War I—in spite of heavy damage to fall-sown crops and to fruit trees in two successive icy winters. One cannot count positively upon great growth in the total food-import requirement of Europe from now until the war ends. This war, characterized as it is by massive blows from the air and swift movements of mechanized columns, can perhaps be won in the absence of extreme food stringency in enemy countries. The events of World War I fail to provide trustworthy analogies.

Furthermore, current tendencies in forecasting the food needs of Europe may well place them unduly high. It is easy to forget especially that rural populations, which constitute about two-thirds of the population of Continental Europe, are not likely to be in need of food relief; that current low official rations do not reflect the food intake of this large element in the population; that we find it difficult at a distance to grasp the advantages to food supply that are gained by the practice, so general now in Europe, of transferring to human use grain that formerly went for animal feed; and that food needs of Europe ought to be appraised not by comparison of current consumption with our own level, but with

the accustomed levels of Europe which were very much lower than ours so far as concerns composition of diet. Tragic as the current food situation undoubtedly is in many places for many people, we are probably inclined now to imagine tragedy in more places and among more people than is actually true, and so to reckon future needs from an inflated base.

Barring one major misfortune, the needy of Europe can probably be fed when they become accessible—perhaps not at a level of adequate nutrition, but at a level to preclude hunger. The event most to be feared is weather unfavorable for grain production either in Continental Europe (where paradoxically, from the military point of view of the United Nations, it would be welcomed) or in North America, and especially in both together. A world shortage of grain, the principal food and feed, might develop before the summer of 1944, despite the present high level of wheat stocks, if the crops of 1943 should suffer from uncommonly bad weather conditions. How the weather will behave is beyond prediction; and while this major uncertainty holds, the prospects for successful relief of the hungry of Europe must also remain uncertain.

ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

WITH the stimulus of the visit by Vice President Wallace to Latin America the activities of the Free World Association have achieved notable successes. Vice President Wallace was greeted in Chile with the first edition of Mundo Libre *dedicated to him. This new member of the family of* FREE WORLD *magazines is edited by Manuel Mandujano; its Editorial Board includes Roberto Aldunate, L. Hernández Parker, Lenka Franulic, Eduardo Frei Montalva, Rudecindo Ortega, Alberto Romero, Manuel Seoane, and Benjamín Subercaseaux. An Honorary Board and a special Advisory Council contain the most notable names of Chile in arts, letters, and politics. Much of the success in the organization of the Free World Association in Chile and in the establishment of the magazine is due to the untiring efforts of Senor Manuel Seoane, former deputy of the Peruvian Parliament, now editor of* Ercilla, *and representative of the International Free World Association in Chile.*

At the same time, news comes from Puerto Rico that a Free World Association has been formed there under the leadership of Dr. Luis Munoz Marin, President of the Senate. The leading representatives of liberal and democratic movements of Puerto Rico have joined the Association. Governor Rexford G. Tugwell sent the following message to the newly founded organization: "I am glad to hear that the Free World movement is going to have representation in Puerto Rico. It is my feeling that what we call 'the Puerto Rican problem' has become identified with a world-wide problem now; and that the consideration of the world's difficulties will be a consideration of those of Puerto Rico as well. It has been too much a habit in this island to think of its troubles as unique; and to think that they can be settled here by political means. That these habits are dangerous, and, for their purpose, utterly useless, I believe profoundly. Only as the world becomes free and secure will Puerto Rico become free and secure. And Puerto Rican liberty will never be won if all people are not free. So I am certain that as you work for wider, for world-wide betterment, you work for betterment in this island."

POPULATION PRESSURE and the Next Peace

by

Constantine Panunzio

THE post-war world will face population problems of the first magnitude and the durability of the next peace will depend in no small measure on the solution, or at least, on the constructive attempts which the leading nations may make toward the solution of these problems. The first and all-embracing problem stems from the steady growth of world population. It has increased phenomenally during the last three centuries: from 545 millions in 1650 to about 2,200 millions at the present time. The rate of growth has probably everywhere slowed down, but the increase itself is still substantial. The yearly increment of world population is variously estimated at from 9 to 20 millions; and in so far as we are able to predict, that increase will continue for some time to come.

Since the usable surface of the earth is fixed, this growth will inevitably increase density. That density, at present averaging about 41 persons per square mile, or a little less than what it is in the United States, will go up year by year. Some additional land may be brought into use, but since most of the profitable land is already being utilized, any additional land will be of a marginal character and will yield progressively diminishing returns. Inventive genius will, no doubt, increase the exploitation and improve the utilization of resources. Still, increasing density and greater concentrations of population will inevitably present a problem; and the human race as a whole will find it difficult to maintain present standards of living, to say nothing of raising them. The problem, therefore, calls for concerted action on the part of world society.

A more tangible problem is that of the distribution of world resources. At the opening of the present conflict, nine nations (Belgium, France, Great Britain, Holland, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Russia, and the United States) possessed a considerable portion of the earth. While their peoples constituted but 23 per cent of the world population and while their home territories made up only 14 per cent of the land area of the world, they controlled empires covering 66 per cent of the land of the globe and dominated, in varying degrees, the life of 57 per cent of the population of the world. The advantages enjoyed by most empire nations are obvious. By having at least preferential access to the resources of their empires or spheres of influence, by means of trade agreements, financial control, taxation, and duties, they are able to derive considerable returns. These returns, moreover, benefit not only the industrial and commercial entrepreneurs but also the entire populations of the empire nations. Empires bring in wealth, add industrial production and commercial activity, and therefore increase employment, thus conferring decided benefits on the peoples of the empire nations.

The problem of the post-war period, therefore, will be to distribute at least some of the advantages which the principal empire nations now enjoy. Whether these nations will yield to world necessity, only time will tell. Will the nations be willing

to internationalize their colonies or at least distribute the advantages derived from colonies? Will they be willing to free those colonies which demand freedom? Or will they continue to insist on retaining for themselves alone the advantages they now enjoy? The answers to these questions will in no small measure determine the nature, scope, and durability of the next peace.

The empire problem is all the more acute because some of the very peoples who are growing most rapidly have meager or no empire resources, while those who are increasing least command relatively the greatest resources. Between 1800 and 1930, Belgium added 5 millions to its population, France 13¼ millions, Great Britain 33 millions, Holland 5¾ millions, and Portugal 3½ millions. On the other hand, Italy, Japan, and Germany, with practically no imperial possessions during most of the period in question, added 23, 36, and 44½ millions respectively during the same 130 years. Moreover, the more rapidly growing countries with meager resources, have very high densities, and great population pressure. Italy, for example, had in 1937-39 a net density (number of persons per square mile of arable land) of 883, Germany of 927, Japan of 3,131, as contrasted with 524 in France. It is true that Belgium, Great Britain, and the Netherlands all have net densities above 2,000, but their populations are practically at a standstill and they have great empire resources to draw upon. Since the high-pressure populations are growing rapidly, their situation will become progressively worse. Nor can we afford to ignore these facts because we are now at war with those very nations. These populations will continue to produce greater densities and greater population pressure; they will produce proportionately greater military man power, and will constitute an ever-present menace to world peace unless the situation is basically changed.

Even otherwise well-informed people frequently ask; "If the prolific peoples are experiencing population pressure, why do they not reduce their numbers? Why do not their leaders cease fostering the growth of their population? Why do they not practice birth control?"

The fact is that populations cannot and do not reduce their numbers at will. Nor does the agitation of the leaders have any effect. The preachments of the Mussolinis and Hitlers have no influence whatsoever on the birth rate; they are merely propaganda devices aimed at stirring their people into warlike action. Nor can birth control be relied on so far as the near future is concerned. The practice will no doubt continue to spread all over the world with the passing decades. But that depends on the dissemination of knowledge and on the ability of people to command contraceptive devices. And that will take time. Furthermore, even those people who adopt birth control do not change their reproduction habits overnight, but only slowly, over a period of time, and in response to fundamental forces. So that, even if the more prolific people should in time reduce their numbers materially, they still will produce greater densities and population pressure in the decades of the near future, and that is the problem. The only hope of a solution, so far as the immediate postwar period is concerned, lies in the alteration of basic conditions.

II

WHAT are these basic conditions? One of the surest means of reducing the rate of growth of any people is to improve their economic status. This may seem paradoxical, since it would be expected that improved economic conditions would increase rather than decrease the reproduction rate of a people. But this is not the case. It is a well-known fact that the well-to-do classes seldom reproduce sufficiently to replace themselves. The same is true of nations. All over Europe the wealthier populations have for a century or more increased the least. It would seem, therefore, that one of the most available means of arresting the extraordinary growth of the more prolific peoples is to give them access to some of the unused resources of the globe.

A closely related problem is that of migration. It is true that emigration does not greatly reduce population pressure. Still, people who are under pressure or who have undergone extraordinary distress have al-

ways sought some escape through emigration, and have always regarded the privilege to do so as one of their "natural rights." As within national boundaries peoples cherish and take for granted the right to move from one place to another in the hope of improving their condition, so the underprivileged people the world over consider migration to be one of the chief means of sustaining them in their struggle for existence and improvement. In the years following the last war it was estimated that some 20 millions sought to go to the United States alone, and for nearly a decade over a million persons yearly poured into America. At the close of the present war there will be an even greater number who will seek to escape from the regions of distress. What is to be done about them?

Haphazard migration offers no solution. Neither does the continuation of the present policy of almost complete suspension of migration. As Warren S. Thompson stated in his work, "Danger Spots of World Population," "The attempt by people either living in low-pressure areas or holding such areas as dependencies for their exclusive use, to keep the people living in high-pressure areas pent up within their present boundaries indefinitely, is what is likely to cause trouble." That situation did actually prevail, and it had a more profound bearing on producing the present "trouble" than we are willing to admit. What is more important is that any such procedure is bound to cause even greater difficulties in the future. The high-pressure people will continue to grow at a rapid rate, will produce greater densities, and will have an increasing advantage in manpower. World society will indeed be obtuse if it does not consider that situation in a realistic manner.

The only possible solution or mitigation of the problem is to establish a system of regulated migration. An international body, whether part of a future League of Nations or an independent organization similar to the Hague Tribunal may be set up to survey the high-pressure areas and the areas of opportunity, establish a system of quotas or some other measuring method, and by international agreements regulate migration. Numerous related problems would inevitably arise, such as how to safeguard the best interests of both emigration and immigration countries, how to protect the migrants, how to safeguard and insure the living standards of the immigration countries; but these difficulties are far from insurmountable.

III

EQUALLY pressing is the problem of blotting out the racial and ethnic discriminations which have been introduced in migration legislation in the last few decades. The race superiority doctrine has not only played havoc in certain countries like Germany, but has also become one of the most fertile sources of intensified international ill will; and the practices based on it have surely greatly deepened the sense of injustice on the part of the colored races. The white race, with national and ethnic Messiahship emblazoned on its banner, has first invaded and taken possession of good slices of the lands of the colored people, and then on the ground that they were inferior, has forbidden the latter to set foot on the territories occupied by whites. And apparently, the whites, blinded by their arrogance, have believed that they could hold the colored races in check simply by calling them inferior. But, as Raymond Pearl points out in "Natural History of Population," "the problems generated by the huge growth of population during the last three centuries are surely not going to be solved by the simple device of groups of men calling each other names. Nor are they going to be solved by war, whether of the old-fashioned kind, or that of the latest brilliant discovery of the diplomatic mind —'undeclared' war."

To set whole segments of the world's population against each other on the basis of superiority and inferiority is to keep world society on tinder. For no people, however humble and backward they may be, will submit indefinitely to being treated as inferior. "Tell me that I am your inferior," said Josiah Royce, "and then perhaps I may grow boyish and throw stones." As with individuals, so with groups, nations and races—you cannot continue to insist upon their inferiority without generating strength in them and paving the way for sudden, retaliatory blows. Only

an insane world will want deliberately to perpetuate the doctrine and practices of race superiority.

IV

THESE are some of the problems which arise from population pressure. In all likelihood there will always be differences in population growth and density, in possession of resources, degrees of freedom of migration; and there will always be some racial and ethnic discrimination. But world society can at least mitigate the problems arising from those phenomena and can at least attempt to establish a system for dealing constructively with them.

Will the post-war world attempt to arrive at some measure of solution of these problems? That, unfortunately, lies in part in the hands of the politician. But it also lies in the hands, the minds, and the hearts of the public as a whole; it lies particularly in the hands and minds and hearts of the leaders of the United Nations, the leaders of today and tomorrow. If only the leaders can realize the fundamental nature of these problems and can develop a willingness to deal with them in a reasonable manner, solutions can be reached which will at least reduce the probability of our reverting periodically to the terrifying and vastly destructive activities of global warfare.

MINORITIES *in a* Free World

by

Jacob Robinson

CAREFUL students of international relations cannot fail to make one curious observation when they compare the post-war aims of 1914-1918 with those of 1939-1942. There are three constant elements, ideas which recur in these discussions with slight changes in terminology. In the first war these objectives were stated as the need to crush German militarism, to end international anarchy, and "to make the world safe for democracy"; now they are expressed as a determination to destroy the military machine of the Nazis, to build an effective international organization, and to safeguard democratic institutions from fascism.

In two respects, however, the situation differs greatly. Economic questions were only of secondary importance in the early discussions, whereas the problem of social and economic security ("freedom from want") is of paramount significance today. On the other hand, there is one subject which received most serious consideration during the first World War and which is hardly mentioned at all in the contemporary literature on war aims. That issue is the question of nationalities. The first World War was fought for the liberation of small nations; it was a war for the realization of the nationalities principle. It aimed at the destruction of existing large units and their division into small national states. The present war has no such divisive and dynamic purposes. The Atlantic Charter pledges the restoration of the sovereign rights and self-government of pre-war states which have been overrun by Germany and

its satellites: a purpose essentially static. Moreover, in contemporary literature the emphasis is on integration into greater units —unions, federations, and confederations.

The problem of *minorities* did not occupy an important place in the official discussions of the first war period. It assumed importance only when the peacemakers in Versailles saw that it was impossible to apply the principle of nationalities as a satisfactory solution of all boundary questions. If the nationalities of Europe were to be fully protected, a supplementary method had to be utilized. This was the international protection of minorities. In the discussions today, too, the problem of minorities is almost entirely omitted. There are specific psychological reasons for this fact. The world has been overwhelmingly impressed by the role played by German minorities in the disintegration of the Europe of 1919-1920. Everybody knows how the so-called Sudeten Germans were utilized in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Nobody can forget the large-scale espionage by the German minority in Poland during the Polish campaign. It has become public knowledge that the Magyar minorities in the Succession States of the Dual Monarchy functioned actively in the service of Hungarian revisionism against their own countries. Psychologically, the natural result has been the generalization that minorities are something of a calamity, and it is better not to talk or think about them, or to plan for them.

Nothing could be more harmful to the cause of democracy than this attitude. While it is true that the old cliché of 1919, the stereotype of the virtuous minorities as against the vicious states, has passed away, we cannot therefore lump all minorities together as vicious Fifth Columnists who contributed to the downfall and ruin of their states. On the other hand, not all the states created or enlarged at the end of World War I may be regarded as models of virtue and given a clean record with regard to their minorities. While the treatment of minorities in the traditionally democratic countries has been such that we need not be too strongly concerned with their future, there are specific regions where we cannot afford to neglect this question. The problem is further complicated by the fact that the minorities issue is often a mask for other items of contention. The question of Galicia, for instance, is not only that of the national rivalry of Poles and Ukrainians, but also involves the possession of oil. The problem in Alsace-Lorraine is not only one of nationalities but also of potash and mineral ores.

If constructive thought is to be given to this problem, I think it should start with the resolution not to yield to meaningless platitudes and generalizations. Distinctions must be made between minorities, if our plans for their future are to correspond to realities. In view of the experience of the last twenty years, I believe the most important distinction would be between irredentist minorities which neglect the duties of citizenship and continually look to their powerful co-national states for help, eventually developing into what we today call a Fifth Column; and, on the other hand, minorities with legitimate aims and with honest allegiance to both their group heritage—cultural, religious, or however it may be constituted—and to their states. The problem of these minorities is not the same, and the solution must be different. To attempt to apply a single plan for both types of minority will inevitably lead to insuperable difficulties. We should not insist on a unitary solution for all problems labelled "minority problems," and thus neglect whatever solutions can be employed to make life in Europe more peaceful.

The last post-war period brought us the experience of two international techniques for solution of the minorities problem. One, the transfer of populations, was not practiced to any great extent. Examples are the exchange of population between Turkey and Greece and between Bulgaria and Greece. The second method was the international protection of minorities, a technique which will certainly have to be applied after this war.

Past experience in Europe has shown us, however, that there are other methods for protecting minorities in addition to these international techniques. One method is national legislation for the protection of minorities. As a matter of fact, highly civilized countries like Belgium and Denmark, which signed no minority treaties, treated their minorities in a way which was certainly no worse than the best treatment ob-

tained under international treaties. Finland, which conferred broad rights on its Swedish minority of only 10 per cent, may also be mentioned in this connection. The liberal British linguistic legislation in South Wales shows how real democracy is able to meet unforeseen situations. The conclusion is clear that the signature of an international document is of less importance in ensuring genuine protection of minorities than the general standard of civilization and law in the countries where minorities live.

In addition to population exchange and international and national legislation for the protection of minorities, our experience includes a fourth method for dealing with this question. The conflicts of rival nationalities may, under suitable conditions, be transcended by the common loyalty to a unifying idea. Such, for instance, is the ideal of Belgium as the common state of the Walloons and Flemings, including both on a footing of complete equality; of Switzerland, where all four linguistic groups (including the numerically insignificant Rheto-Rumanians) are united in a confederation. Another example, with a rather different situation and elements, is the Soviet Union, where the dominant political philosophy seems to be of greater strength than the centrifugal nationalities tendencies. Post-war constitutional reform in certain new or restored European countries may follow this line and so remove causes of friction and dissension.

II

THE current discussion of post-war problems has raised a new element which has an important bearing on the minorities question. The problem of a bill of rights, whether universal, continental, or regional, is today a subject of very serious thought and discussion. Even on the smallest scale for which it is proposed, such a document may suffer from serious drawbacks, for its phrasing will necessarily be vague, and its enforcement may present difficulties of administration. On the other hand, the proposal may eliminate certain difficulties which arose in previous international documents, particularly that of the so-called discrimination. The greatest objection of the governments of the countries which had to sign minority treaties was that of discrimination. Why should Poland have to assume special obligations, and not Germany? Why Yugoslavia, and not Italy? Furthermore, the citizens of such countries raised other objections on the same score. How often did representatives of majority nationalities object to the "privileged" position of the minorities who, in addition to the constitutional rights which they enjoyed on the same footing as the majority, had the additional prerogative of appealing to Geneva? It does not alter the situation that this argument was a misplaced one: the minorities would have been only too glad to have the same feeling of security as the majorities, and would willingly have renounced the protection of Geneva in return.

Another new element has arisen in the current discussion about the bill of rights. The fascist and anti-democratic movements which have risen to power in many countries in our day have seriously impaired the rights, not only of minorities, but of majorities as well. As a consequence, the idea of protecting opposition political groups as well as racial, linguistic, and religious minorities is gaining ground. Despite the radical difference between these two types of minorities (the first being of a changeable character, the second constant) they may well have some common interests: our experience during the Long Armistice has shown in addition that it was predominantly the pro-democratic minorities which sought protection, just as it has been predominantly the pro-democratic political groups which were suppressed.

There is no great probability that the international protection of minorities after this war will take the form of a return to the minorities treaties. It is true that they were never officially repudiated by the signatories, except for Poland, through the Beck Declaration of September, 1934. However, we should not forget that, except Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania, all the states bound by minorities treaties are now on the side of the United Nations or are still neutral (Turkey). It is likely that one group of the United Nations will be forced by another group to assume responsibilities which the defeated countries will not assume? It was not so easy even in 1919, despite the fact that the signatories were

chiefly new states or enlarged states, so that the acceptance of the minorities treaties was a form of compensation for the territorial benefits conferred and guaranteed by the big powers.

Today, we have to think in other terms. While it may be impossible to impose special provisions for certain *distrusted countries,* we may see such special procedures with regard to specific *danger zones* where this problem is of special importance, regions like Central-Eastern Europe, India, and others. For these specific regions, irrespective of whether large or small powers, whether members of the United Nations or the Axis and its puppets are involved, regardless of whether the countries affected have made a great or small contribution to the cause of the United Nations, the same provisions should be made. These should include guarantees of human rights, rights of citizenship and economic security for members of both minorities and majorities, and religious and cultural rights, enabling the preservation of their cultural heritage, for minorities. Of course, the forms may vary: internationally guaranteed constitutions of federations or confederations, regional or continental conventions, or a universal bill of rights. The most important question will be, as before, the efficiency of the international machinery.

This method will prove of value in the case of minorities which do not regard themselves as agents of foreign countries, i. e., for minorities without powerful co-national states, especially states with an expansionist policy, nearby. Among such minorities we may mention the Jews* throughout Europe, the Lusatian Serbs in Saxony, the Basques and Catalonians in Spain, the Welsh in Great Britain and many more. The case of the Jews is the most paradoxical. Although it is common knowledge that the formulation of the minorities treaties was due to a great extent to Jewish initiative, and that not even the worst enemies of this group could honestly accuse them of disloyalty, we witnessed the distressing phenomenon that they were the least protected of all the minorities.

*The Jewish issue in Europe cannot be adequately considered in terms of minority status alone; but the scope of this paper does not permit a discussion of other aspects.

III

In a number of cases neither a general bill of rights, nor special provisions for minorities' protection, will suffice to solve existing problems. Realistically, therefore, we must envisage a third solution, the transfer of populations. It is significant that in spite of his political conservatism and ethical opposition to forced migration, Herbert Hoover accepts the necessity of population transfers for the solution of certain types of minority problems. The most serious objections to transfer are the undemocratic procedure and the hardships involved. Of course, the humanitarian aspect cannot be neglected, and hardship must certainly be avoided, or at least reduced. Moreover, it is certainly undemocratic to force a person to emigrate against his will. But after all, the peace of Europe and the world is of greater importance than adherence to certain procedures for the protection of minorities. If it is well established that both the state and the minority will otherwise remain dissatisfied, why not—with all necessary safeguards against hardships and with guarantees for the transfer of the property of the transferred—remove the reasons for the perpetuation of hatred and dissension? Of course, this program is predicated on the certainty of finding new homes and adequate means of existence for the transferred population. The "solution" of a problem is not good or bad in itself, but is to be judged according to the *way* in which it is carried out and the promises it contains for the future. Under the proper conditions, and for certain cases, the method of population transfer cannot be rejected as inherently bad.

Take the case of the German minorities. After Munich they were either annexed to Germany, or transferred to Germany or its annexed territories, or given a special status when they remained in non-German lands. This status included such rights as allegiance to the German folk and Fuehrer, compulsory membership in the National Socialist party, specially guaranteed representation in the administration and parliament. The psychological effect was one of immense self-confidence inherent in belonging to the master race. The Germans living in the annexed territories, which are na-

tionally mixed, have the same complex of legal and psychological superiority. Those who were transferred to Germany will no longer present a minority problem, of course, except to the extent that the Nazis, as they have begun to do, send them back. Nobody else will propose to send them back to the countries they came from. But the Germans who have been given special status in non-German countries will present a very knotty problem. How can anyone reasonably expect these groups to adjust themselves willingly and loyally to a new postwar status after years of being the "dominant minority"? We should not forget that during the Long Armistice, the greatest difficulties arose in regard to the minorities who occupied a dominant position before World War I. This problem will present itself in a strongly aggravated form with regard to German minorities after this war.

But this is not the only case. Take Transylvania. I should like to see the statesman who could solve the problem of Transylvania without resorting to the transfer of populations. Now it may be said, "Well, the Germans are very great adherents of this new theory. They have practiced transfer of populations on a large scale. Why did they not try to do the same thing in Transylvania? Is not that evidence of the inadequacy of this method?" But the Germans use the transfer of populations, not in order to solve national problems, but in order to complicate them. If they wished to solve the problem of Transylvania, they could have imposed their will on both their satellites, Rumania and Hungary. They did not do it, because they are not interested at all in creating clarity in national relationships; nor do they desire a situation in which there would be no quarrels between the Rumanians and the Hungarians. The Germans are interested in playing one against the other. The problem of Transylvania, with three nationalities—German, Rumanian, and Hungarian—living intermingled, cannot be solved otherwise than by a division of the territory between Rumania and Hungary (with a corresponding exchange of Rumanian-Hungarian populations) and the evacuation of the Germans. Then there will be no reason whatsoever for such discord between Hungarians and Rumanians as to make impossible "good neighbor" relations. Furthermore, only by the removal of the causes of unrest (for which the solution of minorities problems is, of course, only one method) can the way be prepared for organizing larger units in Europe.

An honest approach to the problems of minorities in these specific danger zones, with unprejudiced methods for their solution, is indispensable. Minorities with irredentist aims will have to go where they belong by their allegiance, and minorities without irredentist aims may peacefully remain where they are, preserving their allegiance to their country and to their cultural heritage. Finally, for those minorities that wish to be merged, assimilated, or amalgamated with a dominant nation, there must be complete freedom to do so.

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PRESIDENT JUAN ANTONIO RIOS

WE most heartily welcome to our ranks Senor Juan Antonio Rios, President of the Chilean Republic, who has just become a member of the Honorary Board of Mundo Libre, *the Chilean edition of* FREE WORLD. *President Rios, after a successful career as a lawyer, became one of the most conspicuous leaders of the Radical party in Chile. For many years a member of the Parliament, he was recently elected to the Presidency by an overwhelming vote of all the liberal parties of the country.*

BRITAIN'S EDUCATIONAL EFFORT

by
Gilbert Murray

WAR intensifies a nation's energies, but concentrates them upon its own purposes. It insists on industry, endurance, public service, technical skill. It is quite indifferent to philosophy, scholarship, poetry, belles-lettres, art, music, and abstract science—except in so far as they may happen to come in useful for amusing the troops or locating unseen airplanes. The intellectual standards are lowered, the social standards vigorously raised. When the outside public suddenly becomes interested in educational affairs, most teachers with much experience behind them will have noticed that it cherishes a quite excessive expectation of what the teacher can do. There are said to be a hundred and fifty separate voluntary societies in England planning the regeneration of the country, or Europe, or humanity, by means of a better education. Some, no doubt, are fantastic or sentimental in their outlook; educationalists are a queer crowd; some confuse education with political or religious propaganda; but the great majority are inspired by a genuine concern for the needs of the world, particularly the need for wiser and better men and ideas to save it from the morass into which the present men and ideas have led it.

There are also the pressing material needs of the moment. The heavy bombing of London and other large towns in 1940 and 1941 led to the evacuation of about a million and a half schoolchildren to safer places in the country, while others, whose parents were unwilling or unable to evacuate them, had no schools to go to, and often no houses to sleep in. They slept in the public underground shelters and their life was disorganized. The educational authorities have dealt effectively with this immense trouble. The children scattered all over the country have been rounded up and provided with schools; more than 99 per cent of them are now having a regular school life.

The evacuation has produced curious social lessons and problems. One could, as a rule, rely everywhere on the devotion of the teachers in facing new and difficult conditions, and also on the affectionate welcome which the children received from the country cottagers. There was not much money in it either way, but it was striking to see what a number of women were delighted to have a child or two in the house. It was also curious to see the effect produced by the country on town children of the poorer classes and often on their parents too. Some were frightened by the loneliness and wanted to get back to crowded streets; some, astonished to see "plums growing on trees!" and not on a shop counter; some, not quite pleased at having milk from the inside of a cow instead of a nice clean bottle. In many cases a painful impression was made on the country people by the habits of slum children bred in poverty and the improvidence associated with poverty; sometimes their sharpness of wit proved troublesome. In my own neighborhood a little shop selling ginger-beer and lemonade was in the habit of paying two pence for each bottle returned by the customer and of storing these empty bottles in the back garden. A young financial genius from the East End discovered a simple source of income by collecting the bottles in the back garden and selling them again at the front door.

Such difficulties as did occur were mostly

between hostesses and parents. In the main, however, the great migrations of evacuation—experiments, as Mr. Butler justly observes, unprecedented in our social history—have been wisely and successfully handled. England has had, by this extraordinary mixture of classes, a rare opportunity to "Know Herself," and the results will be a strong stimulant to administrators and social reformers after the war. Even educationally the migrations have had a certain value. New "short courses for teachers" have been organized on the kind of topics for which the evacuation has provided a need or opportunity, such as rural subjects of many varieties, as well as physical training, handicrafts, and domestic science, food economy and youth service. Of course there are also a great supply of courses on the United States and on Russia.

One fundamental difficulty was to keep the schools going at all. Those in the large towns were often untenable owing to the *Blitz*. In the country many of the best school buildings were taken over by War Offices; one of the most famous of the girls' schools is proud to have been assigned to the American Army. In general the dispossessed teachers and children have been housed in unoccupied buildings or large houses whose owners have, for one reason or another, had to leave them. Several of the great public schools are now in country houses or "noblemen's seats." An interesting side problem was the provision of schools in their own languages for the children of our various allies, Poles, Czechs, Belgians, Norwegians, and others. The adults too, especially those in the air force, have intensive courses in colloquial English provided by the British Council on very novel principles. The teachers are expert phoneticians, and the men are taught to understand technical military orders and warnings, shouted through a telephone. For soldiers in action this is the sort of "English" that is wanted. And besides, some such step was extremely desirable as a mitigation of the sense of exile and homesickness which is inevitable in people kept so long among strangers while their own people are left exposed to dire suffering.

Meantime, the difficulties of food supply under these conditions have made an opportunity for a long desired social reform. Milk is provided for children in all the elementary schools, in some cases free, otherwise at the price of a half-penny—one cent—for a third of a pint. A midday dinner also is supplied in school for about a million children. The elaborate medical and dental care provided for every child in peacetime might well have seemed impossible to continue in war conditions, with the scattered schools and the extensive call-up of doctors and dentists by the army. Yet it has been managed. The medical and dental inspection is kept up, and, as a matter of fact, the health of the children has positively improved. One ought not to leave this subject without remarking how the schools, to quote the words of R. A. Butler, now President of the Board of Education, "have shown their mettle under fire. From localities which had been raided he had had reports telling how the children had faced bombing with courage overnight and examinations with equal equanimity next morning."

In the secondary schools, and perhaps especially in the great ancient foundations called here "Public Schools," direct war service makes a closer appeal. The Officers Training Corps, the special training course for the R.A.F., certain technical courses useful for the destruction of human life or, on occasion, for its preservation, make a great demand on the time and still more probably on the active interest of the boys. Boys and girls take their share in fire watching and anti-air raid precautions. In the holidays, and on particular occasions in the summer term, they do land work on farms. Some in this neighborhood are doing a pretty long day at fruit picking, beginning at 5:00 A.M. In many centers, especially in girls' secondary schools, the young people have shown a vivid interest in the study of world citizenship and the part their country can play in the building of a secure and warless world. Special steps have been taken by the Board to arrange throughout the whole system courses of instruction in the history and constitution of the United States and to a hardly less extent in those of our second great ally—Soviet Russia.

In the army itself, education has not been neglected. It is worth remembering that in England the first compulsory instruction in the "three R's" was set up in the army of the Duke of Wellington, and that the Red

Army has been similarly used as a vast school in present-day Russia. Those enterprises, however, were chiefly conducted in peacetime. The Spanish Republican Army is, as far as I know, the only one which had actual schools of reading, writing, and arithmetic immediately behind the front line in the midst of a campaign. The education of an army during war is bound to be rather scrappy; yet, in a democratic country, the danger of leaving an army which is half the nation absolutely uneducated and dependent on casual rumor and cheap newspapers for information about war aims and public affairs is obviously a serious consideration.

II

THE War Office itself, commonly reputed in England to be the least intellectual of public departments, has set up an Army Bureau of Current Affairs to provide instruction on the outstanding issues and problems of the day. The Bureau issues every week to every regimental officer a bulletin on some current topic written by a competent authority. On the basis of these bulletins platoon commanders give short talks to their men, followed by questions and informal discussion. Subjects range from "The Far East," "Oil," "The Mediterranean," to "If Invasion Comes," "America in Total War," and "Re-building Britain." The outsider may wonder whether teaching ability and intelligent views on world policy are a universal quality of platoon commanders, or speculate what happens when a "sea-lawyer" of subversive views begins to cross-question his officer. But the idea is a fine one, suggested by Cromwell's famous requirement that the citizen soldier should be one who "must know what he is fighting for and love what he knows," and in practice it is said to be a success. There is also an optional scheme of army education initiated by the universities rather than the War Office which provides lectures and courses on subjects chosen by the men, some of a vocational sort preparatory to post-war jobs, others on science, literature, history, languages, and the like.

On the universities themselves the war has, inevitably, laid a heavy hand. Doctors, surgeons, chemists, engineers have their military value, and students for those professions are in general allowed to finish their degree courses, though the course itself is apt to be somewhat shortened. The subjects that are only useful to culture and civilization, not to war, are treated more roughly. After one year at the university, as a rule students are called up, either to the fighting services or to one of the numerous ancillary organizations. Apart from these improvizations to meet the needs of war, the English educational system has suffered historically from two acknowledged defects. For one thing, it had different schools and standards for rich and poor; for another, the great mass of the working classes left school at the age of fourteen and, until comparatively lately, had little provision made for them to continue any intellectual pursuit afterwards. A boy's life was apt to be nothing but lessons up to fourteen, and after that no lessons at all. As to this second defect, the government's intention is to raise the leaving age to fifteen, and to increase still further the facilities for part-time education, technical or cultural, for adolescents. This program, though involving expense and trouble, is fairly straightforward. It implies not merely encouragement of evening schools, technical schools, and of such continuation schools as have been set up by public-spirited employers or authorities in response to the great plan put forward by Mr. H. A. L. Fisher in the last war; it implies also a great development of adult education through such bodies as the Workers Educational Association, the Adult Schools Association, and the organizations inside the army described above. The present President of the Board, in a remarkable speech, has suggested that the establishment of "an organized system of continuing and adult education" may prove to be the characteristic educational advance of this age. If such hopes are realized, the social results may prove to be of incalculable value. Over a million young people are usually attending some form of voluntary post-school education in England, or were doing so before the war. But I fear it is one of the obvious weaknesses of all existing democracies that the average adult tends to think that learning is the business of children and students; that he himself has learned as much as ever he need learn and may now forget it and turn his attention to real business.

Besides these more definitely educational bodies, there has been during the present century a remarkable revival in English towns and villages of an interest in music and drama. The Drama League has discovered a quite unexpected talent for acting in the average population, and village competitions in play-acting have become a feature of country life. Since the war, the Government has instituted a Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts (CEMA), which devotes itself chiefly to spreading music and drama all over the country, in villages, factories, air raid shelters, and so on, and a Youth Advisory Council for encouragement of young people in their own mental and physical development and in a spirit of active service to the community.

The other defect is less easy to deal with. We have inherited from the eighteenth century a special system of education for the "upper classes," which means not exactly the rich, but includes those who through inherited culture or tradition or sometimes through particular personal ability are regarded as gentlefolk. They send their boys to extremely expensive "public schools," Eton, Harrow, Winchester, Rugby, and the like, and proceed normally to Oxford or Cambridge. For the clever boys, there are scholarships, that is, money grants to cover or nearly cover the school expenses, awarded by public examination. At the two ancient universities, indeed, scholarships and other forms of aid are so numerous that any clever and well prepared boy can be almost sure of paying his way. The real obstacle to a working-class boy lies in the lack of previous preparation at home or at school. Besides these aristocratic schools and universities there is a vast system of state education, embracing elementary, secondary, and technical schools, either free or extremely cheap, and a number of "modern" universities. This system is rapidly improving, but almost inevitably it has a utilitarian bias and is content with a somewhat lower standard than the first named, at any rate in the more literary and cultural subjects.

The existence of these two systems has naturally produced criticism and complaint. The educational ladder by which a clever boy or girl can pass from one system to the other has been broadened and broadened till it is now spoken of as a highway, though not a sufficient highway. About half the scholars at Oxford and Cambridge now come from secondary schools or small grammar schools and not from "public schools" of the Eton and Harrow type. Still the difference that remains has a certain galling quality about it, and the more ardent democratic reformers have been said to hesitate whether they wish "to abolish Eton and Oxford altogether or to insist that every working class boy shall go to Eton and Oxford." Meantime the wisest line seems to be that advocated by Mr. Butler—to welcome a diversity of system which offers opportunity to the diverse tastes and talents of different boys and girls, but to see that interchange between the different types of school is made far easier and not dependent on what particular parents are able to pay. "There are merits," he says, "in all the different types of education in this country; we must preserve those merits and enlarge the number of those who enjoy them."

War is fertile in illusions. No doubt one of the illusions is that, because we are all making greater efforts toward public service and the attainment of high ideals, therefore the efforts will bear fruit and the ideals be attained. We forget that the effort itself has been called forth by the presence of extreme danger and unwonted difficulties. It is fine that the evacuation problem was so admirably mastered and, in part, its evils actually turned to good; fine that representatives of all the National Education bodies in the country have joined in a Council for Education in World Citizenship to fit young people for the part the next generation will have to play in the building of a co-operative world; fine that, in the midst of our sharp financial stringency, the Government, instead of economizing on education, should have raised its contribution from £41,000,000 to £57,000,000, and that Mr. Butler should be throwing himself with so much energy and careful thought into plans of educational progress. But war, as the old Greek historian puts it, is "a brutal schoolmaster"; it teaches bad lessons and disappoints high hopes. Our great social schemes may be wrecked by sheer poverty. Our bold plans for a co-operative and enlightened world after the war may be swept away by the storms of bitter

hatred nazi atrocities will have left behind them. The democratic cry for more widespread education may turn into a cry for lower standards, or more immediately utilitarian training. Mr. Butler speaks of a suggestion made to him "that we should abolish Latin and introduce a compulsory study of the internal combustion engine instead."

The war itself is full of pitfalls and unforeseen dangers, and the same applies to all efforts toward the building of a "better world" that are made during the war. All may fail, but looking on from outside as an old teacher and once for some time a member of the Board of Education, I should say that, in the matter of education, the Government, the teachers, the administrators, and a large part of the public itself, have risen to meet the call of the time with an energy and intelligence deserving success.

An Editorial

OPEN ALL DOORS NOW!

IT is four months since December 17 when the United Nations issued a declaration denouncing the crimes of the Nazis in murdering the Jews—four months, 124 days to be precise, between the declaration and the opening of the British-American Conference on the Refugee Problem in Bermuda. On the basis of the most conservative estimate that 2,000 Jewish men, women, and children are murdered each day (in addition to untold thousands of non-Jews), Hitler has killed off a quarter of a million helpless human beings between the expression of pity and the commencement of action. Meanwhile, there have been mass meetings and protests, spectacles and prayers, and pages of advertising in a reluctant press—all calculated to awaken and move a callous world. Such is the state of affairs at this moment. The question is how long will it continue and how will it be changed?

There are certain elements in this situation which are almost too obvious to mention, yet they must be stated as clearly and as forcefully as possible. First, when it is a matter of life and death, conventional procedures and diplomatic punctilios cannot be scrupulously observed. Those who are responsible for action must make their decisions and take measures as quickly as military leaders do on the battlefield. Each day's delay represents thousands of victims in Hitler's slaughter pits and asphyxiation chambers. Secondly, the Conference will be a futile and cynical gesture unless these immediate measures are all-embracing. All doors must be opened now! Political considerations, reasons of state, immigration quotas, and all other considerations which may receive attention in normal times must be disregarded for the duration of the emergency. There is room everywhere for the unfortunates who can still be saved; room in Turkey and Switzerland, in the United States, Canada, and the countries of Latin America; in Australia, New Zealand, and even in China; and most definitely, there is room to spare in Palestine where these refugees are heartily welcomed.

If humanity today has advanced beyond that savage condition in which for 2,000 years the blood lusts and neuroses of the animal called man were satisfied by the persecutions and massacres of Jews, this is the time to prove it. The British and American delegates at the Refugee Conference are not merely the representatives of their countries; they are the spokesmen of mankind—particularly of the peoples of democratic nations. As such, they have the right and the power to make demands on every country in the United Nations. This right and power will be recognized even in neutral countries. They must demand that all doors be opened immediately, that all possible means of evacuation, transportation, and settlement be utilized. They must recognize that the numerous difficulties—and of course there are difficulties—can be overcome, even as the problems of war are solved, if they are met with intelligence and determination. They must realize that it is their duty to provide havens of refuge.

PLANS
FOR THE FUTURE

Although when founded in 1934 the National Planning Association did not envisage war in the near future, its purpose was sufficiently far-reaching to embrace that contingency. "The aim of the National Planning Association is to use our knowledge, experience and foresight in the development of workable plans for dealing with the future," it declares. "Fear and confusion disappear if we know what we face, what we want, and how we can best reach our goals. The guiding principle of the Association is the achievement by democratic means of the highest possible material and cultural standard of living for the whole people."

The manner in which these objectives have been directed to post-war planning is the subject of the thirteenth of our series of articles. Readers will find it interesting to compare these proposals with the plans of the British counterpart of the N.P.A., which we published in our December issue.

XIII—The National Planning Association

NATIONAL BOARD OF TRUSTEES

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RECOGNIZING that a total war effort can only be developed by clarifying the principles and goals for which we are fighting, the Association at present sees as its main function: "to analyze the war effort, to help define the emerging problems of the post-war period, and to put forward suggestions for solving them." This main purpose has two goals: (1) "The Association, in particular, seeks to explore specific opportunities for economic expansion with a view to developing jobs and markets. A vigorous post-war program of employment and production is the only means of permanently defeating Hitlerism." (2) "Only through the joint efforts of management, labor, agriculture, and Government can private and public programs which support and sustain each other be devised."

The work of the Association consists of research, group discussions, and the issuance of a series of "planning pamphlets" as well as a monthly public policy digest. These present new facts, correlate existing information, or indicate political and economic developments.

Economic aspects are emphasized in "Guides for Post-War Planning" (November, 1941), which is not an official statement but a condensation of the views of many individuals and groups concerning "the building of a society so strong spiritually and materially that it will never again be subject to such an attack as

we face today." Two conclusions may be said to express the American point of view: "One is that depression and chronic unemployment are undesirable conditions. The second assumption is that by organized, concerted national effort it is possible to prevent, or at least mitigate, these undesirable conditions." The purpose of planning for the period to follow that of a strictly defense economy is to guarantee "that we consume in one way or another all that we are capable of producing. There must be no potentialities of unused savings, no lack of investment opportunities. If we remove the fluctuation in the rate of investment we shall be ridding ourselves of the major cause of depression." Of the two principal proposals often made—the market guarantee program and a government investment program—the study reports that both "seek means of stimulating the largest amount of activity by private enterprise."

The Association emphasizes in this report the importance of maintaining decent living standards by strengthening our social security system "in order to insure that the economically weakest in our society shall share properly in an increasingly prosperous nation." In this economy of prosperity, labor "in the sense of organized workers in industry, extractive enterprises, and elsewhere," has a special stake. In respect to agriculture, the problem is to produce and distribute plenty: "We must continue to expand our efforts to conserve our soil, we must bring better housing conditions and labor saving devices to our farms, and we must make certain that our rural population shares with the rest of us in advancing standards of living."

It is recognized in this pamphlet that a war economy brings special complications. The new productive facilities developed during the war will be in excess of peacetime needs; some will have to be written off as defense cost, but much will remain which will be quickly and easily convertible to meet the demands of the post-war era. "By and large American private initiative can be relied upon to make the conversion, *provided* there is an effective, sustained demand for goods. For that reason the government program for full peacetime production must be started immediately. What is more, the long-range goals must be clearly formulated and *expressly stated,* so that private effort will know what to expect and can plan accordingly."

In the international scene, this economic program can only be carried out, according to the Association's recommendations, by positive American participation in the maintenance of peace. The United States cannot win the peace by withdrawing from world affairs but must conduct an offense against the forces that destroy peace. "No single force in the world has more to do with causing war than insecurity and poverty. National prosperity is not enough; we cannot be unmindful of the need for world prosperity. Otherwise we may find ourselves periodically arming to defend our land. . . . There may be a time immediately after the war when we shall export abroad regardless of imports. Motivated by humanitarian considerations we shall want to help feed the populations of devastated war areas, and even assist in the task of physical rehabilitation. Let us understand clearly, however, that we do not expect repayment for such assistance, that we extend our aid because we wish the rest of the world to be prosperous. . . . This, however, may not be enough. We may have to do more. We should at least be prepared to encourage large economic groupings for post-war economic adjustment and development. . . . At the next peace conference a healthy concern for material welfare may help achieve spiritual and political welfare."

Post-War Industrialization of China

ONE of the most detailed and specific of the National Planning Association's studies of the needs of the post-war world is a pamphlet prepared for the Association by Dr. H. D. Fong on the industrialization of China, published in June, 1942. Certain principles are suggested as guides in our efforts to organize the post-war economic development of a new, united, independent, and victorious China. In the first place, an undeveloped China has proved to be and would remain a cause for possible international conflict over the character and source of the control exercised over her, and China herself cannot rest satisfied with the agricultural role assigned to her by Japan or any other aggressive nation. Secondly, international co-operation must take the place of international rivalry in the development of China's industrial resources: "China after the war must find her proper place in the world economy, especially in the economy of southeastern Asia. China, Japan, India, and some new federation or 'Indonesian Union' comprising French Indo-China, British Malaya, Thailand (or Siam), Burma, the Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines, must be brought within the orbit of this southeastern Asiatic economy." A third principle is that foreign investments will be welcome in China's post-war industrialization on the basis of equal treatment and with no infringement of Chinese sovereignty. Finally, a thoroughgoing survey of Chinese resources, conducted by a joint group of Chinese and foreign experts, must precede scientific planning of large-scale development projects.

According to Dr. Fong, any single form of economic organization—socialism, capitalism, or co-operation—will be inadequate to meet China's needs. The heavy industries must be owned and operated by the state, while light industries may well be developed by private capital, both foreign and Chinese, with state regulation of working conditions and other matters affecting public welfare. In this connection, Dr. Fong stresses the fact that, "despite its rapid wartime growth, government enterprise is officially viewed as a means of supplementing private enterprise and by no means as a method of gradually eliminating private enterprise and socializing the economic system." In addition to these state and private enterprises, the system of co-operation will have to serve as the basis of organization for the largest sector of China's post-war economy, since for the predominantly decentralized and small-scale character of both agriculture and industry in China, co-operation "seems to offer the best hope for improvement." The capital for this program "should be entrusted to a government organization for developmental purposes, under the name of China Reconstruction Finance Corporation (CRFC). This corporation could have as its main function the financing of China's post-war industrialization in the three fields of transport and public utilities, agriculture, and industry, by furnishing all or a part of the necessary capital for various projects." Organizations which already exist in wartime China, such as the China Development Finance Corporation, or abroad, such as the China Defense Supplies, can be adapted, co-ordinated, and reorganized in order to supply trained personnel and a working structure for the CRFC to rely on.



When Demobilization Day Comes

AN enumeration of the problems which will confront America upon the cessation of hostilities is made by the NPA in its pamphlet of July, 1942. Foreseeing that the incentive to scrap what we have had to endure during the war may well be overwhelming, the Association warns us that a "mere legal decision to stop wartime controls overnight could scarcely be called demobilization. Its rightful name would be chaos." The practical questions of demobilization of the armed forces, including such matters as dismissal compensation and vocational training for soldiers, and the equally unavoidable problems of demobilization of the war economy and of agriculture are reviewed in the light of solutions resorted to after the first World War and their results. The relaxation and transformation of wartime economic controls is described as perhaps the most important question of all. To prevent an inflation similar to that of 1919-20, it may be advisable to retain the rationing of certain consumer goods until the stocks begin to approach the total effective consumer demand. Wartime controls of raw materials, on the other hand, may have to be switched to favor production of peacetime goods. In short, the pamphlet states, "the measure of success for our demobilization policies might be the speed and efficiency with which peacetime demands and supply displace wartime demands and supply for goods and services."

The international complications of these transitional measures are discussed in terms of the responsibility of the United States toward the rehabilitation of other countries and the repercussions upon our own economy. No specific program is recommended: "To say that we should not participate at all is neither realistic nor necessarily desirable. Our influence and power to assist in rehabilitation will be so great that we can scarcely divorce ourselves of responsibility for the use that will be made of the assistance we shall render. . . . However the United States proceeds, we may expect criticism and all manner of difficulties."

International Development Loans

ENLIGHTENED self-interest on the part of industrially mature nations will, according to a pamphlet published in September 1942, necessitate a plan whereby capital can be made available on an international basis without imperialistic exploitation. It is suggested that an

International Development Authority be established, made up of one member each of a series of national development authorities, to facilitate foreign lending without the connotation of exploitation. Although this pamphlet argues that the world economy after the war will be constructed of national economic units, it insists that "national development in every country in the world, undertaken simultaneously and cooperatively, will provide the expansionary environment in which world trade can be reorganized on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis." National development on the basis of economic isolation will give way after the war to undertakings on the basis of imported capital equipment, and co-operation must be forthcoming on terms which are acceptable to the economically backward areas in the light of their growing national consciousness and their repugnance to colonialism or extraterritoriality.

"Private investors in London, New York, Paris, Amsterdam, and Zurich, after the experience of the last twenty years, will probably not be willing to lend monies in sufficiently large amounts or low rates of interest to enable national development in debtor areas to get off to a good start. The alternative is for governments in creditor countries to guarantee the loans, or to lend the funds themselves.

"The Governments of the countries to be developed will want so far as practical to finance the developments themselves; the principal emphasis in any scheme of development would be domestically recruited capital, materials, and labor. The availability of foreign funds, foreign technical assistance, and foreign machinery, however, will transform the process of national development from one which would threaten to disrupt international economic relations and trade into one which can make a key contribution to the expansion of world income and the reorganization of world trade."

Relief for Europe

THE most recent planning pamphlet dealing specifically with post-war issues, that of December 1942, is the result of group discussions on the subject of international relief. The argument of self-interest is again advanced for American assumption of responsibility for the rehabilitation of Europe. Both politically and economically, the well-being of Europe is our problem: "There can be no real peace until throughout the world living conditions are bearable, and the idle have a chance to perform useful and satisfying work." Distinguishing two periods to succeed the end of fighting, the transitional period and the long era of general reconstruction, the pamphlet points out that no sharp line of demarcation can be drawn between the two: "Relief and reconstruction comprise one process, in which 'relief' will predominate at first, and later, reconstruction. By definition, the transitional period is the phase in which pure 'relief' will be an important if not a dominant consideration; a time when some external or international relief agency must be responsible for seeing that the hungry are fed, that the naked are clothed, that the sick are made well, and that life is again made tolerable."

In sketching the type of organization advisable for the administration of relief, the pamphlet points out three basic assumptions: (1) Relief and reconstruction should be tendered to all countries needing help, and the degree of need will be the sole criterion. (2) Relief and reconstruction are distinctly fields of governmental activity; private agencies will be utterly incapable of solving the problem. (3) There should be planning for relief on a world-wide scale, with a single administrative authority.

"The term 'international' is used in a thoroughgoing sense. Besides implying representation for the United States, England, China, and Russia, it means including all nations who contribute supplies. It signifies likewise the inclusion of Belgium, of Yugoslavia, of France, and of all other recipient countries as well, including Germany, and other ex-enemies, if they be in need of relief."

A number of reasons are given for advising broad international control. The most important reason is psychological: "No nation, however small and poor, wants to be dictated to, especially at the end of a war which presumably is being fought to end dictatorship. Each country has a right to be heard and to hear." International control will also be more efficient: "For example, a decision concerning relief supplies to Belgium would more likely be sound if a Belgian were in the body making the decision." A third reason is political: "It is inevitable that large supplies of food in a starving world will constitute a tremendous potential weapon. 'Food will win the war and write the peace' is no exaggeration. Such a weapon ought to remain in international hands." Finally, international organization is more consistent with the ultimate purpose of relief than any other arrangement: "We have seen that relief must be part of reconstruction. Now the absolute essential of reconstruction in Europe is international collaboration. The reorganization of agriculture, the restoration of continental and trans-oceanic shipping, the resettlement of populations, and all other great tasks of the

transitional and reconstruction periods can be solved only by international co-operation, and they are all tasks that must be initially tackled by the relief agency."

Urging the use of previous experience and existing machinery, in addition to the experienced personnel that private relief organizations will be able to provide, the pamphlet remarks that the history of relief after World War I shows that business and relief do not mix: "It seems probable indeed that the notion of specific repayment for relief supplies will be discarded. Compensation will be in the form of world healing, in which we all have an interest. Every nation can take part in relief, for all have something to contribute either in goods or services. All those resources should be considered as a pool, and the allocation regarded as a multilateral, reciprocal lend-lease arrangement." Precedents of value are found in existing machinery for international co-operation such as the Lend-Lease Administration, the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements, and the International Wheat Agreement. In addition, an over-all international relief agency must be created now, in advance of the peace. "The first days of peace must bring relief for Europe, if the victors are to prove that democracy can win peace as well as win wars."

EDITORIAL COMMENT

LIKE Political and Economic Planning in London, the National Planning Association in Washington demonstrates the service which can be performed by a private agency operating for the public good. The emphasis upon group discussion by experts and the freedom from official ties give a flexibility and scientific detachment which inspire confidence in the results.

In most of the findings of the Association, emphasis is placed upon economic aspects of the society to come. So long as the proposals remain in the paper stage, they appear conservative; it is only in imagining them translated into actuality and impelled by social forces that we can call them bold. The reiterated emphasis upon private enterprise as the basic system of post-war economy, with governmental enterprise undertaking only what is too big or too risky for private hands, and the clearly stated belief that post-war organization will, with few exceptions, follow national economic groupings—are undoubtedly the result of efforts to keep a tight rein upon revolutionary imagination. Too tight a rein, however, may prove to have been mistakenly opportunistic; for, once the principle of planning is accepted, far-reaching changes must be expected and must, therefore, be reckoned with in advance by planners.

We heartily endorse the demands for economic planning on a world-wide scale and for recognition of the ultimate impossibility of prosperity in isolation and the proposals for a fundamental change in approach to the problems of the peace. The argument that America's self-interest will dictate relief without exaction of repayment will need all the support which enlightened public opinion can give it now, before reactionary political and financial interests begin to assert openly the old motives of profit.

In view of the danger that conservative forces will sabotage economic plans at the peace conference, all agencies which concentrate exclusively upon economic development programs may be seriously limited in effectiveness. The National Planning Association will do well to consider the political influences necessary to support its proposals. Moreover, an extension of its studies to cover problems of Latin America and Europe is desirable to make effective the principles of planning for a world-wide economy. This Association operates with an awareness of American modes of thinking and has power to influence our thought. It must, therefore, give new attention to the political aspects of post-war world organization which the American public will have to face in the near future.

THE UNDERGROUND REPORTER

Belgian Resistance

March 15, 1943

RESISTANCE to the invader in Belgium has recently assumed the aspect of total war. This increase in Underground activity has been provoked by the mass deportations of laborers to Germany.

Belgium's glorious Underground tradition dates back to 1914-18. Throughout that first German occupation, the invader never succeeded in stopping publication of those patriotic periodicals which placed the chiefs of the *Kommandur* at the head of *their* subscription lists.

Now underground veterans, aided by an army of young apprentices, have resumed the dangerous work. Illegal periodicals appearing in Belgium are among the most diversified and best-prepared publications in Europe's clandestine press. There are more than 150 in the country, including satirical journals and magazines for women. Nor does this figure take into account the vast number of periodicals published for the youth of school age. The best known of these is *Le Boche,* printed and edited by the pupils of a school in Brussels. The existence of such a large number of periodicals directed to specific categories of the population constitutes the main difference between the present period and that of the first World War. In addition to the papers just referred to, there is one for the peasants, *Le Paysan,* one for lawyers, one for teachers, etc.

National unity in Belgium is being achieved through movements of resistance which touch the Walloons as well as the Flemish: the array of secret Flemish journals has enraged the Hitlerians and their collaborators, who had hoped to turn internal dissensions to their own uses. The University of Ghent, which had supposedly become a center for separatism, favoring the "New Order," has instead remained a center for Belgian patriotism. Despite complaints from collaborationists that the students are "imbeciles who cannot understand the new currents of history," university periodicals have become an expression of that spirit of independence which the Nazis have not succeeded in breaking.

Generally, throughout Europe, periodicals of resistance are distributed free of charge. Necessary funds are obtained from active members, sympathizers, and the governments-in-exile. In Belgium, supplementary income is derived from a widespread sale of the Underground publications. The system governing contributions is most ingenious. Instead of signing with his name, each person who makes a contribution signs with a quotation. This signature is subsequently published in the paper, as proof that the money has reached its destination.

For the sake of self-protection, the Underground movement prefers not to keep a record of names. Instead it has numbered codes and carefully-chosen hiding places for its subscription lists. *La Libre Belgique,* organ of a large patriotic organization, has many subscribers and issues renewal notices regularly. These do not indicate the cost of a subscription; this depends on the income of the purchaser. *Le Peuple,* organ of the Belgian Workers Party (Socialist) sells for one franc. Careful selection of sales agents has reduced to a minimum the danger of being caught by the Gestapo. Nevertheless, the delivery-sales-purchaser trio does not know where the paper comes from.

The Underground's most important duty is to safeguard the printing establishment; occasions when the Germans have been able to lay hands on the presses or on the Mimeograph have been exceedingly rare.

Recently, nazi agents discovered the location of the secret periodical, *Le Belge*. Almost all of one edition was seized, but the editors evaded the police and, shortly thereafter, *Le Belge* resumed publication. The new edition, better printed, was widely distributed. An editorial entitled, *Le Belge* in a New Skin, exultantly announced its own rebirth. We reproduce part of this issue, including the editorial, on the next page.

We owe our "subscribers" excuses and explanations for having abandoned them for several weeks.

Our 72d number had barely emerged from the Mimeograph when our friends from the Gestapo, whom we always furnished with several free subscriptions, decided to make quick disposition of a large number of copies of our periodical. Their insistence on immediately removing our freshly-printed papers preoccupied us considerably, although it gave us the opportunity to see how well we were thought of in those high quarters.

Since our matrix was destroyed, and only a small proportion of our subscribers were served, we apologize to those fortunate ones if they find in this 73d number a repetition of articles they have already read, although naturally presented in a different form.

Our readers will learn with pleasure that the Gestapo, with their customary clumsiness, succeeded in disarranging our installations, but could not remove our ammunition, that is to say our pens; with their customary bestiality, also, they attacked some innocent people, in the manner described by La Fontaine in his fable, The Wolf and the Lamb: "If it's not you, then it's your brother, or at least some member of your family."



Now, the little incident being closed, we pay homage to our readers and, after a fashion—by thumbing our noses—to our masters and dispossessors.

We have subjected ourselves to great sacrifice. We have obtained the use of an important printing establishment, so that our propaganda—joyfully carried on until now—may continue, but with ever wider scope.

Our readers will appreciate our efforts, and from now on we shall without any doubt be able to offer them a well printed and always lively magazine.

Good Journalism

THE secret press is admirably edited, and this statement holds true even if one reads dozens of publications, large and small. The press, as a whole, makes a point of denouncing traitors and of designating them by name. But, above all, it extols the spirit of resistance and by disputing the German communiqués it gives a truthful picture of the war. In general, the reading of collaborationist journals is intensely discouraged. Those who buy such journals say they merely want to obtain information about food. While the illegal publications reject this excuse, they nevertheless take cognizance of it to the extent of attacking those whose pens are sold to the Nazis.

Every item betraying the bad faith of the official press, every bit of news that could fortify the hope of victory, is picked up by the clandestine press. Here is a typical note, from a paper published in Brussels, headed Confidence Is Dead:

A gentleman, whose name is of no consequence, wrote an article on the birth rate for *Le Soir*. In the effort to prove that the ideas he was presenting were making headway, he wrote: "We are convinced that the future—whatever the outcome of the war—etc., etc."

Those words, *whatever the outcome of the war,* seen in black and white, are simply delightful. They would not have been printed a year ago. They denote more than hesitation; they indicate despair of a German victory. We must add that the censor saw nothing and allowed the text to appear in italics.

At the moment the Underground press is largely preoccupied with the deportation of labor to the Reich. In Brussels, 400 street-car-company employees were sent to Germany; 20 men and 50 women were conscripted at Innovation, a large department store; from the Vandenheuvel breweries 50 laborers were sent to the Reich; from certain factories, 25 per cent of the workers were deported. The nazi military allow the men and women designated for transport across the frontier six hours for the liquidation of their personal affairs. Employers are not allowed to dismiss potential deportees; the Nazis, on the other hand, are free to transport workers from one end of Belgium to the other, depending on where workmen are needed. To top the irony, deportees "retain the right to old-age pensions."

As in France, the Underground movement is waging a passionate war against this man hunt; in protecting those selected for transportation it manifests a genuine national

solidarity. But resistance takes varied forms—from Cardinal van Roey's protest, read in all churches, and the Bishop of Liège's condemnation of the deportations as an "outrage against our patriotism and our dignity as free Belgian citizens," to the physical elimination of recruiting agents. Popular exasperation has reached its peak. Ever since Jules Ravert, Quisling representative of the Office du Travail in Brussels, was assassinated, the other employees have feared for their lives. In a small country it is hard to escape detection for long. Nevertheless, Belgians hope that protest-manifestations in railroad stations and elsewhere, revival of sabotage, and the pressure of public opinion, single-minded in its hostility, will give the invader something to think about.

Prayers and Action

NAZIS accuse the rare Quislings (in Belgium these come from among the Rexists or the Flemish National Socialists) of helplessness before the wave of sabotage and pro-British, pro-American sentiment. The legitimate press itself betrays this state of affairs. A Flemish National Socialist periodical, charging the clergy with Anglophile sympathies, complained, "Each time they see a German plane, the nuns at the school in Melgesdreef, Marxem (Anvers), pray it may crash."

Despite efforts at denunciation, there is no confidence among either the traitors or the Nazis. The chief collaborationists know they cannot count on the minor administrators who—outside of routine work—sabotage every measure aimed against their compatriots. The Germans place no greater trust in the Belgian police, though it has been purged more than once. In Ghent not long ago the nazi chief, Elias, attacked the mounting wave of sabotage

De Vrijschutt

DE TOESTAND

LE BELGE

HAUT LES COEURS

NOTRE SOUTIEN

and terror and appealed to "honest citizens" to collaborate with Germans in repressing it. He asked that terrorists be reported to competent authorities: "When I say competent authorities, I mean German authorities, not Belgian. If you warn the latter, you run the risk of having the information passed back to the criminals themselves."

As a result of the most recent acts of sabotage, fear of everyone and of everything has become chronic. Saboteurs have achieved the ultimate in daring. During the last quarter of 1942 not a day or a night passed unmarked by some act successfully directed against the enemy. Of them all I shall cite only these two:

Presenting a forged authorization from a German official, an unidentified man obtained admission to the railroad station at Luttre. Thereupon twenty masked men who had hidden in the station appeared, revolvers in hand. They tied up the German guard and destroyed eight powerful locomotives, two steam engines, and the large emergency crane used to clean the tracks after a derailment. There is an obvious connection between this act (and others like it) and the efforts of the R. A. F. and of the American Air Force to destroy all rail equipment.

In Liège, a guard in the Office du Travail was attacked and bound by seven unidentified men who broke into the building. After setting three fires, they burned the documents and dossiers pertaining to the workers destined for deportation to Germany.

All Belgium is repeating the words spoken by King Albert on August 2, 1914: "A country which defends itself wins the respect of everyone. Such a country never perishes."

—Translated by
Libby Benedict

The Polish Village

THE first period of the German occupation struck its heaviest blows at the Polish cities rather than the villages. Tens of thousands of Polish peasants were evicted from their farms, but the economic situation of those permitted to remain on their land was relatively good.

The 1939 harvest was unusually large throughout Poland. The war, which wrought terrible destruction in the cities, scarcely affected the rural areas. Money was plentiful. City people sold their belongings to tide them over the war, which they believed would be a short one. Pianos, furniture, furs, watches, and sewing machines flowed from the cities into the villages. Prices for agricultural products were rising. Because the German price-control mechanism did not at first function as efficiently in the villages as it did in the cities, prices of agricultural products rose about 70 per cent while those of industrial products rose only 30 to 50 per cent. The cost of certain agricultural necessities, such as manure, did not rise at all. The village was thus receiving more money for its products and was at the same time able to buy much more with this money than it could before the war.

In the spring of 1940, however, a new regulation was issued, requiring all 1939 crops to be delivered to the district co-operatives and sold at official prices. But it was easy to evade this ruling by declaring that the crops had already been sold, had been destroyed in the war, or that for some other reason they were no longer in the hands of the peasants or landowners. Thus the peasants and the large landowners were able to sell their produce in the black market at high prices.

A new economic period in the villages was inaugurated on July 1, 1940, at the beginning of the economic year. The Nazis began to tighten their control, both economically and politically. The establishment of quotas for the compulsory delivery of farm products was accompanied by political pressure. Mass arrests, firing squads, and deportation to Germany to augment the diminishing nazi labor supply became a matter of deliberate and consistent policy. German administration, crude and chaotic during the early months, was superseded by a more tightly-knit organization. The inevitable German red tape is so formidable, however, that the proverbial "come tomorrow" of Polish administration pales into insignificance beside it. In retaliation for German contempt, Warsaw has coined the ironic expression *"echt deutsche Wirtschaft"* (true German efficiency), to describe the complicated workings of the German administrative machine.

This machine is organized as follows. Each region is administered by a *Kreishauptmann,* whose powers seem to be unlimited. It is difficult to determine whether the local Gestapo is subordinate to the *Kreishauptmann* or whether the reverse is true. But all German officials fear the Gestapo. As for the Poles, the question is of only academic importance. Economic control is exercised by the *Kreishauptmann* through three subordinate officials: the *Kreislandwirt* (the Agrarian Administrator), the *Ernährungsleiter* (the Food Administrator), and the *Forster* (the Administrator of Forests). All these officials are Germans.

The regional Agrarian Administrator, whose chief task is to increase production and

to extract as much as possible from the land and its owners, is invested with the broadest powers. He takes care of general problems of organization and issues directives and rulings, the execution of which is entrusted to the *Bezirkslandwirts* (District Administrators). Every region is divided into two or three districts with as many Administrators. These Administrators have direct control over landholdings of 50 hectares (approximately 123 acres) or more. The smaller holdings are controlled through the local village councils.

These councils have been stripped of their former independence and have become merely the local organs of the centralized economic administration. The bailiff and other officials are appointed by the *Kreishauptmann*. The local quota officer is personally responsible for the delivery of the wheat quota imposed on his community. Agricultural instructors have been assigned to many villages to train the peasants to newer methods in the maintenance and development of farms. Current questions are dealt with at the monthly meetings, at which the *Kreislandwirt* issues instructions to the managers of large estates and to the bailiffs and quota officers. The official language is German, although Polish translations are also given, and usually every speaker tries in his petty way to imitate Hitler's hysterical delivery.

Bribery is potent, and widely practiced at every level; from the nazi point of view, however, the administration functions satisfactorily, for even bribes are powerless to buy exemption from the quota or even any substantial reduction thereof.

Stripping the Land

IN 1940-41, all the great landowners were required to submit their sowing plans and later on they received instructions as to the kinds and quantities of products they were expected to deliver. The village councils received similar instructions. Special local commissions were appointed to take charge of the allocation of quotas among the individual landholders. Generally the bailiff, the quota officers, and several other persons of standing in the community (like ministers or priests or rich landowners) are selected to serve on these commissions—a device the nazis have found extremely convenient for deflecting peasant discontent. Whenever a peasant complains to the German officials that his quota is too high he is told that the commission is wholly responsible for the allocations. Under such conditions the role of the members of these commissions is most unpleasant. Each village is divided into small areas. These are assigned to those individual members who are to enforce the delivery-orders and report recalcitrant peasants as well as those who sell illegally. Failure to deliver the quota is punishable by the confiscation of the culprit's entire harvest and by whipping, exile, and imprisonment.

The method the nazis have adopted to determine quotas completely disregards such essential factors as soil fertility and the way the land is worked. Whether the soil is rich or poor, whether the land is held by a large landlord or divided into small farms, whether it is worked with modern equipment or by the primitive methods of small peasants, the quotas assigned are identical, based solely on the area under cultivation. Consequently the large, well-equipped estates can fill their quotas, whereas the small peasants can meet their quota allotments only with extreme difficulty. The quotas for 1941-42 were, for the most part, impossible of fulfillment.

All surpluses, i.e. all produce remaining in the owner's hands after his quota has been filled and his personal needs deducted, must be delivered to the district co-operative stores, operated under nazi control. The Nazis have further ensured compliance by limiting the amounts of grain that the peasants are permitted to grind for their own use. Cards authorizing the grinding of not more than 330 pounds of wheat per person annually have been issued to each family.

The so-called "maximum" prices paid by the co-operative stores in 1940 and 1941 were 28 zlotys per bushel of wheat and 21 zlotys per bushel of rye. At the same time, the price of a bushel of wheat in Warsaw was approximately 350 zlotys (one zloty amounts to about 19 cents). In the summer of 1940, the Nazis introduced a bonus system. All who delivered their full quotas were granted the privilege of buying gin, alcohol, tobacco, fabrics, shoes with wooden soles, thread, iron, oil, and sugar at prices three to ten times lower than the official average market price.

When the sale of agricultural products in the open market was prohibited, in the summer of 1940, the district co-operatives gained virtual monopoly

of the field. Since that time the peasant has been compelled to sell his entire harvest directly to his co-operative. Certain products, like beets, are sold not to the co-operative itself but through it, so that the co-operative here acts as the sales agent. Moreover, the co-operative is the only place where the farmer can buy all that he needs (seed, manure, farm implements, coal, iron, oil, and the other articles listed as quota premiums). The co-operatives have therefore become the monopolistic centers *(Zentralstelle)* of the economic life of the village. They employ thousands of people and occupy entire buildings.

The contrast between German and Polish farms in Poland is very interesting. Many Polish farms have been confiscated, especially in Poznan, and turned over to Germans. These Germans are primarily interested in making quick and large profits. They invariably sell their produce in the open market and send all the cash back to Germany. They operate the farms carelessly and wastefully, with no thought of the future. The total farm output in the Poznan region has shrunk by about 30 to 50 per cent. Similarly, in the Lublin region, the farms operated by Germans have without exception proved the least capable of delivering their quotas, although these very farms had frequently been among the most efficient and productive when they were run by their Polish owners.

The Daily Routine

IN his daily life the peasant is subjected to much abuse and exploitation. In many respects, he has reverted to serfdom. In winter every owner of a horse and wagon must cart lumber three times a week from the various forest clearings to the mills. Since distances are great, and roads near the mills are usually jammed by peasant wagons lined up to deliver the lumber, each trip takes from twenty to thirty hours. In regions where there are no forests, peasants have to transport stone or clear the roads of snow.

In his economic activities, the peasant is surrounded by numberless restrictions and prohibitions. He is forbidden, for instance, to slaughter a pig without first obtaining permission from the village authorities. In the spring of 1941, huge numbers of cattle were taken from the peasants for purely nominal compensation; each family was allowed to keep only a specified number, sometimes no more than one cow. In Podhale every farmer with herds of goats was required to deliver a specified quota of cheese. There were similar quotas for the delivery of eggs, honey, wax, and other farm products.

German quota regulations are so exorbitant that the farmer could not exist without resorting to illegal transactions. Smuggling and illicit sales have become universal practices. There is not a peasant in Poland today who operates on an entirely legal basis. German control is circumvented by various ruses; and the dangers and difficulties which all share have strengthened the economic solidarity of rural Poland.

Economic oppression has recoiled like a boomerang upon the invader, for whom the farm population harbors a terrible, silent, grim, truly-peasant hatred. People in Poland today do not expend themselves in speech. There is no talk of revenge nor of the mass executions and massacres. The peasant merely says, "The day will come. . . ."

The present mood in Poland is vividly reflected in a story told by a man who recently escaped. He writes:

"I stood with a neighbor in the street of a village. A German infantry detachment marched by, the soldiers confident, healthy, well-fed, secure in their strength and mastery. With clenched fists I turned to my companion. The old farmer smiled with quiet, grim assurance from under his heavy moustache.

" 'Look,' he said to me, 'they have enough food.'

" 'At our expense,' I muttered.

" 'You are impatient,' the old man went on. 'You are still young. It was the same in the last war. But I am tough; even if I must live on nothing but potatoes, I will survive the second war. My wife and children will, too, and so will you, do not fear.'

"But will they?"

Such is the spirit of the Polish peasant. He is tough. He will endure and remain strong. He will live to see a better day.

BOOKS

Post-War Problems and Solutions

THE PEACE WE FIGHT FOR, by Hiram Motherwell. x + 281 pages. Harper; $3.00

THIS TIME FOR KEEPS, by John MacCormac. 196 pages. Viking; $2.00

SLAVES NEED NO LEADERS, by Walter M. Kotschnig. xv + 284 pages. Oxford, $2.75

ANY American interested in the kind of post-war tasks which will confront us should read these books. Nowhere will he find the picture of Europe on armistice day more vividly portrayed than by Hiram Motherwell. John MacCormac writes of the social revolution going on about us even in the midst of war. Walter Kotschnig's volume is an answer to the fascist challenge to education. The "intensive study" and "hard thinking" about the post-war policies of the United Nations, which Secretary Hull has called for, might well begin with these three books.

Mr. Motherwell's book deals principally with the immediate post-armistice period and with the steps which will have to be taken by the United Nations if we are to win "the peace we fight for." Such a peace is envisaged in the statement in the lend-lease agreements that "production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods" are "the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples." That idea must be our guiding star from the moment on armistice day when we answer the cry of the hungry for food to the day when national boundaries and political constitutions come up for settlement. As trustee in bankruptcy for a Europe in a state of social anarchy, the United Nations must provide, alongside the armies of occupation, a civil supergovernment with sufficient authority to start the wheels of European industry and agriculture and to keep them going. The organs of this supergovernment already exist in elementary form in the Inter-Allied Post-War Requirements Committee, Lend Lease Administration, Board of Economic Warfare, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations. The civilian authority developed from these units must concentrate on the administering of key industries and key raw materials sources, procuring essential commodities from abroad, controlling communications by land, water, and air and supervising central banking and credit. Goods moving under the supergovernment's control must cross all political boundaries duty-free.

Ultimately the functions of the provisional supergovernment will be taken over by a successor organization—Mr. Motherwell suggests a Federation of Western Europe. Among other things the federal government (there might even be two or three) would establish a customs union over its territory and would administer jointly the colonial possessions, chiefly in Africa, of its several members. Meanwhile, the other features of the provisional peace structure will have emerged, features based on the idea of pooled interests rather than assumed obligations. They include joint action by Britain and America to maintain peace outside Europe, Russian-British action under their mutual defense treaty against aggression by any other European nation or coalition, solidarity of the Western Hemisphere under a progressive development of the good neighbor policy, virtually guaranteeing it immunity from attack, leadership of free and united China in all east Asia, and joint administration of the colonies in southeast Asia through some federal agency which must include Great Britain, the United States, Holland, China and, ultimately, Japan.

Mr. Motherwell's views on the future peace are bold and ring with conviction. They will be questioned by many and opposed by some. But whether or not he foresees the future correctly, his picture of Europe in fragments is so striking and his statement of reconstruction-needs so sound as to warrant the closest attention. "The Peace We Fight For" deserves wide reading, not only by the people throughout the country but also by officials in Washington. If public opinion sets the limits beyond which officials cannot go, then the American people stand in need of knowing what Europe will look like, feel like, and be like on armistice day.

"This Time For Keeps" is an eloquent appeal to the American people to purge our foreign policy of isolationism and our democratic capitalism of monopolistic and cartel practices. Thus we shall be able not only to win the peace but also channel to the common man the full benefits of the technological revolution through which we are passing. In this

book Mr. MacCormac is not immediately concerned either with European reconstruction or with the lines which the post-war security system will take. Rather, he tries to show how the revolution in technology, carried on under fascist political leadership abroad, became a threat to an America steeped in an isolationist tradition and how a failure to direct technological change here carries threats to the integrity of our democratic government and traditions.

The argument by now is fairly familiar. Both the war and this revolution are world-wide and the latter will go on after the former has ceased. We can win the war and yet lose the revolution. Its trend "is toward the full employment of the world's resources and the devices of modern technology in the interests of an ampler life and a wider opportunity for the common man. The machinery we have made and the skills we have devised must be used to provide jobs and plenty for all who are willing to work." In the process, however, "we must not turn men into machines. We must co-operate for the collective welfare and not coerce." This is possible "neither under Communism nor Fascism." Hence, "we can win our revolution at home and abroad only by professing and practicing a dynamic democracy." Even if fairly familiar, this argument looks toward a wider horizon than was customary before the war. What Mr. MacCormac says may not be new, but it is important and he says it well. Not the least of the book's values is the slogan-title it carries. It is American to the core. One doubts that it could be translated into Russian or Chinese, more's the pity.

More basic in its relation to lasting peace than either physical reconstruction or wise direction of technological change is education. This relationship is harder to define and is less susceptible to analysis precisely because it is more basic. Most people will agree that Russian resistance is stouter because of the Russian educational system; that the faith and fanaticism of Hitler's armies are stronger because of nazi educational philosophy; that Italy's showing in this war can be attributed in part at least to the failure of Mussolini's educational reforms; and that the traditions and outlook of the schools of France, England, and the United States have been in no small way responsible for the performance of those countries under the stress of war. Yet Americans at least are reluctant to appraise our schools in the light of our political and economic isolationism. Perhaps this explains why education as a factor in the present crisis has been largely overlooked and why for every book showing how education can facilitate the achievement of lasting peace there are a dozen or more on how to do it with political or economic measures.

The appearance of Prof. Kotschnig's book is particularly welcome. "Slaves Need No Leaders" expresses his belief that "this war is being fought in the schools as much as on the battlefields, that there are intellectual fronts to be held as well as military positions." In it he surveys the school systems of the main belligerent countries and compares the opposite philosophies of education in Germany and in other Occidental countries as they contribute to the upbuilding of "order" in the one case and "civilization" in the other. He analyzes the impact of nazi rule upon education in the occupied countries, pointing out the different treatment accorded Belgium, Holland, and Denmark, which qualify as "junior partners" in nazi doctrine, and Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Greece, "slave states" who "need no leaders." His analysis of the German character in the section on the re-education of Germany focuses light on the most baffling post-war problem which the United Nations will have to face. The complexities of the German character, among other things, cause Mr. Kotschnig to conclude (a conclusion with which Mr. Motherwell agrees) that retribution should be ruled out of the final settlement with Germany. He recommends the setting up immediately of an international educational authority, provisional in organization and duties, but one on whose foundations a permanent organization can be built. Ultimately, the control of education will be returned to the redeemed peoples themselves. The extent of this control will indicate the duties of the permanent authority.

Post-war problems are so many and so vast that it is too much to expect adequate treatment of them all in any one volume. For this reason books which deal with single subjects probably are of more value than others in advancing our thinking and understanding. All three of these volumes do this, but the first and last do it especially well. By reading and reflecting on them the education of the American people will proceed apace.

DONALD C. BLAISDELL.

BLUEPRINT FOR VICTORY, by Homer Brett. 215 *pages. Appleton;* $1.75

Written in white heat after our first reverses in the Pacific, this book is a plea for the concentration of forces in that area for the defeat of Japan before taking on the Nazis. Now that this question is again being considered by Allied leaders, Mr. Brett's book will be of value to those who wish to be informed on the less popular side of the controversy.

War and Society

ECONOMICS IN UNIFORM: MILITARY ECONOMY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE, by Albert T. Lauterbach. x + 282 pages. Princeton, $3.00

THIS study is concerned with the social and economic impact upon industrialized countries of peacetime armament and wartime mobilization. Military economy, as the author points out, is not identical with war economy. It comprises two phases—pre-war economic preparedness and war economy proper. Even the Western Democracies have always interpreted the term in this wider meaning. (As far back as 1931, the United States drafted an Industrial Mobilization Plan which provided for pre-war measures of armament production.) Nevertheless, the German and the Anglo-American concept of military economy were originally diametrically opposed. The English-speaking countries were anxious "to minimize the disturbing economic consequences of both national and foreign war preparations and to save the national economy any abnormal interference that could possibly be avoided." Only under the pressure of actual war did they abandon their "business as usual" attitude. In Germany, on the other hand, the requirements of military economy superseded from the outset all other considerations.

Dr. Lauterbach is, however, careful to point out that the Anglo-American attitude should not be condemned as altogether criminally negligent. A country can pursue an all-out military economy only if it knows when it is going to war; it cannot be maintained indefinitely. Germany knew when she was going to strike—she operated on a "fixed-term" policy; the Allies, on the other hand, who had no aggressive designs, could not base their preparations on a definite time schedule.

The author surveys nazi and allied military economy in great detail. Ideological and structural differences are traced back to their historical and sociological roots. A highly informative chapter, "Idea of Military Society in Germany," a brilliant essay in itself, pictures nazi *Wehrwirtschaft* as the climax of a century-old development. American military economy, in turn, is interpreted as the product of our own characteristic attitude toward military and economic problems.

Of the many pertinent conclusions Dr. Lauterbach draws from his findings, only one may be mentioned here—his reinterpretation of the concept of "war potential." The war potential of a country is not just its resources, as the Western Democracies liked to think before the war, but only "those essential factors of modern warfare that can be mobilized at the same pace as that at which an emergency may arise." In this interpretation the term is no longer a technical, but a social concept.

In a concluding chapter, Mr. Lauterbach outlines the probable trend of our post-war economy. He expects that in search of economic security we shall have to abandon all thoughts of an early raising of our standard of living. This would be in line, it may be added, with an attitude predominant ever since the Great Depression: A safe job at low pay is better than an insecure job at high pay. Hitler knew it and capitalized on it for his own purposes. We should not shrink from using it as a stepping stone to a better world.

ANDREAS DORPALEN.

Report from the Pacific

GUADALCANAL DIARY, by Richard Tregaskis. 263 pages. Random House; $2.50

BATTLE FOR THE SOLOMONS, by Ira Wolfert. 200 pages. Houghton Mifflin; $2.00

RICHARD TREGASKIS began his diary on Sunday, July 26, 1942, while on a transport in the Pacific, bound for a destination still unknown. On August 7, the convoy which he was accompanying as a war correspondent discharged its marines onto a Guadalcanal beach, thus beginning our first decisive step in the long march toward Tokyo. It was a difficult step, but it was a step that had to be made. Mr. Tregaskis remained on the island until September 26, finally departing in a B-17 after seven weeks of mud, insects, snipers, bombing, shelling, and all the variations of bitter life and sudden death of modern jungle warfare. In the early part of October, Ira Wolfert, another war correspondent, reached Guadalcanal in a Flying Fortress just as a Japanese task force was attacking. He remained there through November. What these two men have written, taken together, comprises an informative and moving record of some of the blackest days of the war.

The two accounts, of course, supplement each other chronologically, but it is interesting to note that they supplement each other in another, more fundamental way: in the matter of style. "Guadalcanal Diary" indicates an effort to capture through a reportorial or even historical method the military, psychological, geographical, and sociological facts of life on the island; while "Battle for the Solomons" is sim-

ply a series of rough inspirational word drawings, done furiously and in a remarkably vivid and earthy idiom—drawings which are obviously a compilation of some of Mr. Wolfert's dispatches.

On the whole, I prefer the Tregaskis book, for the reason that it accomplishes completely and thoroughly the only thing that such books can adequately accomplish: to give the reader a large sense of having lived through the experiences described. The prose is unrhetorical and unmelodramatic, except for occasional lapses, and the reader is thankful to the author for not intruding his silhouette in the way of the facts. It is certainly lamentable that Mr. Wolfert did not concern himself more with facts. He did, however, remember to do what Mr. Tregaskis seemed to forget. He summarizes and interprets and gets a feeling of the whole.

"This generation of kids," he writes, "the so-called 'soft' generation, 'softened up,' according to experts, by this and that, WPA, boondoggling, youth administrations, automobiles, labor-saving devices, and so forth, had a chance to prove themselves." Prove themselves they did. And they did more. Mr. Wolfert reports that they have communicated to the natives the essence of American democracy. He writes: "There is not going to be any repetition of British experiences in Burma on these islands, because the American boys squat right down with the people and teach them what they know and learn what the natives know." Elsewhere he adds: "Incidentally, one of the most heartening aspects of the war in this remote corner of the world is that wherever American boys go, they win over the natives to their side, not by any planning or propaganda, but simply by being Americans, meaning democratic, willing to sit down with the natives in their huts, admire their prowess, learn their arts, and share their knowledge."

CHARLES NEIDER.

ECONOMIC UNION AND DURABLE PEACE

by Otto T. Mallery

A sound, constructive and realistic proposal by which nations may unite economically *without* sacrificing sovereignty. Based on an amplification of the Hull Reciprocal Trade Agreement program. "A practical formula for making international organization workable and enduring."—FELIX MORLEY. "All who cherish democratic ideals and realize that skillful planning is necessary to make them safe for the world should read Mallery's book with care."—DR. WESLEY C. MITCHELL, Director, *National Bureau of Economic Research.* $2.00

HARPER

THERE GO THE SHIPS; by Robert Carse. 156 *pages. Morrow;* $2.00

FIREDRAKE, by A. D. Divine. 251 *pages. Dutton;* $2.75

There is an economy in the writing about the sea which no other subject seems to call for. Simple and forthright ideas find expression in sharp and concise language. Both the professional writer and the professional sailor seem to be affected by the elemental directness of their subject.

In the plain monosyllabic words of an able seaman in "There Go the Ships," we get the salty story of an American convoy which set sail for Russia through the Arctic Sea. Most of the ships arrived. What they went through to get there is a heroic saga that loses none of its interest and thrill in the telling.

Completely different is the story of the one million miles which H.M. Destroyer "Firedrake" covered from the icy waters above the Arctic Circle to the tropical seas of Africa. It is the tale of patrol and maneuver and attack as well as defense. It has more detail and more action; but on the whole, it has less of life. The difference lies in the fact that this is the story of a ship; the other, of the men who sail them.

QUEEN OF THE FLAT-TOPS, by Stanley Johnston. 280 *pages. Dutton;* $3.00

This is by all odds one of the most breath-taking books yet to come out of this war. The Queen, of course, is the aircraft carrier, "Lexington," and Mr. Johnston has told the story of her life and death in a hard-hitting piece of reporting that leaves nothing to be desired. The unique feature of the book is that it is a first-hand account; Mr. Johnston was on board the ship, and his careful description of the working of the great vessel and the play and work of the sailors who manned her

gives the layman a clearer picture of the role of the carrier than any other such book which this reviewer has seen. Illustrated with excellent photographs.

PEACE AND BREAD, by Ludwig Grein. 128 *pages. Dorrance;* $1.00

This record of a youth spent in the Germany of the first part of the twentieth century could be summarized in the words of the ballad: "Ain't it all a bloomin' shame!" Mr. Grein has written a sincere account to remind us that Germans have been poor, have suffered and in suffering held to many of the ideals in which we believe, and that many of them have struggled in vain against the Prussian tyranny. He is not a practiced writer.

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY DURING THE WORLD WAR, by Charles Seymour. xv + 427 pages. Johns Hopkins Press; $3.00

The second printing of this well-known volume comprising President Seymour's 1933 Albert Shaw lectures at Johns Hopkins is a timely event. Now when we are once more plunged into a struggle which is so reminiscent of the first World War, popular interest in President Wilson and our 1917-1919 diplomacy has undergone a remarkable revival. This volume has been supplemented in the decade since its first appearance, but it has not been superseded, and it will find many new readers. The bibliography has been brought up to date.

THE ARMY MEANS BUSINESS, by Herbert Corey. 297 *pages. Bobbs-Merrill;* $2.75

Mr. Corey is an experienced hand at reporting, and he has turned in a first-rate account of the organization problems of the new American Army. Although the book is primarily a study of the army, necessarily a large part of it is devoted to the matter of supply, and some of the best and most graphic chapters are really studies in industrial conversion. There is much praise and little criticism, but the story is one which justifies such a conclusion. The book deserves, and will undoubtedly have, wide reading.

PEOPLE OF POROS, by Peter Gray. 325 *pages. Whittlesey;* $3.00

There is a nostalgic element in this story of a Greek island village, the effects of which are heightened by the knowledge that the primitive, but by no means simple, life led there has now been disrupted by sadistic conquerors.

We Cannot Escape History

By John T. Whitaker

"'We Cannot Escape History' is one of the best books by a foreign correspondent I ever read. It combines in splendid measure the great virtues of utter freshness and utter realism. This book ought to be indispensable for the education of American public opinion at this time."—JOHN GUNTHER. $2.75

A Latin American Speaks

By Luis Quintanilla

"He tackles the trouble that lies between South and North America in forceful brilliant style . . . North Americans should welcome his provocative and arresting book. It tells much of the enormous gift that Latin America has for the future of democracy." —*N. Y. Herald Tribune.* $2.50

Vichy Two Years of Deception

By Léon Marchal

"The most penetrating analysis yet presented of the complex factors in the tragedy of France from the Spring of 1940 through 1942 . . . Americans who want an authoritative close up of France's collapse both as to personalities and events can't afford to miss this book."—*Philadelphia Inquirer.* $2.50

The MACMILLAN COMPANY
60 Fifth Ave., New York

THE WORLD OF THE FOUR FREEDOMS

By SUMNER WELLES

These selected wartime addresses by the Under Secretary of State are a weapon in the war of ideas, a heartening statement of the purposes for which we fight and the kind of peace we hope to win. $1.75

THE TRAGEDY OF EUROPEAN LABOR 1918-1939

By ADOLF STURMTHAL

A political history of European labor during the eventful period between the two world wars, and a keen analysis of the reasons for labor's failure to defeat fascism. $3.50

BUSINESS AS A SYSTEM OF POWER

By ROBERT A. BRADY

A challenging study of business organization and the political, social, and economic power it wields. Foreword by Robert S. Lynd. $3.00

Columbia University Press

A Check List of Forthcoming Books on International Affairs

JAPAN'S WAR ECONOMY, by Ray Cromley. Macmillan. The economic aspects of daily life and the strengths and weaknesses of Japan's industrial organization, including sidelights on the Japanese character and psychology and why Japan must be taken seriously.

BRAZIL IN THE MAKING, by Jose Jobim. Macmillan. An introduction to Brazilian industry and commerce giving the background of facts important to all who will trade with Brazil now or in the years following the war.

THE NEW EUROPE, by Bernard Newman. Macmillan. Information drawn from official sources and the considerations which must be weighed in determining practical boundaries for the Europe of the future from the standpoint of history, physical geography, economics, language, religion, ethnic lines, and the sentiment of the population.

BALKAN FIREBRAND, by Kosta Todorov. Alliance. Autobiography of a statesman and diplomat, a leader of the Bulgarian agrarian party and now head of the Free Bulgarian Committee.

FOUR FREEDOMS FOR ASIA, by Sydney Greenbie. Appleton-Century. The Four Freedoms as the people of Asia see them, how they are trying to solve the problems of aggression, what problems of want prevail, what their religious problems are and whether they have a desire for freedom of speech and press.

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY; Shield of the Republic, by Walter Lippmann, Little, Brown. A summary of the author's view on the foreign policy of the United States covering a period of thirty years.

ACTION CAN WIN IN '43, by Max Werner. Little, Brown. A book on military prophecies by the author of "Military Strength of the Powers" and "The Great Offensive."

WILDCATS OVER CASABLANCA, by Lt. M. T. Wordell and Lt. E. N. Seiler. Little, Brown. An action picture of the North African invasion.

THE FIGHTING FRENCH, by Raoul Aglion. Holt. A story of the army of patriots who are the Fighting French beginning with De Gaulle's rejection of the Vichy Government; a record of the men and women who organized for liberty and victory in the face of defeat and death.

Among Ourselves

To the Editors:

The appeals of five different organizations whose principal objective is leading the people of the United States to intelligent support of peace through world government reached my desk at the same time, a time when I happened to be concerned with paying my income tax.

I would like to support all of these important causes, but picked out one, FREE WORLD, to receive my financial contribution because this organization seems to be closer to the vital problems than any of the others. I suspect that it is closer because it is literally an international organization, composed of people of many countries.

Without knowing anything of the conditions under which these organizations operate, I would like to suggest that they make realistic their urging of co-operation in a United Nations by themselves uniting into a nucleus for United Nations action.

There seems to be little overlapping of function by the various organizations so that, like the United Nations, union may give strength without the loss of individuality. Offhand it would seem that FREE WORLD and *Common Sense* should aim at more different types of interested citizens, while *Foreign Affairs* should be the scholars' journal. At the same time, the Foreign Policy Association's excellent little Headline Books should be reaching with the help of the others a larger number of words-of-one-syllable citizens. Research might also be unified. The Commission to Organize the Study of Peace might lead off, while organizations like the Council of Pacific Relations would represent their own special area. In the field of "action-now" the Post-War World Council could offer useful leadership.

There would be lots of reasons why such a union would be impossible. One is reminded of sitting on the sidelines at the Disarmament Conference, and will remember that the only delegation that came to the Conference to disarm was Russia. The others all knew too many reasons why it could not be done. How utterly naïve to do the thing one is organized for, by simply taking a step in that direction. What friction of personalities, what demotion to less exalted titles, what resignations. Clearly the big organization is for others.

There are so many reasons for uniting! Most important of all, it will give substance to a disembodied idea. Here are Americans, British, Chinese, French, Germans, Russians, and many others asking to swear allegiance to the United Nations. The impression of the United States doing this might offset the fact that the whole world knows that the U. S. Senate does not know what it wants to do. It would be excellent practice for the brilliant writers on co-operation to struggle with the problem of bigness.

Of course the first thing that such an organization would do would be to invite a prominent Chinese to sit in its inner councils. Russia might learn to be communicative by practicing with an unofficial representative. Perhaps some of the post-war battles could be fought sooner by including both business men and brain trusters in the economics section. What a chance to break ground, to experiment, to show the way.

I am serious about this! I hope that you will be also!

DONALD B. WATT
Putney, Vt.

[The Editors of FREE WORLD and the leaders of the Free World Association agree heartily with Mr. Watt's suggestion. There are over twenty organizations in addition to those mentioned by him which ought to be united in action, as they are in basic purpose, for the reasons he gives and for a hundred others equally valid.]

To the Editors:

Have you any suggestion to make as to how the people, of whom there must be many, who feel very strongly that we *must* carry out the proposals adopted at the Madison Square meeting, can make their feeling known? Of course the Jews should not have to make the appeal. We should all rise up as one man and *demand* in no uncertain terms that measures be taken at once. Long ago it should have been done; *now* there must be no delay. This country should offer sanctuary to all who can get away from Europe. We alone have the space and the resources. It is a pity we have lost the generosity I thought we had at one time—long ago now. I have hung my head in shame ever since the episode of the S. S. "St. Louis."

LOUISE A. ELSWORTH
Penn Yan, New York.

To the Editors:

I have at hand your good letter of March 25 asking for financial support of your FREE WORLD undertaking, apparently in view of the fact that I had given you a trial subscription. However, I hope that you will not be misled by the generous response which you have received to date, because if it were to be judged by my case it would be based on curiosity rather than on unqualified support. I do feel that you have a tremendous opportunity before you, but this opportunity carries with it a certain respon-

sibility which is liable to be abused by your contributors if not by yourselves.

The very title of your journal, FREE WORLD, suggests something to many people which they have never had and something which they never will have, because it would mean a certain form of license with more or less freedom from responsibility. Frankly, the kind of personal freedom which led to the fall of our so-called "beloved France" is not the kind of freedom in which I happen to be interested. I am quite aware of the fact that you may have had a need for a certain enticing title for your publication, but I think you will agree with me in the end that it also carries with it many dangers.

Therefore, I am obliged to inform you that my subscription must be considered entirely in the nature of an experiment. If your conception of a free world is one in which the resources of the United States should be scattered far and wide without the assumption of corresponding responsibilities by Great Britain, Russia, and other countries, then I am sure you are due for a very rude awakening. As a matter of fact, the thing would become a question of whether a free world is not to be considered an enemy rather than a friend of our country. It is merely a question of time before the public will be in a position to decide. I hope that you will justify the position which all loyal Americans will expect of you and that you will not succumb to those extreme visionaries like our Vice President Wallace and his ilk who scarcely know whereof they speak.

Wishing you much luck, and waiting to be shown, I am,

HARRY STEENBOCK,
Prof. of Biochemistry
Madison, Wis.

Even a trial subscription ought to be sufficient to indicate to Professor Steenbock that FREE WORLD is indeed among the "ilk" which he calls "extreme visionaries like our Vice President Wallace." It certainly ought to be enough to clarify certain points about which he is sadly confused. First, it was not any kind of "personal freedom" which led to the fall of France. It was the betrayal of "beloved France" by the enemies of every kind of freedom which brought about her collapse. Secondly, FREE WORLD insists that freedom is inseparable from democracy, which imposes responsibilities of citizenship on every individual, and that neither freedom nor democracy can be completely realized anywhere until they are both assured everywhere by a universal and democratic federation of nations. And finally, the idea that "the resources of the United States should be scattered far and wide without the assumption of corresponding responsibilities by Great Britain, Russia, and other countries," is a product of Goebbels' Mind—and it is a product for "foreign" consumption. That it is offered seriously as a "conception of a free world" merely proves how successfully nazi propaganda instills an isolationist attitude. Nothing could be farther from the aims of FREE WORLD or of Vice President Wallace. We are at one in our constant advocacy that all the nations, without any exception, recognize their obligation to constitute a healthy and happy world organism. That is a sound concept, whether judged by historic, political, or bio-chemical principles.

To the Editors:

I hope you will find room for the enclosed poem. If you print it, it may be that those responsible for last week's executions in Madrid will think, and if they will think, will, perhaps, not be so liberal with their execution. My inspiration was Franco and his bloody hands, so often washed in the Holy Fountain Pillar.

The Anvil and the Hammer

"The Seeds of Mercy are forever bearing fruit." Executions four years after a civil war ends Are not seeds of Mercy.

The Anvil and the Hammer had a quarrel one day;
The hammer pounded the anvil mercilessly upon its head.
Easy, my brother hammer! Remember when I am old and rusty,
They'll melt me into many hammers; then I'll pound you as you pounded me this day.
Out of my melting body, replied the anvil, new hammers will be cast.
Then I'll pound you steadily, steadily as long as you last,
When out of many hammers such as you a new anvil will be cast.
You now are up, and I am down; consider myself your brother.
Remember you and I are from the same father, the same mother.
Have mercy on the son of your father, so he will have mercy on you.
Always follow: "Do unto others as you wish others to do unto you."

MANUEL F. SUAREZ
New York.

WHO'S WHO IN THIS ISSUE

With becoming modesty we accept congratulations for having obtained *SIR NORMAN ANGELL'S* commentary on current events as a regular feature. We trust that all FREE WORLD readers who have had a taste of his ideas in these pages will read *SIR NORMAN'S* recent book, "Let the People Know," and, conversely, that all the 450,000 buyers of his book will continue to read him by subscribing to FREE WORLD —a fair exchange is no robbery.

As an economist and author, *MERRILL K. BENNETT* has directed his energies almost entirely to the study of food and related problems. Fifteen years spent with the Food Research Institute of Stanford University, of which he has recently been appointed Executive Director, have established his authority on this subject. We look forward to the sequel to *Food for Europe; Seven Questions,* in which the deliberations of the United Nations Food Conference will be discussed.

HAROLD E. DAVIS, Professor of History at Hiram College, has specialized in Latin American questions. He has recently spent six months in Mexico, Guatamala, and El Salvador to investigate at first hand political developments there. He has frequently contributed to the *Bulletin* of the Pan-American Union and to the *Hispanic American Historical Review.* Some of the background for *Mexican Sinarquism* will be found in Ovidio Gondi's article, *La Hispanidad in Hitler's Service,* which appeared in the June, 1942 issue of FREE WORLD.

ALFRED KANTOROWICZ, a foreign correspondent for the *Vossische Zeitung,* has devoted much of his energy toward keeping the world conscious of the nazi crimes against civilization. In 1933, when he escaped from Germany, he helped to found the Library of Burned Books in Paris and became director of that cultural center of the war against fascism. He is also the founder and permanent secretary of the League of German Writers-in-Exile. In this country he has contributed much revelatory material about Germany to current periodicals. His *Strategy of Anti-Nazi Propaganda* was published by us in March, 1942, and *The Third Front* in February, 1943.

It is in keeping with the tradition of English classical scholars that *PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY,* famous translator of Greek dramatists, participates actively in the public affairs of his nation and of the world. *PROFESSOR MURRAY* is President of the International Institute for Intellectual Co-operation and Co-President of the League of Nations Union. Among his books on political and social subjects are "The Ordeal of this Generation," "Faith, War and Policy," and "Liberality and Civilization."

CONSTANTINE PANUNZIO, a native of Italy but a citizen of the United States for many years, is now Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles. He was co-founder of the Mazzini Society, is Honorary President of the Los Angeles center of that organization, and is active in the Free Italy movement. As a specialist in population growth, he is a member of the governing boards of several national associations dealing with migration. He was designated by the New York's World Fair as one of five hundred persons belonging to American minority groups who have made "outstanding contributions to American culture." Among these are his books, "The Soul of an Immigrant," and "Immigration Crossroads."

Recently in the public eye as the recipient of the letter from Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles explaining the policies of the State Department, *RALPH BARTON PERRY* has for thirty years been noted as a Professor of Philosophy at Harvard whose interests went far beyond the campus. In 1935, "The Thought and Character of William James" won him the Pulitzer Prize for biography. At present *DR. PERRY* is Chairman of American Defense, Harvard Group, and also of the Universities Committee on Post-War International Problems.

In conformity with Navy regulations, *LEONARD REED,* Ensign in the United States Naval Reserve, informs us that his article reflects his private opinions. His statements are not to be construed as official or as reflecting the views of the Navy Department or of the Naval Service at large. Before he enlisted in the Naval Reserve, *ENSIGN REED* was doing administrative work at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, checking against their practical application the academic theories learned as a graduate student in Public Administration at the University of Alabama.

DR. JACOB ROBINSON is well qualified to draw discerning distinctions among various minority group problems and to point out the bearing of basic principles of political theory on the complex political, economic, ethnic, and racial questions that must be solved. Until

May, 1940, he was a practicing lawyer in Lithuania. As a member of the Lithuanian Parliament, he was leader of the minorities bloc and chairman of the Jewish fraction. He served as Lithuanian Counsel in both the Council of the League of Nations and in the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Hague. He is now Director of the Institute of Jewish Affairs and Associate in International Administration at Columbia University.

SIGMUND SKARD first wrote his poem *Colored Cavalry,* in Norwegian. It was published in his volume of war poems, *"For Norge."* Recently the author made his own translation which retains all the strength of the original. *DR. SKARD* was Assistant Professor of Comparative Literature at the University of Oslo and Chief Librarian of the Royal Norwegian Academy until three weeks after the German invasion of Norway. He is now Consultant at the Library of Congress.

HENRY TORRES is a Paris attorney famous over the past twenty years for his defense of such notable figures as Germaine Berton who assassinated the head of the Camelots du Roy; Colonel Macia (in the affair of the "Catalan Plot") who was later to become President of Catalonia; and Samuel Grynszpan, the youth who killed the Secretary of the German Embassy in Paris in 1938—and was delivered to the Germans by Vichy. From 1932 to 1936, *MR. TORRES* was Vice President of the Committee for Foreign Affairs in the Chamber of Deputies. When the Franco-German Armistice was signed, he slipped out of France on a British boat and landed in Africa. One of the few important political figures to escape the vigilant surveillance of General Noguès, he finally reached this country in the summer of 1941. Quite naturally he is, in his own words, "an ardent supporter of General de Gaulle."

Readers of FREE WORLD will recall the informative articles on the Far East by *H. G. QUARITCH WALES* which appeared in the June and August issues last year. *MR. WALES,* Director of the Greater-India Research Committee, is an orientalist who has for eighteen years engaged in travel, study and archaeological research throughout India, Burma, Thailand, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and French Indo-China. From 1924 to 1928, he was in the Thailand Government Service. He has been lecturer in Siamese at the University of London. After two years on special advisory duty with the Indian Army on the General Staff at Delhi and in Malaya, he arrived in the United States early in 1942. His book, "Years of Blindness," just published, is a study of the changes which are revolutionizing the East.

MR. WALES suggested that we get the opinions of a Buddhist scholar concerning his analysis of the situation in the Far East. We naturally turned to *MR. LIN YUTANG,* member of our International Honorary Board, whose article, *The War About the Peace,* created such a stir when it appeared in FREE WORLD last June. He graciously provided us with an interesting commentary.

LIEUTENANT MICHAEL WILLS tells us of the most important recent event in his life in *The Speech of Henry Wallace.* He is a young Californian who spent some time in France, writing and painting; at present he is stationed in Fort Eustis, Virginia. Obviously his article is a personal reaction and does not state the official point of view of the War Department or the United States Army.

QUINCY WRIGHT, Professor of International Law at the University of Chicago, is a member of our International Honorary Board and of the Executive Committee of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace. His latest and major work is the two volume book, "A Study of War." In January, 1943, we published his essay, *Responsibilities of the United States in the Post-War World.*

AHMET EMIN YALMAN, who thirty years ago came to America to take his degree as Doctor of Philosophy and Sociology, returned last fall as a member of the Turkish press delegation. Since 1923, he has been Editor of the daily *Vatan* in Turkey. During the first World War, he was a correspondent in Germany. In 1919, he was exiled by the Sultan to Kutahia and in 1920, to Malta by Allied authorities for taking sides with Mustafa Kemal. Two of *DR. YALMAN'S* books have been published in the United States; they are "Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by Its Press," and "Turkey in the World War."

About the essay that we publish this month Professor John Dewey wrote: "I have read nothing since the war began that has presented so much sober and serious truth as is contained in it. In spite of the failure of the last peace, we are still indulging in a great deal of wishful thinking, and the end of the war is all too likely to catch us unprepared for that kind of peace for which the great mass of the peoples of all nations are longing. . . . The transformation that Turkey has undergone is evidence, as you point out, that in spite of the difficulties in the way, a transformation may be brought about in world conditions."



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In the same issue . . .

Ernest K. Lindley

Brilliant Washington correspondent and commentator, begins his monthly articles reporting and analyzing men and events in the capital of the United Nations. They will be a regular feature of FREE WORLD.

Among notable contributors to forthcoming issues

H. V. Evatt
Minister of External Affairs of Australia

Lin Yutang
Chinese Philosopher

Gaetano Salvemini
Italian scholar and foe of fascism

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